

ER 60-5219/a

16 JUL 1960

card
Mr. B. Boyd Hight, Jr.
Chairman
Duke University Symposium Committee
Box KM, Duke Station
Durham, North Carolina

Dear Mr. Hight:

Thank you for your letter of June 24th and the copy of 'The U. S. -Soviet Conflict.' From the record of the symposium it is evident that your student group had an informative and stimulating discussion of this major world problem. I am passing the booklet to some members of my Agency who will be interested in reading the papers presented by the guest speakers.

Your enterprise in organizing the kind of program reflected in 'The U. S. -Soviet Conflict' is most commendable. Well-informed citizens will be one of our most important assets during the critical years which lie ahead.

Please accept my best wishes for the success of future symposia sponsored by the Duke University Committee.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Retyped: O/DCI/JSE:ji

Allen W. Dulles
Director

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/s/ Robert Amory, Jr.

Deputy Director/Intelligence

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12 July 1960

Comments on "The U.S. - Soviet Conflict"

"The U.S. - Soviet Conflict" contains the lectures delivered by Professor Frederick Schuman of Williams College, Professor Merle Fainsod of Harvard University, and Mr. Thomas Whitney during a symposium organized by a student group at Duke University, 6-8 October 1959.

The talks of the guest speakers presented analyses and conclusions that they have expressed in books and articles. In view of the then recently concluded Khrushchev visit to the United States and trends in the USSR, Professor Schuman was generally optimistic about the future course of U.S. - Soviet relations, stating that: "Unless further mistakes and miscalculations are made, the Cold War will be ended by a series of diplomatic settlements during the coming year or years . . ." Professor Fainsod was more cautious about appraising developments in the USSR as conducing to a relaxation of tensions. Mr. Whitney described Soviet economic advances as a serious challenge to the United States. His second talk was an account of the Khrushchev visit. The guest participants amplified their views during discussion periods, in which several members of the Duke faculty joined.

It is suggested that Professor Fainsod's talk on "The Conflict: Directions of Development" (pp. 28-31) and Professor Schuman's on "The Cold War: A Problem of Power" (pp. 43-55) contain the representative opinions of the two speakers. The rest of the material in the booklet is familiar to intelligence officers concerned with Soviet affairs.

prepared by D.D./I

Duke University Symposium Committee

BOX KM, DUKE STATION
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA

60-5219

Box KM, Duke Station
Durham, North Carolina
June 24, 1960

Mr. Allen Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The "U.S.-Soviet Conflict" was the title of a three-day Symposium held at Duke in the autumn of this past year. The Duke Symposium Committee, in its first annual presentation, invited three distinguished guests to take part in the discussion: Professor Merle Fainsod, Director of Harvard's Russian Research Center; Professor Frederick Schuman, the controversial and stimulating Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College; and Mr. Thomas Whitney, a journalist of wide experience who had just completed coverage of the Khrushchev visit.

In presenting programs such as the "U.S.-Soviet Conflict," the Symposium Committee, a student-inspired, directed, and financed organization, is attempting to accomplish two objectives simultaneously: first, to provide a background of information or thought about a particular topic or problem, and, second, to provide a focal point for intellectual stimulation and further study. Next November, for example, the Committee will present "Post-Christian Man," an exploration and exposition of the values of twentieth-century man, including such speakers as Will Herberg and Walter Kaufmann.

As someone with a particular interest in and knowledge of the "U.S.-Soviet Conflict," you might be interested, we thought, in examining the published transcripts of last year's program. Please accept a copy, then, with our compliments. We should receive with interest any criticism you might have of the program.

Yours truly,

B. Boyd Hight, Jr.
B. Boyd Hight, Jr.
Chairman

THE U. S. - SOVIET



A SYMPOSIUM

**Duke University
Symposium Committee**

"THE U. S. SOVIET CONFLICT":

A SYMPOSIUM

Dr. Merle Fainsod - Harvard University
Dr. Frederick Schuman - Williams College
Mr. Thomas Whitney - Journalist

October 6-7-8, 1959

Sponsored by THE DUKE UNIVERSITY
SYMPOSIUM COMMITTEE

SPEAKERS

Since having been graduated from college, Dr. Fainsod has been teaching political science at Harvard University. He has also served in an advisory capacity for several governmental agencies, including the Office of Price Administration and the Retail Trade and Service Division. Author of several books, Dr. Fainsod last year completed Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, a study of the transformations of Soviet society as viewed through the events of one city. His recent work has centered around the Russian Research Center at Harvard, of which he is the director.

Dr. Schuman - world-traveller, author, broadcaster, and journalist - has taught at the University of Chicago, Harvard, Cornell, Columbia, and California, and currently holds the Woodrow Wilson Professorship of Government at Williams College. During World War II he was Principal Political Analyst of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission. His most recent work on the U.S.S.R., Russia Since 1917 (Knopf, 1957), was displayed this summer at the American Exposition in Moscow, but was placed under glass to prevent visitors from reading it because it "violated elementary principles of courtesy and hospitality."

Mr. Whitney has specialized in Soviet affairs for twenty years - ever since he graduated from college. He worked for the Office of Strategic Services for three years on Russian materials during the war. In 1944 he became Chief of the Economic Section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He remained in Moscow for nine years - and from 1947 to 1953 was a Staff Correspondent of the Associated Press in Moscow. In 1953 he joined the Foreign Desk of the AP in New York and at present is a free lance journalist, writing interpretive articles for the American and free world press on Soviet and general world affairs.

NOTE: In order to preserve the flavor of "The U. S. Soviet Conflict" Symposium, verbatim transcripts of the addresses as they were originally presented have been preserved on the following pages.

CONTENTS

SEMINAR:	"The Conflict in Ideology".....1
	Prof. Frederick Schuman
PANEL:	Prof. John Hollowell, Prof. Merle Fainsod, Prof. Glenn Negley
ADDRESS:	"Soviet Change Since Stalin: Its Impact on the U.S.".....15
	Prof. Merle Fainsod
SEMINAR:	"The Conflict: Directions of Development".....28
	Prof. Merle Fainsod
PANEL:	Prof. Frederick Schuman, Mr. Thomas Whitney
ADDRESS:	"The Cold War: A Problem of Power".....43
	Prof. Frederick Schuman
SEMINAR:	"The Economic Race for World Supremacy".....59
	Mr. Thomas Whitney, Prof. John Curtiss
ADDRESS:	"The Khrushchev Visit"..... 71
	Mr. Thomas Whitney

"THE CONFLICT IN IDEOLOGY"

Tuesday Seminar

Opening Remarks: Prof. Frederick Schuman, Williams College

Panel: Prof. John Hallowell, Duke University

Prof. Merle Fainsod, Harvard University

Prof. Glenn Negley, Duke University

Moderator: Boyd Hight, Symposium Committee

Moderator: This afternoon's seminar is the first scheduled event of the three-day Symposium on "The U.S. - Soviet Conflict." You will find the schedule for the rest of the Symposium in the program which you received.

It has become trite to say that this is an age of crisis. In fact, much discussion has centered on the selection of the most important problem. The suggestions have been numerous: the problem of economic survival, the problem of race, the problem of freedom or the lack of it. But certainly no problem is more timely, particularly on this campus, than the problem of U.S. - Soviet relations or, as we have chosen to title it, "The U.S. - Soviet Conflict." Khrushchev has just left and in the late spring Eisenhower plans to return his visit, and just a month or so hence Russian students will visit Duke. The discussion we are about to begin, then, comes at a most propitious moment.

In order to provide a basis for the rest of the program, this afternoon's seminar is a discussion of the conflict in ideology. Our participants are Professor Frederick L. Schuman, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College; Professor Merle Fainsod, Director of Harvard's Russian Research Center; and two Duke specialists in political theory, Professor Glenn Negley from the Department of Philosophy, and Professor John Hallowell from the Department of Political Science. Professor Schuman will open this discussion with a statement to the topic; and, after this opening, other members of the panel will comment. Toward the end of the seminar, questions from the floor will be in order and are encouraged. And now we will begin this afternoon's seminar with Professor Schuman.

Prof. Schuman:

Dear Mr. Moderator, dear distinguished colleagues, dear fellow-students and fellow-teachers and friends: I begin by saying what goes without saying, but what I will say nevertheless, namely, that it is for me a great privilege and pleasure to be with you today and beyond today, and a double privilege and pleasure to be accorded the honor of opening the first program of the Symposium. Whether it will be in any sense either a pleasure or a privilege for you to be here with me is quite a different question on which occasionally I have doubts, but I will not anticipate so early in our proceedings what the answer to that question ought to be. When this program was planned, it was suggested that I talk for about fifteen minutes as a basis for discussion. It is, of course,

dangerous ever to invite a professor to talk for fifteen minutes, because, as you have discovered, professors always talk for fifty minutes. In this case the danger is a double danger, because I spent part of the summer teaching in the state of Washington on a class schedule of sixty-minute hours instead of fifty-minute hours. However, I have confidence that the moderator will find ways and means of stopping me at the appropriate moment.

I cannot now anticipate whether the members of the panel, or all of us together, will arrive at any consensus of views with regard to what we are calling here "The Conflict of Ideologies." But it does seem to me that this way of approaching our topic and our problems may prove to be a helpful one in a sense of enabling us more accurately and more effectively to identify, as it were, the enemy or the antagonist in the recent Cold War, or the competitor in the years of peaceful co-existence which perhaps lie ahead. I think it rather important that we identify our rivals with as much accuracy as possible, because wrong identifications are frustrating and dangerous. I take as a text for this particular observation a passage from one of my favorite books on world politics which reads as follows:

'Very true,' said the Duchess, 'flamingoes and mustard both bite, and the moral of that is "Birds of a feather flock together."' 'Only mustard isn't a bird,' Alice remarked. 'Right, as usual,' said the Duchess. 'What a clear way you have of putting things.' 'It's a mineral, I think,' said Alice. 'Of course it is,' said the Duchess, who agreed very cheerfully to everything Alice said, 'There's a large mustard mine near here. And the moral of that is "The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours."' 'Oh, I know,' exclaimed Alice, 'it's a vegetable. It doesn't look like one, but it is.' 'I quite agree with you,' said the Duchess, 'and the moral of that is "Be what you would seem to be," or if you want to put it more simply, "Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you have been would appear to be otherwise."'

No doubt you will agree that mustard can be rather dangerous if incorrectly labeled and wrongly identified. Communism is surely much more dangerous and certainly more difficult to label correctly and to identify rightly. So great is the difficulty that a great number of us over the years have been more or less content with slogans, catch-words, and clichés. Many of us have found it easy to say and to believe, for example, that Communism is totalitarianism, that Fascism, which many of us a generation ago also failed to identify correctly, is also totalitarianism; and, therefore, Communism is Red Fascism, or more simply, Communism is Fascism. According to Euclid, you will all recall, things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. I think this is true in mathematics, but I doubt very much whether it is always true in human affairs and in politics. I think one must make an effort, at least, to make some further distinctions and discriminations in these matters.

We have been assured for a good many years now that Communism can best be understood by equating it with the incarnation of evil or with Anti-Christ.

I recall about a decade ago, President Truman, in a press conference, said that Communists are liars. This would be helpful if all Communists were liars and all liars were Communists, but if this is not quite the case, then there are some difficulties. But, at the same time, the then Attorney General of the United States in another press conference said that all Communists are rodents. That makes the problem very simple, because then all you have to do is call the exterminators, you see. I suspect, however, that the zoologists and the taxonomists might have a little difficulty with that formulation and might contend that some confusion had developed as to the species involved.

Let me suggest to you that to approach Communism precisely as an ideology, as a creed, as a belief-system, as a cult, may enable us to understand more correctly the nature of our antagonist and the fundamental characteristics of the Communist challenge or menace than some alternative procedure. I'm going to call it a cult or a creed or a belief-system. I don't think I'd choose to call it a religion, although some of us have done so, as you know, I'm sure. Bertrand Russell argued some years ago that Communism, or Marxism in its current form, is the fourth of the Judaic higher religions, by which he meant, I take it, that it was in part derived from the Jewish-Christian tradition. But more concretely, he seems to have meant that all of the higher religions, or most of the higher religions, of Judaic-Christian origin always have in their symbolism the figure of a bearded prophet. They always have a sacred book, which everyone refers to but no one ever reads. They always have a galaxy of heroes, saints, and martyrs. They always have an apocalyptic vision of some ultimate disaster or catastrophe which, however, in some strange way is going to be the means to salvation. And Marxism in its contemporary form has all of these symbols in abundance. The figure of the bearded prophet is, of course, Marx himself. The book that nobody ever reads is Das Kapital. The heroes, saints, and martyrs are numerous. The ideologically begotten son of Marx was Lenin. Stalin the Terrible was Saint Paul and Saint Peter rolled into one. The present Pope is Khrushchev, who, however, modestly subordinates himself sometimes to the College of Cardinals ----.

Well, one can make these analogies. Our friend, Arnold J. Toynbee, has argued more seriously that Marxism, particularly in its Twentieth Century form of Communism, is the major Jewish-Christian heresy of our age, meaning that it has Jewish-Christian components in its belief-system and in its value-system, that it is derived from the Jewish-Christian tradition. But it is nonetheless a heresy in many respects, which Toynbee, in his usual verbose fashion, points out for page after page in his Study of History. If I may, I shall not refer to the enemy ideology here as a religion, but only as a cult or a creed.

I do not know at the moment whether you in the audience desire the members of the panel here on the platform to elucidate or discuss the specific components or elements that make up the Communist cult or creed and that make up the liberal democratic cult or creed. I'm not going to take time to try to do that now. I would really talk an hour and fifty minutes if I tried to do that. I will only say that if one enumerates the various items or elements in the Communistic

belief-system, and examines them critically, then it becomes rather simple to demonstrate that they are almost all of them wrong; they are incorrect; they are inadequate; they are inaccurate; they are unhistorical; they are false, in short. You can demonstrate rather easily that Marxism is psychologically wrong, sociologically wrong, historically wrong, that it is wrong as a system or doctrine of economics, that it is wrong as a contribution to political science, as a theory of the state, and that it is wrong as a philosophy of dialectical materialism. But don't be misled or deceived by the ease with which one can refute Marxism. This really has very little to do with the problems we face. Refuting Marxism is a little like giving up smoking. According to Mark Twain, "Giving up smoking is the easiest thing in the world. I've done it hundreds of times." So Marxism has been refuted hundreds of times and this has little or no effect on the faithful, or on other people for that matter. I think it was one of the early church fathers who said, "Credo quia absurdum," which, very loosely translated, means that the true test of faith is to believe what is absurd. And this is as true of the Marxist faithful as it is true of other true believers.

I think the more important question for the present and the future is the question of what is the actual or potential market for Marxism in its contemporary Communist form. If we can say anything about the market, about the appeal of this cult or creed, maybe we can acquire some insight into its future prospects. Similarly, what is the present prospective market for the liberal democratic creed on a world scale? It seems to me on the basis of experience thus far, and indeed on the basis of the very logic of the situation we have met together to analyze and consider, we have to think of the market for contemporary Marxism as consisting primarily of the impoverished, the exploited, the degraded, the desperately poor people of the world. Marx himself assumed, as you know, that in the Western capitalist countries the so-called proletariat would become larger and larger, and poorer and poorer, and more and more exploited, degraded, and impoverished; and, therefore, more and more susceptible to conversion to a revolutionary creed or cult of salvation. In this Marx was obviously completely wrong, as I suppose Nikita Khrushchev began to suspect in the course of his travels here recently.

But unhappily it is still true that the desperately poor of the world, the impoverished, the exploited, the degraded, are very numerous in the world at large, very numerous indeed. And they include many people outside of the frontiers of the Red Empire or the Communist bloc as it is now constituted. If we, who are disciples of the liberal democratic faith, are not more active in the years to come in developing what we choose to call the underdeveloped countries, and are not more effective in raising living standards in these areas of the globe, we shall continue to face the risk of a possible extension of the area of the Communist ideology and Communist power beyond the present lines of demarcation. But we shall not, in my judgment, really face the danger of any universalization of this ideology or this system of power, because its market is precisely limited in the way I have tried to suggest. There is no

market for Communism to speak of in communities where people are highly literate and prosperous and regard themselves as middle class rather than proletarian.

If one takes the view, which I choose to do, that the universalization of the Communist ideology is for this reason, among other reasons, an impossibility for the future, I suggest that, if we think about the matter, we will have to take the view that the universalization of the liberal democratic ideology on a global scale is also an impossibility in the predictable future. The market for the liberal democratic ideology, in order to become a world market, would have to be a market in a world in which most of the people of the world were literate, prosperous, and were healthy, wealthy, and wise. That time is still far off. So the prospects would appear to be that instead of either of these rival and antagonistic ideologies becoming universal or global, they will more and more continue to be competitors in bidding for the support and affection particularly of the world's poor, of the great masses in Asia and Africa, and perhaps even of Latin America, still living on the margins of subsistence.

Is this good or bad? Is this dangerous or hopeful? I put it to you that on the whole this is hopeful rather than dangerous, and that all parties involved will stand to benefit from competition or rivalry of that kind. I put it to you further (and I see that the Chairman hasn't told me to sit down yet, but I'm going to sit down in just a moment), that the competition or rivalry between the Marxist or Communist ideology and the liberal democratic ideology can also be, and will, in my judgment, in fact be a hopeful, creative, and constructive thing within the Free World itself and within the Communist bloc itself insofar as this rivalry or competition summons people on each side of the line of demarcation to live up to their professed beliefs and ideals, instead of merely talking about them. We should all be better human beings, I'm sure, in America and throughout the Free World, if in fact we were challenged to live up to what we profess to believe about human dignity, human liberty, racial equality, and all the rest of our ideals. And if the Communists could be challenged really to live up to their best and highest professions of a social and economic order of dignity and equality, they should be better off for that; and those they rule over should be better off; and all mankind should be better off for it. So I look forward, you see, rather optimistically to the future of the conflict of ideologies. My distinguished colleagues here may take a very different view of the matter. I hope they do, so we can argue about things. Thank you very much.

Prof. Hallowell:

I think that it is easier to identify Communism as an ideology than Professor Schuman apparently does, since we have the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and most recently the speeches of Khrushchev. And I think these give us a clear picture of the ultimate objective which the Communists have in mind---namely, as a maximum objective, world domination and the establishment of a world socialist republic with headquarters in Moscow. I see nothing in recent history to suggest that they have abandoned this goal. As far as the appeal being simply to the poor and the downtrodden, of course, there is a

great deal of truth in this; but, the Communists would like to turn such middle-class countries as France, Italy, and Germany into Communist countries, if possible. If they haven't been able to do so as yet, it isn't, it seems to me, because the Communists have been reluctant to do so, but because of the defense which the Western powers have established, the resolution they have shown to defend Western Europe by force of arms if necessary. When it was possible through coups d'état and economic and political pressures and fifth-columns to take over middle-class countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the Russian Communists showed no hesitation. I suggest that the line of demarcation in Europe is there not because of any unwillingness or lack of desire on the part of the Russians to change it, but rather because of our resolution to defend it, if necessary, against further aggression.

I wish that Professor Schuman had emphasized that there are significant differences between their way of looking at things and ours. As he said, the only trouble is that it would take more than five or ten minutes to delineate these differences. But I'd like to mention the fact that they don't believe as we do, although we don't always live up to it, in the existence of any absolute principles of morality. For this reason, they have no moral compunctions about lying if this means will serve their end. We may lie, but when we do we have a bad conscience about it. We do have some standards by which we are able to judge our own actions, to criticize our own government and to criticize the foreign policy of our government. I doubt if the Communists adhere in their ideology to any absolute system of morality in terms of which they can be critical, or if the people have any opportunity to be critical, of the morality of their domestic or foreign policy. They have no standards in their ideology that tell them that it is wrong to lie when they do. Certainly, Harold J. Laski is not noted for being biased against the Soviet Union or Marxism, yet this is what he said in 1948:

"The passion for conspiracy, the need for deception, the ruthlessness, the centralized and autocratic commands, the contempt for fair play, the willingness to use lying and treachery to discredit an opponent, to secure some desired end, complete dishonesty in the presentation of facts, the habit of regarding temporary success as justifying any measure, hysterical invective by which they sought to destroy the character of anyone who disagreed with them, these have been the normal behavior of Communists all over the world."

These are the words of a man who was sympathetically disposed to Marxism as an ideology.

Prof. Fainsod:

I had thought when Professor Schuman finished his presentation that the conflict had been resolved and we could adjourn this conference. Professor Hallowell has reminded us that perhaps there are some issues which are not so easily resolved. But before we leave Professor Schuman's presentation, we should

be grateful to him for suggesting that the Soviet challenge, the Marxist appeal in the underdeveloped countries, should serve as a reminder of conscience and a reminder of responsibility to us of a great deal of work to be done in this area--- work to be done in fulfilling our own aspirations. Indeed, I suppose one could go on to say, and this may be in part what Professor Schuman had in mind, that to the extent that the underdeveloped countries are in a position to benefit, both from the aid which is made available to them from the Soviet side and from our side, provided they are able to maintain their independence, this kind of competition for their loyalty may serve as a stimulant to their own development.

I think where I got off Professor Schuman's train was the assumption that I thought was implicit in what he said that this kind of peaceful assistance on the Soviet side was an end in and of itself. I would assume that it represents a stage toward a different end, that it is designed not merely to win friends but also to lay a base for ultimate political penetration and for the realization of their ultimate ideological world vision, that is, a world that is essentially Communist.

And here I think there is an important ideological difference between us. I take it we are not really looking toward an American world, at least I hope we're not. I take it that our objectives are plural, that is to say, that we are looking forward to a kind of world in which different systems persist. It may worry a few of us that Mr. Gaitskell may win the election in Britain, but I don't think it worries most of us terribly whether Britain be under a Labor Government or under a Conservative Government. This we regard as a kind of choice that the British have the right to make. And our concern, it seems to me, with the underdeveloped countries, with India for example, is not that we want India to be precisely like America, but rather that we want India to be independent; we want it to be stable; we want it to be viable; we want it to meet the needs of its own people; and that's all we want. I take it the Soviet objectives extend beyond this.

Prof. Negley:

I agree completely with Professor Schuman that preliminary to excitement about a conflict of ideologies it is sensible to understand what ideology you think you are having a conflict with. I'm not sure that we have been quite clear about this. For the abbreviated purposes of this short discussion, I would like to suggest four points which I think were basic and essential to Marxist philosophy, suggesting that these are no longer held by the philosophers of the Soviet States; I think there is a very important distinction and difference.

The first point concerns the description of the dialectic as historical process. This dialectic contained oppositions and antitheses in terms of economic classes. This is essential. Without this there is no Marxist philosophy. Unless the historical process is interpreted as developing conflicts due to the differentiation of economic classes, then the whole structure of Marxist philosophy collapses. The second tenet predicted the autonomy of administration in

the new society that was to come. There was to be no bureaucracy. As a matter of fact, Marxist philosophy used "bureaucracy" as a symbol of bourgeois politics and legal theory. The third principle was that of the transition to the new society by revolution. The existing machinery of the state had to be smashed. There was no other way to do it. The Bolshevik Marxists were quite clearly opposed to any kind of evolutionary, peaceful development of the new state. Fourth, there was never any suggestion of compromise between these two political systems. There was to be either one or the other. These four principles all fit together.

By contrast, let us look at the contemporary philosophy of the Soviet state, as expressed in their own writing: In 1957 the editor of a Polish philosophy journal wrote a long article on the necessity of re-examining and re-interpreting Marxist doctrine in terms of recent and contemporary events in historical progress. This article was very bitterly attacked by two writers in a Soviet philosophy journal which, I think, more than any other could be considered to have the official imprimatur of Party policy. After a rather scathing indictment of the Pole for suggesting a change in Marxism, we have this summary by these two writers, which I would like to read to you, reminding you again of the four points that I have made: "In the past fifty years a whole series of tenets of Marx and Engels have been re-examined in the light of the changed historical situation. Marxism has been enriched by the Leninist theory..." Now I want to stop right here. I'm not interested in semantic swapping. If they like to say 'enriched,' I'm perfectly happy to accept the word. I would say "revised"; but revisionism is heresy. "Marxism has been enriched by the Leninist theory of the building of socialism first in one country." This is a transfer, a complete change of the interpretation of dialectical process from one of economic classes to one of the opposition of states, not the opposition of classes. "Second, the discovery by the Russian proletariat of Soviet rule as a form of dictatorship of the proletariat." Well, here again we won't ask semantic questions about how the Russian proletariat "discovered" this. The main point is that Soviet rule was substituted for, or is taken as a form of, the dictatorship of the proletariat. We know Soviet rule is bureaucracy. Russia is developing one of the tightest bureaucracies of any country in the world at present. "Third, by the theory and practice of a non-capitalist path of development of economically backward peoples towards socialism." To be sure, we have the word "non-capitalist" here, but note the expression, "path of development." Not the transition by violence, by revolution; not that they wouldn't encourage violence and revolution if it served their purposes, but they are prepared to accept a "path of development" of economically backward peoples, and this fits in very closely with the emphasis of the previous speakers on economic aid. And finally, "...by the theory and practice of combining the general democratic and socialist liberation movements." This was elaborated by Stalin in a little book, The Foundation of Leninism, better than in any other place--- the willingness to enter into an alliance with democratic movements within these countries in order to achieve the final goal of socialist liberation. About the kindest thing Lenin had to say about people who advocated things like that was to call them opportunists, which was anathema. This writer goes on to say, "No one will ever call this

revisionism." I think this presents a very interesting historical circle. I don't think it makes the Soviet state any less an opponent. Quite the contrary, I'm much more concerned about this philosophy than I am about Communism. I agree with Professor Schuman that Marxism is too easy to answer---just too easy. It falls apart at the seams as a philosophy. This philosophy does not. Do you recognize it? It's the Hegelian state, not a Marxist state in any sense. I think that we might clarify our conflicts about ideologies if we were more clear about the real nature of Soviet philosophy rather than to accept their professed ideology of Marxism.

Moderator: Professor Schuman, the comments so far have been, to a degree, adversely critical. Perhaps you would like to answer some of them.

Prof. Schuman:

All of you are already well aware that I have already talked much too long. My colleagues here are much more modest in this matter. You will also be disappointed to learn that I find myself in hearty and enthusiastic agreement with practically everything that has been said. So I don't think we have anything to quarrel about here. That's too bad because quarrels are always interesting and exciting. But let me, if I may, make a few comments on certain points that have been brought up thus far in the discussion.

I would quite agree with Professor Fainsod that the political or ideological motivation of Soviet aid programs to poor countries is not altruistic, or unselfish, that all these programs are means to an end beyond merely the end of winning friends and influencing people. They are means to an end of diminishing American prestige and influence in these areas, and they are means to the ultimate end, which is an article of faith on the part of all the true believers, of universalizing the ideology.

I had a little difficulty with what I took to be the implied proposition that American economic aid to underdeveloped countries is an end in itself or, at least, aims merely at a pluralistic world rather than a monistic world. I'm sure it does. But I have a little bit the impression that if we look back over the past ten or fifteen years, probably we here in America wouldn't have extended any economic or technical aid to anybody abroad except for the challenge of Communism, except for the danger that we thought we were confronted with and were in fact confronted with. And we were prodded into doing this because it had to be done; and it still has to be done on a larger scale by a sense of fear, by a sense of menace, by the existence of a powerful competitor. Let me add as a footnote to that thought only this: It is my impression that the late, unlamented Joseph Stalin, who went to the Marxist Valhalla on the 5th of March of 1953, made no really significant theoretical or ideological contributions to the form of Marxism that we are talking about here. But he made some extraordinary operational contributions to the ideology, so to speak, or to the system, some of them of a peculiarly horrible and atrocious character. But from one point of view, I think what we must always keep our eyes on here is

this question: has the technique of Soviet economic planning and of Soviet industrialization evolved to such a point at which this is perhaps a more effective way of industrializing backward countries and raising living standards in backward countries than any way we know about or any way that we have to offer? I hope not. I'm just raising the question, but it seems to me a very vital and important question indeed, and of the essence of the appeal of Communism—not in its ideological sense at all but in its operational sense---to many peoples in the desperately poor communities of the world. Now this is the form which the challenge is more and more taking.

Now one further very brief comment, if I may make it. I quite agree with Professor Hallowell that the Communists have in no sense abandoned or renounced their millennial vision of proletarian revolution and salvation. They have not renounced their aspirations for what he called world domination; and I'm perfectly willing to accept that phrase, if you like. This is an article of faith. The true believers never abandon any article of faith. This is true in all the ideologies and belief-systems and cults of the world. You forget about some of them. You may revise some of them. But you never abandon an article of faith. And this is an article of faith; and, therefore, it hasn't been abandoned; and it will not be abandoned. However, what seems to me important here is not the article of faith as such, but the question of works along with the faith. What are the works here? What are the means by which the faithful in the enemy camp continue to aspire toward universalizing their faith? And, incidentally, is it not true of all faiths that really move peoples' minds and hearts that their disciples do seek to universalize them? You will have noticed that Premier Khrushchev, with or without tongue in cheek, in the course of his recent travels and his recent utterances, kept talking of victory, not through subversion, not through propaganda, and not through revolution. Communism, said he, was ultimately going to triumph by out-producing capitalism, by contributing more to human health, and wealth, and welfare than the system of the Free World has thus far contributed. Now I don't think it matters very much whether such a spokesman of the rival ideology is, as we say, "sincere" or "insincere" in this profession. What matters is what is done, not what is said. And if what is done takes the form of efforts to overtake America in production, in wealth, in prosperity, and in welfare, this, it seems to me, is hopeful rather than dangerous. This seems to me to represent an operational implication or application of this ideology which could contribute to the welfare and happiness and ultimately even to the freedom of all mankind rather than constituting a subversive menace or great danger to our values. With that I conclude.

Prof. Fainsod:

Your remarks, Professor Schuman, really suggest a widening of the field of discussion somewhat. It may move us from ideology as words to ideology as a more operative thing; and, it suggests something which I think is a very, very important part of the Soviet challenge, that is: Their degree of future-mindedness as contrasted with our present-mindedness, their sense of guiding their production mechanism in order to build at a rapid rate, their glorification at the present time of a production ethic that is contrasted with our consumption

ethic. All of this may be extremely important in determining who wins the race over the years.

But there is something, I think, that your discussion obscures, and that is a tendency to identify production, literally, with freedom. These two things are not necessarily the same thing. Indeed, it seems to me the Soviet pattern of rapid industrialization is essentially a pattern of industrializing through dictatorship. You suppress consumption in order to concentrate on production. You use your one party system in order to enforce that kind of suppression of consumption.

Now ours is a much more difficult problem. Ours is a problem of meeting their production challenge, while at the same time allowing all of our liberal democratic values free play. And, in a sense, the problem as it is projected into the underdeveloped areas offers that kind of contrast too. I should think it would be a very, very attractive pattern for some members of the new African nations or the new Asian nations to borrow the political institutions of the Soviet Union---to institute a dictatorship, to suppress consumption so that you could emphasize industrial growth. And, indeed, you can show very great production gains in this fashion. The Chinese have done a pretty good job of showing those gains. Now our problem, it seems to me, and this goes to the heart of the ideological conflict, our problem is different. Our problem is one of combining these production achievements with the free play of different kinds of forces in society, of allowing and preserving your liberal values, preserving the rule of law, and all that goes with it. Now, if this is our problem, ours is much more difficult. But, I shouldn't assume that we ought to let the issue be simply one of who produces more regardless of what this does to human values.

Prof. Hallowell:

I'd like to emphasize the same thing. Our quarrel with the Soviet Union, as I see it, isn't that they have a different economic system. Great Britain now has, in a sense, a socialist system and we have no objection to that. Our quarrel with the Soviet Union is not that she has a different economic system, but that she has shown a lack of respect for human rights and those values that we call liberal democratic values.

I think it's relevant to bring it up again, and I would appreciate it if Professor Schuman would comment upon the works of the Communists and the way in which the Communist faith is translated into action. How did Communism become established in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary? Was it simply by the example of greater economic productivity on the part of the Soviet Union? Was it simply by persuasion and example? If so, and if they have so much confidence in their system, why don't the Russian Communists allow the Polish and the Hungarian peoples political independence? Why do they shoot them down if they have given up violence and revolution and are simply relying on the example of their greater productivity?

Moderator: Professor Negley, would you like to comment?

Prof. Negley:

Well, not on ideology because we haven't talked about it yet. We seem to be talking about the mechanics of world politics. The comments so far leave me very pessimistic about our present status, if we are to turn our attention to that. If one draws the obvious implication from what has been said, we are certainly in a most unenviable position as compared with the Soviet program of aid.

We are stressing things such as respect for life, as Professor Hallowell has mentioned. These countries never had this respect. We are stressing consumption. These countries have never had consumption. Another bowl of rice is a fantastically large and glowing prospect to them, not a refrigerator. We are at a disadvantage in attempting to communicate these principles or values to people in the so-called underdeveloped and, to some extent, illiterate countries, in attempting to convince them of principles and values which are so alien to their thinking that they make no sense. They understand the Soviet system much better than ours. It's closer to their own. Brutal? Yes, so are they. Ruthless? Yes, emphasizing production at any cost, and, furthermore, the use of that production - as was mentioned here very effectively - the use of that production by a small elite either to get or to maintain their own power. I think the prospect of American or democratic values or principles being accepted by such countries in return for economic aid is not very promising.

Moderator: Professor Schuman, would you like to continue this discussion?

Prof. Schuman:

We've touched on a number of matters here, and I suppose that this is inevitable. Some of these I have every reason to believe Professor Fainsod is going to discuss much more fully this evening, and others, including Professor Hallowell's query about Eastern Europe, will be discussed much more fully tomorrow evening. Modesty prohibits me from revealing the identity of the speaker tomorrow evening. So I don't know that we ought to bat these ideas around here further at the table. Perhaps the moderator would prefer to open the floor to general questions and comments.

Moderator: This is what we had intended to do. We'll keep this very informal, so if you'll just raise your hand for recognition, and then if you will stand and state your question and direct it to a particular member of the panel if you would like for him to answer it, we can proceed.

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:

Question: There was so much talk about the conflict between democracy and Communism, particularly in reference to the underdeveloped countries, I can't resist putting in my two pennies worth about the opinion of an Indian about this conflict. The situation is that if a man doesn't have any clothing, any food, any roof on his top, this is what he wants first: He doesn't care about ideology at all; what he wants is food, what he wants is clothing, what he wants is

protection. The problem is then, first of all, to provide this for him in a way that he can utilize it and continue to utilize it. He wants organized effort, organized production. It so happens that this is the experience, in a new, unique experiment which is completely democratic, and where the values of democracy, the values of the individual, are being maintained. Still the productivity, the efficiency, and the effectiveness, as far as the layman who wants these for mere subsistence is concerned, shall be met. This is the experience today, I think, in India, because the economy has been planned on somewhat socialistic lines. But the liberty of the individual has been kept completely free. He has all the same rights and liberty - and probably some more - that we can find here. And, in view of this, I do think that some of us, at least those who are attracted to political subjects, do look at it more effectively and favorably, but sometimes we don't. I'd like to hear the opinion of the Chairman of the Panel, Professor Schuman, in regard to this, if I may.

Prof. Schuman: I concur in the observations made by our friend from India, but unless I misunderstood his question, he is asking of me a question which I am sure he is much, much more competent to answer than I ever hope to be. Namely, what estimate are we to make of the prospects and probable success of democratic economic planning in India as a method of raising living standards and promoting industrialization? I'm sure all of us here, and, indeed, everyone throughout the Free World who has any awareness of the problem hope most fervently that this effort at promoting mass literacy and raising living standards and achieving industrialization within the framework of the liberal democratic ideology in India will, in the end, achieve its goals, that it will succeed in its purposes. I hope that myself. I believe that myself, but I'm not in a position to offer any informed judgment as to the probabilities.

Moderator: Are there other questions?

Question: I'd like to direct this to Professor Schuman. Sir, as you mentioned a number of times at the beginning of your address, you tried to oppose the Communist creed and what you called the liberal democratic creed. I wonder if you'd be willing to elaborate on that, particularly with respect to the comments Professor Fainsod made calling it indirectly a subject that often take to mean expelling or reducing the American Manufacturing Association. I mean, exactly what is it you want us to sell, what is it you are opposing to Communism? Is it Christainty? Morality? Do you want to oppose to one set of beliefs another set of beliefs and demand that people accept those on their own bases? Are you selling an economic system as the Vice-President seemed to be selling one in his much publicized debate with Khrushchev in Moscow? Or are we selling what Professor Fainsod called pluralism and a general tolerance? What precisely did he mean by this liberal democratic creed?

Prof. Schuman: It seems to me one of the grave weaknesses in the position of America during the years of the Cold War, and a possible continued weakness

in times to come, is that much of the time we seem to be engaged in selling nothing in particular except anti-Communism. I'll agree that we should sell anti-Communism, but when we come to the point of asking ourselves what is it affirmatively that we are concerned with selling, if you want to use that term, we are by no means agreed. We are in considerable confusion. We might even deplore any full agreement or monolithic unanimity about this because we are pluralists and believe in freedom, after all. But there is here a certain lack of clarity, a certain lack of sense of purpose, a certain lack of affirmative goals and objectives, a lack of will, or a lack of means, in translating the venerable, values, ideals, and aspirations of the liberal democratic ideology into terms which seem relevant and effective in the contemporary world. I don't claim I know how to do this. I don't know how to do it at all. But we had all best devote further thought to how it ought to be done and how it can be done.

"SOVIET CHANGE SINCE STALIN: ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S."

Tuesday Address

Welcome: Dr. Paul M. Gross, Vice-President, Duke University

Speaker: Prof. Merle Fainsod, Harvard University

Prof. Fainsod:

The historian writing a century hence about changes in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin will have a easier time than we in describing the world that Khrushchev made. We are too deeply involved in fashioning our own history to have much confidence in our capacity to view it with detachment or to divine its future course. Even if we think we succeed in identifying the forces which are molding the present, we cannot be certain that new impulses will not assert themselves which transform the shape of things to come.

To see the transformations of the last few years, in perspective, we must look to the past, for it is only against the background of the Stalinist past that we can begin to understand Khrushchev's Russia.

The Stalinist impact on Soviet society was many-sided. In the economic sphere the driving thrust was forced-draft industrialization. Heavy industry and the armed forces enjoyed a prior claim on all economic resources; the result was a lop-sided economic development in which the consumption sector of the economy was starved to accumulate the capital for industrial expansion and the building of military might. Power took precedence over welfare, and the great mass of rank and file collective farmers and workers was confronted with a chronic shortage of food, consumer goods, and housing. At the same time, industrialization unleashed its own imperatives. The crying need for engineers and technicians to man the new industrial plant led to an overhauling of the educational system, an emphasis on technical training, and the growth of a new Soviet-trained technical intelligentsia, who played an essential role in managing an increasingly complex economy. Technical dynamism was built into the system, not only by the emphasis on technical education but also by surrounding the career of the engineer and manager with special privileges, perquisites, and status in order to attract talent. Egalitarianism was repudiated as "petty-bourgeois nonsense"; the new state elite and middle class which emerged under Stalin largely monopolized the rewards of Soviet society.

In the political sphere, Stalinism spelled the development of a full-blown totalitarian regime in which all the lines of control ultimately converged in the hands of the supreme dictator. The Party became a creature of Stalin's will and lost such policy-determining functions as it once possessed. Its role was reduced to that of a transmission belt, which Stalin used to communicate his directives, to mobilize support for them by propaganda and agitation, and to check on their execution. Under Stalin, terror itself became a system of

power and the secret police flourished and multiplied. The fear which its agents inspired provided the foundation of Stalin's own security; through them he guarded the loyalty of the Party, the armed forces, the bureaucracy, the intellectuals, and the mass of the Soviet population generally.

These developments left their impress on Soviet society. But they also left a legacy of suppressed aspirations with which the new rulers have had to reckon.

First, there was the widespread desire for a higher standard of life--- for more food and consumer goods, for better housing, for more leisure, for more adequate provision for old age and other disabilities. The most disadvantaged groups were the collective farmers and the unskilled and semi-skilled workers, but the pressure for improvement extended well beyond these groups into the middle and even relatively privileged strata of Soviet society.

Second, there was the desire for greater security, for a life of stable expectations, for liberation from the threat of the concentration camp and the numbing uncertainties of constant surveillance and denunciation. As Khrushchev made clear in his closing speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, insecurity communicated itself even to Stalin's closest collaborators. "It has happened sometimes," Bulganin is quoted as saying, "that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next--- home or to jail." To read Khrushchev's speech is to sense the terror which the lieutenants felt as they lived from day to day at the mercy of a fickle and suspicious despot. And it is not hard to imagine how they yearned for firm ground under their feet, and in yearning mirrored the fears and hopes of every bureaucrat in the hierarchy. Perhaps not altogether paradoxically, the resentment against Stalin's system of calculated insecurity was most intense among those who had most to lose as a result of arbitrary arrest and removal, though the cloud of fear which Stalin projected cast its shadow over the whole of Soviet society.

Third, there was the desire for greater freedom, not necessarily or usually freedom in the western political sense, but freedom to use one's talents and capacities, freedom to perform one's function without fearing the consequences, freedom to travel outside Soviet boundaries, and freedom to transcend the Stalinist doctrinal rigidities in thinking and writing about Soviet realities. Suppressed though these aspirations were during the Stalinist era, they were nevertheless fermenting behind the facade of Stalinist ideological conformity. Understandably, these aspirations found their sharpest focus in the new Soviet intelligentsia who were coming into positions of responsibility and influence during the latter part of Stalin's reign. Their dreams of larger autonomy, moreover, did not necessarily involve an overt challenge to the Soviet leadership; indeed, many of those who harbored thoughts of greater independence and authority operated within a framework of over-all loyalty to the Soviet system and envisaged such developments as strengthening a regime of which, after all, they were an integral part.

Within this context the new leadership faced its own unresolved problems and difficult choices. There was the issue of the succession and how it would be decided. There was the problem of facilitating an orderly transfer of power and stabilizing the authority of the new regime. There was the issue of priorities in economic development--- whether capital resources should continue to be concentrated primarily on heavy industry and armaments, or whether an effort should be made to gain popular support by expanding consumer goods output and housing. There was the lag in agriculture, the urgent need to increase food production to meet the demands of the rapidly growing industrial areas and to lift living standards. There was the task of improving the machinery of administration, of correcting the supercentralization which prevailed under Stalin, of rationalizing administrative processes, and of reviving initiative at every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy. There was the question of the future role of Stalinist terror in upholding the regime's stability, whether less reliance could be placed on police repression and more on incentives and indoctrination. There was the question of the organization of the Communist orbit, of how future relations were to be regulated with Communist China, Yugoslavia, and the East European satellites. And finally, there was the complex challenge of foreign policy, of whether a detente should be sought in relations with the West and whether Soviet objectives could not be more effectively advanced by breaking the mold of Stalinist intransigence and embarking on a fresh course.

Post-Stalinist Developments

Compared with the glacial silences of latter-day Stalinism, the mood of post-Stalinist Russia was one of ferment and change. Improvisation and experiment became the order of the day. Stalin's successors revealed an awareness of the grievances of their constituency, a disposition to go at least part way to placate them, and a determination to rationalize and stabilize the totalitarian order and to root it in popular support.

The first response of Stalin's lieutenants to the crisis of Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, was to submerge their differences and to rally the forces of national unity around Party and government.

The "disorder and panic" which the new leadership feared might accompany the death of Stalin did not develop. The East German uprising of June 1953 was suppressed by the Soviet army, and scattered demonstrations in Czechoslovakia and other satellite areas were quickly brought under control. The combination of a firm display of power and a policy of concessions and promises served to facilitate acceptance of the new regime and gave it a breathing space to consolidate its authority.

Meanwhile, the issue of the succession remained to be resolved. In the first weeks after Stalin's death the triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov appeared to emerge as the leading figures of the new regime. The surface show of unity and collective leadership which they maintained was suddenly shattered when the Soviet press revealed on July 10, 1953 that Beria had been arrested and

expelled from the Party as an enemy of the people who had sought to utilize his control of the political police to dominate the Party and government. The purge of Beria seemed to reinforce the principle of collective leadership, but appearances proved deceptive. The election of Nikita Khrushchev in September 1953 as First Secretary of the Party Central Committee marked the emergence of a new star in the Soviet constellation of power. Following in the footsteps of Stalin he utilized the great powers of his office to install his henchmen in leading Party and government posts, while at the same time espousing policies which won him increasing support within the Presidium itself. During the next year he gradually displaced Malenkov as the chief spokesman of the Party leadership. The redistribution of authority was confirmed at the February 1955 session of the Supreme Soviet when Malenkov was forced to retire as chairman of the Council of Ministers and was replaced by Bulganin on Khrushchev's nomination. The rise of Khrushchev did not go unchallenged. Faced in June 1957 with a hostile majority in the Presidium, which by this time included Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov as well as Malenkov, Khrushchev took his appeal to a special session of the Party Central Committee and emerged triumphant. Moving swiftly to consolidate his authority, he followed up his victory over his Presidium opponents by ousting his erstwhile supporter, Marshal Zhukov, in October 1957 from his positions as Minister of Defense and member of the Presidium and Central Committee on the charge that he had "pursued a policy" of underestimating and curtailing Party leadership of the armed forces. On March 27, 1958, Khrushchev assumed the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, thus combining in his own person both the top governmental and Party posts. His position of undisputed ascendancy was made dramatically evident in the published proceedings of the December 1958 plenum of the Central Committee and at the 21st Party Congress which followed during the next months.

More important than the parade of personalities were the issues which agitated the Soviet scene in the period after Stalin's death.

On the economic front, they largely centered on the priority to be accorded heavy industry as against consumer goods and housing, and on schemes to stimulate a substantial increase in agricultural output and to raise labor productivity generally. Malenkov's initial sponsorship of the consumer goods campaign won him mass popularity, but it also contributed to his undoing. Supported by powerful allies in the Presidium and the military who saw the issue in terms of power and national security, Khrushchev joined battle with Malenkov toward the end of 1954 and succeeded in trimming down the consumer goods targets. The signal for the resumption of the heavy industry drive which was given by Khrushchev in his speech to the Central Committee on January 25, 1955, marked a rededication to the goals of industrial development which Stalin had championed. But Khrushchev also found it essential to make clear that he was not neglecting consumer interests. During 1957 and the greater part of 1958 consumer interests were very much in the forefront of the regime's public pronouncements. In May 1957, Khrushchev announced a bold program to catch up with the United States in the per capita production of meat, milk, and butter. In July he promised

"to liquidate the housing shortage in the course of 10 to 12 years." At the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Revolution on November 7, he outlined an ambitious set of consumer targets for the 15 year plan to end in 1972. In the spring of 1958, he initiated an ambitious program to raise the production of chemicals and synthetics---measures that promised a substantial increase in the supply of fabrics and other consumer goods. But the control figures for the seven-year plan to end in 1965, which were published in mid-November 1958, were far less consumer-oriented. The increase in the output of producers' goods was projected at 85-88%, the increase in consumers' goods production at 62-65%. There was a marked widening of the spread in favor of producers' goods compared with the goals originally incorporated in the sixth Five Year Plan. Thus the priority of heavy industry was again reasserted.

Meanwhile, energetic measures were being undertaken to increase agricultural production. Beginning with his September 1953 speech to the Central Committee, Khrushchev took the lead in sponsoring a series of imaginative agricultural reforms designed to lift food output. New incentives for collective farmers were provided in the form of substantially higher state procurement and contract prices and the subsequent merger of different types of procurement into a single system of state purchases. Capital investment was expanded by providing additional agricultural machinery and fertilizer. Intensive efforts were made to train needed agricultural specialists and to direct them to the countryside. Party controls were tightened and trusted Party personnel dispatched to weak collective farms to strengthen their management. The sown area was greatly extended by opening up the virgin lands of Kazakhstan, Siberia, and other previously untilled areas. Corn acreage was substantially expanded with the aim of enlarging the livestock feed bases. Planning was somewhat decentralized, and the collective farms were given greater freedom in adjusting their operations to meet the farms' delivery quotas. The state machine-tractor stations (MTS) were liquidated, and their machinery, specialists, and skilled workers transferred to the collective farms in the interests of unified management and greater over-all farm efficiency. There was a new emphasis on the rationalization of farm operations, on cost consciousness and on regional crop specialization based on factors of economical production. The effect of these reforms was felt in a substantial increase in agricultural output and a marked improvement in the supply of food to the cities as well as the countryside.

On the political front, the major development involved the reinvigoration of the Party and the reaffirmation of its leading place in Soviet society. Under Stalin the Party had fallen on evil days, and its role was reduced simply to another transmission belt through which he exercised his personal dictatorship. The purge of Beria prepared the way for a reassertion of Party direction of the police, and the rise of Khrushchev was accompanied by a tightening of Party controls in state administration, the armed forces, and all other sectors of Soviet life. The effort to pour new life into the Party largely took the form of a call for wider participation of members in Party meetings, adherence to the forms of elections in choosing Party officialdom, and more frequent and regular convocations of Party assemblies and governing bodies at every level of Party life. But

the so-called "democratization" campaign operated within prescribed limits. Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev made clear that the new leadership was determined to preserve the system of Party dictatorship, that deviations from the Party line would not be tolerated, and that all challenges to the monolithic unity of the Party would be sternly rebuffed.

There were also changes in the governmental area to be noted. Perhaps the most important was the trend toward administrative decentralization of governmental operations---the delegation of greater operational authority to local planning bodies, factory managers, and chairmen of collective farms; the transfer of functions from the central government to the republics and from the republics to lower organs; and the law approved by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957, establishing a network of regional economic councils to take over functions formerly vested in a large number of central economic ministries. These measures endeavored to correct the overcentralization of the Stalinist era, to revive initiative in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, and to stimulate greater efficiency by bringing the responsibility for decision nearer the problems to be resolved. As with all delegations of power, they involved some risk of weakening or undermining central controls, but the Party organization retained its tightly centralized character, and the leadership counted on its unifying discipline to hold disintegrative tendencies in check.

Dramatic changes also took place in the legal arena. The series of amnesty decrees after Stalin's death, the large-scale release of prisoners from the forced labor camps, the abolition of the Special Board of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the rehabilitation, frequently posthumous, of many persons condemned as enemies of the people during and after the Great Purge, the strengthened powers of the Procuracy, the curbs on the security police, the enactment of a new series of "fundamental laws" as the basis of a long-promised revision of legal codes, the repudiation of the practice of pronouncing persons guilty of serious crimes on the basis of confessions extracted from them, and the strengthening of other procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the accused---measures such as these appeared to augur a new era of "socialist legality" in Soviet affairs. Compared with the dark Stalinist days, progress was registered in the direction of a more rational and less harshly punitive legal system. But the dimensions of the "new legality" remained subject to the caprice of the Party leadership, and both the treatment meted out to Beria and his associates and the sequence of Hungarian events seemed to indicate that self-imposed legal norms would be ruthlessly swept aside whenever the regime felt that its authority was imperilled. Despite the pruning of the authority of the security policy, it remained a formidable power in reserve, and no less a figure than Khrushchev felt impelled at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 to pay tribute to its essentiality and to call for a strengthening of its authority.

On the ideological front Stalin's successors embarked on a policy of controlled relaxation. But, though they were disposed to shed Stalinist rigidities, they insisted on maintaining the authority of the Party leadership to serve as

the ultimate custodian of orthodox doctrine. The cultural thaw which followed Stalin's death soon encountered its limits as the guardians of ideological purity pounced on such works as Zorin's Guests, Panova's The Seasons, and Ehrenburg's Thaw itself and followed with a not altogether successful effort to harness the craftsmen of the pen at the Second Writers' Congress in 1954. The Twentieth Party Congress with its denigration of Stalin spurred a fresh probing of the boundaries of the new freedom. This time, there is reason to believe, the Party leadership miscalculated. Genuinely shocked and outraged by the unintended consequences of deStalinization---the challenge of events in Hungary and Poland, the ferment among students and intellectuals in the Soviet Union itself---they replied in a not unfamiliar pattern---with force and terror in Hungary, with suspicion and reluctant acquiescence in Poland, and with a renewed war on "unhealthy" ideological manifestations in the Soviet Union itself. The educational reforms announced toward the end of 1958 had as at least one of their objectives a desire to instill proletarian consciousness in the oncoming student generations by assuring that most of them would have the experience of physical labor before embarking on their life work. After Hungary the swing of the pendulum moved in a neo-Stalinist direction, but it did not move all the way. The Third Writers' Congress in 1959 marked a new effort to find terms of reconciliation with the dissident intellectuals, but the Party leadership showed no disposition to relax its demand that Partiinost be the dominant value in all scholarly and creative work.

The insistence on the paramount role of the Party extended to all spheres of life, including the military. The post-Beria decline in the status of the security policy was accompanied by many indications of the rising importance of the military on the Soviet scene. Perhaps the most obvious was the return of Marshal Zhukov to a position of prominence and his rapid rise to Presidium eminence. But a display of independence on Zhukov's part led in the fall of 1957 to the loss of all the high posts which he had previously occupied, and the military high command was thus sharply reminded of the Party's controlling role as the ultimate Ministry of Coordination. Meanwhile, the military strength of the Soviet Union continued to mount rapidly. The Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb in 1949 was followed by the acquisition of the thermonuclear weapon in 1953, and intercontinental jet bomber in 1954, and the intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957. By outstripping the United States in achieving a long-range ballistic missile and by taking the leadership in the exploration of outer space, the Soviet Union scored a series of resounding successes which had their reverberations both at home and abroad. Within the Soviet Union itself there was an upsurge of pride and patriotism. The effect abroad was even more electrifying. There was a sharply heightened respect for the Soviet Union's military and scientific prowess, a crisis of confidence in Western leadership, and an increasingly vivid realization that the Communist bloc and the West were engaged in a grim race that threatened the world with disaster.

One of the results of the Soviet Union's improved power position was to introduce a new self-confidence and dynamism into Soviet foreign policy.

Despite the rebuffs encountered in attempting to lure Tito back into the Communist fold, and despite the setbacks administered in 1956 by the Hungarian rising and the Polish quasi-revolution, with their clear indication of the underlying weakness of Communist attachments in Eastern Europe, Soviet foreign policy had many successes of which it could boast. The projection of Soviet power into the Middle East, the rise of Communist strength in South and Southeast Asia, and the spread of neutralism in Asia and Africa testified to the continuing momentum of the Soviet forward thrust. Nor was the source of Soviet influence military prowess alone. An imaginative program of trade, aid, loans, and technical assistance was directed toward crucial target areas in the underdeveloped countries of Asia. The appeal to these nations was reinforced by pointing to Soviet experience as a model of rapid industrial development. The attraction of an all-embracing ideology was not neglected as Soviet cultural emissaries endeavored to present their homeland as the fulfillment of man's dream of justice, equality, and democracy. Everywhere, the Soviet Union sought to identify itself with aspirations for peace, by portraying itself as a peace-loving nation forced to arm by the provocations and threats of the imperialistic war-mongers. The image which Soviet policy makers projected was calculated to have special appeal in Asia and Africa, and the response from the Communist point of view was not unencouraging.

The shape of Khrushchev's Russia offered striking contrasts with latter-day Stalinism. Inside the Soviet Union there was less emphasis on police surveillance and coercion and more on positive efforts to induce loyalty by increasing incentives and broadening the amenities available to the Soviet population. As in the early years of Alexander II's reign, there was a loosening of bonds throughout a society. The lot of the collective farmer improved measurably. The burdens of the industrial workers were somewhat lightened with a reduction in the hours of work, the lifting of old age pensions, the abandonment of the most drastic disciplinary sanctions of the Stalinist era, more attention to the housing problem, and a rise in real wages. The managerial and administrative elite enjoyed greater operational autonomy and a degree of security which had been denied them by Stalin. The intelligentsia was given a broader field within which to maneuver, though any disposition to challenge Party tenets brought a quick reminder that scholars and writers were still artists in uniforms. At the same time, the welfare concessions, the continued accent on growth, the sense of expanding vistas which this communicated to oncoming generations, the pride inspired by Soviet scientific and military achievements and the heightened prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena all combined to cement a bond between the people and the regime which contrasted markedly with the fear and alienation which prevailed under Stalin. The regime remained totalitarian in its essence, still asserting its all-encompassing authority over the whole of Soviet society and tolerating no derogation of the monopoly powers of the Party leadership, but it could claim that it had responded to grievances which Stalin had ignored. The impression which Khrushchev and his associates conveyed was one of stability and confidence, of faith in their continued ability to channel and control the aspirations which Stalin's death unleashed. What of the impact of these developments on the U.S.?

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As a result of recent changes, Khrushchev's Russia emerges as a far more formidable competitor for world leadership than was Stalin's Russia. Its present growth rate is markedly higher than that of the U.S.; its educational system is geared to continued rapid scientific and technical progress; its military strength needs no underlining while the memory of moon shots is still fresh.

Where then does this leave us? How will we respond to the Soviet challenge? There are, of course, no certain or final solutions in this world, but if we are really determined to prevent the expansion of the Communist power we must meet the challenge at every level at which it presents itself.

1. Our first responsibility in a world where a thermo-nuclear holocaust is an ever present danger is to project ourselves to the peoples of the world as a nation that stands for peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This means constantly taking the initiative ourselves on the issue of disarmament, but it also means making clearer than we have succeeded in doing so far that no disarmament agreement is worth the paper it is written on unless it is accompanied by control or inspection arrangements that ensure its enforcement. This is the test which Khrushchev's recent dramatic proposal must meet. If it does not meet it, we have no alternative except to continue to maintain a capacity for instant and full retaliation against thermo-nuclear attack and we will have to continue to work to reduce our own vulnerability with all the scientific and technical means at our disposal.

2. Meanwhile we must intensify our efforts in the continuing technological race. This means more support for science and education, more emphasis on the disciplines which are indispensable to survival and progress.

3. We must also quicken our rate of economic growth to keep ahead of the Soviet bloc and to demonstrate the dynamic potential of our own system. We sometimes overlook the extent to which the effectiveness of our foreign policy depends on the skill with which we manage our domestic economy. Depression, stagnation, and economic collapse here can do infinitely more damage to our cause than battalions of Communist infiltrators in France or Italy. Every time our unemployment index rises, a thrill of hope surges throughout the Communist world. Unless we are able to maintain a healthy society at home, we shall not be able to discharge our responsibilities abroad.

4. We should neglect no opportunity to strengthen our relations with our allies and do everything in our power to make them impervious to Soviet disruption. They represent the pillars which support the free world, and they are as essential to our survival as they are to their own.

5. We must do what we can to prevent the uncommitted nations and neutral powers from falling under Communist control. It is tempting to criticize the so-called neutralist powers because they insist on maintaining their neutrality, but before we do so, we might recall that most of them are following policies

of non-involvement which we ourselves pursued for more than a century after the achievement of our own nation-hood. What we want is not their subordination, but their independence. It is in our interest as well as theirs to help them maintain their independence, to help them build strong, stable, viable economies capable of resisting Communist penetration and subversion---and this means economic aid on a scale much greater than we have provided so far.

6. Finally, we must continue a patient and unremitting search for a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union, a search in which we must make constantly clear that we have no expansionist aims, and in which, at the same time, we must indicate our capacity to resist Soviet aggression if that policy should be contemplated by the Soviet Union.

I recognize that negotiations with the Soviet Union try the patience of a saint, that time and again we appear to approach the brink of catastrophe before a working formula is achieved, that settlements once made have ways of becoming unmade, and that the whole weary business has to be begun all over again. But it is preferable to be locked in negotiations rather than to be locked in combat. For difficult as it is, annoying as it is, hard as it is on the nerves---we must somehow continue to explore ways of living together. For if we do not live together---in a thermo-nuclear age---we die together. I should like to believe that the instinct to live is almost as highly developed among the *Realpolitik* masters of the Kremlin as it is in Washington.

It would be pleasant to be able to end this discussion on the optimistic note that there will not be another World War in our lifetime. But it would be foolhardy to offer any such comforting assurances. It would be equally foolhardy to act on the assumption that war is inevitable. As Karl Jaspers, one of the fathers of existentialism, once wisely put it: "Any one who regards an impending war as certain is helping its occurrence, precisely through his certainty. Any one who regards peace as certain grows carefree and unintentionally impels us into war. Only he who sees the peril, and does not for one instance forget it, is able to behave in a rational fashion and to do what is possible to exorcise it."

"It is of crucial significance for the course of events whether the individual can endure to remain in suspense; or whether he flees into certainties....The most compelling element in our lives is the fact that we do not know the future, but contribute toward its realization and see it loom before us incalculable in its entirety."

The task before us then is not an easy one. It calls for bold and imaginative leadership, steady nerves, and an awareness that we shall be living in the shadow of danger for the rest of our lives. But, if I may conclude in the words of Pericles, "the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them--- glory and danger alike---and yet notwithstanding, go out to meet it." It is in this spirit that I hope we shall be able to grapple with the problems that lie ahead.

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:

Question: Do you think that the Soviet ideology of final world domination has been or can be modified enough to permit the co-existence of our two systems?

Prof. Fainsod: I think, in a sense, Professor Schuman addressed himself to this question in his last comment this afternoon. And what he was suggesting if I remember him correctly was that if the momentum of Soviet expansion could be checked, if the appeal of our system develops sufficient strength so that some kind of stability arises and, if we are able to maintain this over time, that conceivably over a long enough period Soviet ideological Messianism might erode. It might erode not necessarily in terms of giving up the ideology, but erode as a working principle. I think we must understand that Soviet foreign policy is not purely ideologically determined, that is to say, Soviet foreign policy is conditioned by many factors. Ideology is one factor in which they confront the world. It offers them a kind of hope or plan, but Soviet policy makers must also take into account their resources. They must take into account the resources of their enemy or opponents. They must take into account their evaluations of the intentions of their opponents. Now if the result of this rather complex calculus indicates that Soviet expansion is risky, dangerous, that it puts even the homeland under a very serious threat, the balance of strength which confronts the Soviet Union may lead to some ultimate form of stability between the two sides. But I don't see this as something which is automatically going to be attained as a result of negotiations between Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev in the course of the next year. This is not a one-blow affair. It's a long, long drawn out process involving generations.

Question: You spoke of the necessity of having independent rather than dependent allies and yet you advocated much increased economic aid. Is this not a contradiction?

Prof. Fainsod: I don't think so. I advocated much increased economic aid and at the same time advocated independent allies and even independent neutral states. As I see it the aid can be extended without political strings and without setting as a condition that Burma, for example, support our every move. I argue essentially that it's important to have a strong nationalist Burma, a Burma that is capable of handling its own problems, that is non-Communist, which is what the Burmese leadership at the moment is supposed to be, that is capable of providing an alternative to Communism which its own people prefer. But I don't think this is a question of buying their support. I think it's a question of simply making it possible for them to build the kind of institutions that they would like to build.

Question: Do you think that there is a good likelihood of a third world war?

Prof. Fainsod: I'm afraid that I've said about all that I could say on that subject. So much obviously depends on the unknowable, the relative strengths, the

relative achievements, the relative progress of the Soviet and Western bloc over the next period, that it seems to me, really, not within the power of man, to be able to answer that question. I know that I hope to do everything I can to prevent it.

Question: Will the change since Stalin in the USSR produce ultimately a conflict between the peoples of the USSR and China?

Prof. Fainsod: As Khrushchev said in Washington, "This is a very complicated question." And I think he finds it just as complicated as we do. I should say that there are points of friction. Khrushchev is pursuing a line of policy that is, in a sense, vitiated by the actions of China in Tibet, toward India, and so on. This is one of those cases where co-ordination within the Soviet bloc is not taking place very effectively. There are other potential sources of friction. There is friction about the dimensions of economic aid which should go forward from the Soviet Union to China. There may be friction about how China's objectives in the next decade can be most effectively advanced. Shall they be subordinated to Soviet objectives? How will the two be reconciled? There are problems of spheres of influence in terms of who takes the initiative in Southeast Asia or South Asia. There are potential border frictions and so on. But I would say that despite all these potential and actual sources of friction, that for the present period the Soviet Union and China have much more to gain by maintaining a united front with each other than by separating. And my guess is that these differences are likely to be patched up in terms of maintaining the working agreement and in terms of exerting their common power for common ends.

Question: What policy could the United States undertake, not only to contain Communism, but to roll back its boundaries as well?

Prof. Fainsod: Well, I assume that the questioner does not have war in mind. And, if he doesn't, it seems to me that he has to think in non-forceful terms. And if you do your thinking in these terms, it seems to me that the possibly fruitful efforts are those efforts which are designed to make possible a loosening of bonds within the Soviet orbit as opportunities become available. This may mean offering economic opportunities to which the Poles, for example, have been responsive. It may go beyond that. I think another hopeful line of activity, short again of force, is cultural exchange: the exchange of ideas. This applies not merely to satellite areas. I think it applies to the Soviet Union itself, and some of us have been engaged in these efforts. I must say that, on the whole, the Soviet Union itself is much more interested in using cultural exchange in order to obtain some technical knowledge which will be useful to it, or to make impressions by way of the ballet and the opera and so on rather than to permit the contamination of the minds of its own people by exposing them to ideas from the West. But it is interested in cultural exchange, and what we've been engaged in is a kind of process of trading off. That is, we emphasize the things that we believe will serve our purposes and they are emphasizing the things that they believe will serve their purposes. And we get agreements with results

sufficiently ambiguous so that neither side knows whether it's gotten the better of the deal. Maybe that's the secret of successful diplomacy.

Question: What is your suggestion for a disciplined system of education?

Prof. Fainsod: Well, this is a sore subject, and I could talk a long time about this. Let me start by saying that I don't think we work very hard in our schools. We could work a lot harder, and I mean from the grade schools up. You visit Soviet schools. They start in September; they go through to July; there is relatively little in the way of holidays; and the curriculum is filled with the tough scientific and mathematical subjects. Our curriculum could stand a good deal more in the way of math and science than it now has. Now don't misunderstand me. I represent the social sciences and I hope, the humanities, and the last thing I would like to see is a school system that modeled itself on the soviet schools, where, in effect the social sciences consist of indoctrination and the humanities consist of teaching one foreign language and a little about Russian literature with the rest of the curriculum exclusively math and the sciences. But they're doing a great deal more in the way of math and science than we are doing, and I think we ought to be doing a great deal more than we are doing. And I could carry this on to much greater length, but this would be the essence of my observations.

"THE CONFLICT: DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT"

Wednesday Seminar

Opening Remarks: Prof. Merle Fainsod, Harvard University

Panel: Prof. Frederick Schuman, Williams College

Mr. Thomas Whitney, Journalist

Moderator: Prof. Theodore Ropp, Duke University

Moderator: This is the Duke University Symposium Seminar, Wednesday afternoon, October 7th, 3:15 p.m. in 204 East Duke Building.

Prof. Fainsod:

I have a few remarks with which to open, after which we will hear from Professor Schuman and from Mr. Whitney and then the discussion will be allowed to take its course. Well, I've been asked to lead off on this most difficult of all topics, difficult because it involves a certain element of prophecy and prophecy is one of the most hazardous of all enterprises; and I ought to make very clear at the outset that I have no special prophetic credentials. What I would like to do is to examine various possible roads which U.S. - Soviet relations may take, to raise questions as to what long term developments we would consider favorable from the point of view of basic American interests, what we can do to promote such developments, what the prospects are that such developments will actually take place.

Now one possibility that we must consider, though I wish we didn't have to, is the possibility of war, intentional or unintentional, between us and the Soviet Union. Neither side presently wants war, and the balance of terror in terms of thermonuclear destruction operates as something of a barricade against war. But it's a precarious protection in a fluid situation. But, at the moment, until and unless a satisfactory disarmament agreement is achieved, it's about the best protection we have. Even though neither side wants war, there is always the danger of the unintended war, the expansion of the local into the general conflict ---the kind of problem raised by Korea, Indo-China, Berlin, Suez, Lebanon, Laos, Formosa---future incidents which we cannot now foresee. And one of the questions which, I think, we ought to put in the forefront of our discussion is whether we can develop techniques for containing these local conflicts, for confining them to the arena of negotiation; and, I need hardly say that this problem becomes infinitely more difficult as the nuclear club expands or is permitted to expand. And I ought to add that there is always the danger of the accident, of the bomb that is dropped because of a misreading of intelligence, the pre-emptive strike that is launched because one or the other side decides that the enemy is about to move or has moved. Against such accidents there are no absolute protections. About all that can be done is to take every precaution and to make sure that weapons are under responsible control.

Now putting war aside for a moment, I should like to call your attention to a second perspective, what I would call the Khrushchevian perspective, that over the years there will be an increase in the relative strength of the Soviet bloc vis-a-vis the Western bloc, that, as the strength and alleged superiority of the Soviet system becomes manifest, the will to resist in the West will

decline and the attraction of Communism throughout the world will increase. Along the way, as Khrushchev sees it, there will be a breakup in the system of Western alliances, a great upsurge of neutralism, an increase in the strength of indigenous Communist forces in Asia and Africa and then in Europe, and finally a series of Communist take-overs, country by country, with the Soviet bloc becoming increasingly powerful and the United States becoming increasingly isolated until finally Communist power overflows the globe. Now obviously one of the questions with which we must concern ourselves here this afternoon is whether this perspective is a valid one, whether there are lines of action that can be taken that will prevent it from coming to realization. I'm sure that we will want to touch on this theme in our discussion.

Now another perspective is that we succeed in stabilizing our relations with the Soviet Union; that we maintain a precarious balance of power between the blocs; that our common interest in survival leads us to resort to negotiation rather than force; and that, over time, we succeed in using time as effectively as the Russians have in the past; and that the effect of this kind of prolonged balance will be to lead the Soviet leadership to abandon the Khrushchevian perspective. Now if that is to happen, there would have to be a kind of evolutionary development in the course of which the Soviet regime gradually sheds its Messianic militancy and becomes something of a status quo instead of an expanding power and is content to adjust its differences with other powers within the framework of the nation states system.

Now, as an indication of the reality of such an evolution, we would have to look for certain supporting developments within the Soviet Union---the decline in the importance of Messianism as a basis for Soviet policy, the emergence of government policies which put more emphasis on welfare rather than on power objects, the development of an educational system which stresses the human values which we and they share in common instead of emphasizing the profound gulf which divides us. We would want to look for freer traffic in ideas with the West, an attrition of censorship, freer access of Soviet citizens to Western publications, and more freedom for Soviet citizens to travel abroad and for non-Soviet citizens to circulate freely in the Soviet Union. And we may well ask what we can do to promote such a development. I assume first that our policy must emphasize the strengthening of the free world against Communist expansion, that this will set the conditions for the abandonment of Communist Messianic or imperialist goals and will contribute to a possible re-consideration of party dogma and ideology. It means, I think, also maintaining a certain posture of willingness to accommodate what we conceive to be legitimate Russian national interests, thus, perhaps, giving aid and comfort to such elements in the Soviet Union as are prepared to move toward a more limited perspective of Soviet goals. It means, I think, also persisting in our search for a mutually acceptable disarmament plan in order to make our peaceful intentions clear and perhaps also to reinforce aspirations or pressures inside the Soviet Union in favor of accommodation, in favor of a greater stress upon welfare as opposed to power objectives. It means, also, making maximum effort to use cultural exchange and

similar programs to achieve a freer circulation of Western ideas in the Soviet Union.

Now you may well ask what are the prospects for such a development. I see them, at best, as a very long term affair. This is not a transformation that is likely to take place over night. It depends very much on whether we succeed in our efforts to contain the spread of Soviet expansion, whether certain forces inside the Soviet Union are given sufficient scope so that they begin to exert their pressures for stability, security, and peace. I have in mind the pressures of this new state middle class of the Soviet Union, seeking to widen its freedom of action, looking for a more orderly and efficient society, free of police pressure, looking for contacts with the outside. I have in mind the rising expectations of the masses for more food and consumer goods and housing and leisure. And I have in mind the desires of many people within the Soviet Union for peace, for a letup on pressure. And I have in mind also the spread of education, the possibility that this may, over time, ignite critical faculties and lead to a demand for wider participation in the processes of decision making.

Yet I can see these same factors operating negatively if Western efforts to contain the spread of Soviet power fail. If those efforts fail, I think we can expect to see a reinforcement of the Messianic elements in the Bolshevik creed, the belief in Communism as the wave of the future; and I would hasten to add that there are very powerful internal forces, party orthodoxies, the grip of the party stalwarts on the internal power machinery, which stand in the way of this kind of evolution even as a long-term affair. And so, while I think I would state almost as an article of faith my belief that over the long term the forces of freedom within the Soviet Union have more perspective, I would suggest that it is by no means a sure thing, that, at the best, it is likely to be a slow evolution, and over the short term, party controls, the totalitarian pattern, will still remain very powerful.

Now there is still, it seems to me, a fourth possibility---a Soviet regime which remains basically totalitarian, a one-party state, but which grows weaker rather than stronger over the years. And here again it depends on what we do with the time at our disposal. If our own policies should stress, over the next decades, a high rate of industrial growth, if we should succeed in keeping scientific and military supremacy, keeping ahead in the race, if we should succeed in promoting social progress, economic strength, and political unity in the free world, we may well find ourselves in a much stronger position than we now foresee. And in terms of promoting this kind of development, I assume also that we would want to give maximum encouragement short of war to such disintegrated forces within the Soviet orbit as exist---nationalist movements, movements in the direction of national Communism, of independence. I think the encouragement of such forces can take the form of moral support, offers of economic assistance, cultural exchange. There is certainly something to build on here. We've seen enough, in terms of the events of '56, the Hungarian events, developments in the Polish orbit, the pull out of the orbit of the Yugoslavs, to recognize that

ere is a good deal of smoldering restiveness in the orbit. And over the long term, it may well be that these forces of nationalism that many thought had been oppressed will continue to assert themselves and become quite powerful.

It is, I think, also worth pointing out that there are internal pressures in the Soviet Union itself, aspirations for a better way of life, which may operate to impose some brake on the Soviet rate of industrial growth. But, if the Soviet leadership is able to persist with its present plans, if its rate of industrial growth continues to be large, larger than that prevailing in the Western world, if its attention to scientific and industrial development should result in its catching up with the West, if it should contain the disintegrative forces within its own orbit, then we will have very little ground for complacency. In recent years we haven't done very well, and assuming that we don't do better in the future than we have done in the recent past, assuming that internal difficulties within the Soviet orbit do not seriously disrupt the Soviet timetable, a situation may develop in which the USSR grows relatively stronger while we grow relatively weaker. I can't stress enough that there is nothing inevitable in this process, nothing which says this must happen. It depends on what we do with the time and resources which have been placed at our disposal, and those resources are still very great indeed.

Prof. Schuman:

I know that all of you will join me, and I'm sure Mr. Whitney here too, in realizing that Professor Fainsod has given us a masterly presentation of the broad alternatives which lie ahead. In my own very brief comments at this time, I would like to amplify a bit one aspect of the presentation and raise a very broad question with regard to another aspect of it. At the beginning of his observations, he made the comment that in the absence of a disarmament agreement, armaments would remain the best protection that we have. I suppose most of us believe that, those of us, at least, who are not pacifists (and I am not one); but, with a little reflection on the matter, it seems to me that under the technological, scientific, and political conditions prevailing in the world, massing up nuclear arms, far from presenting the best protection that we have, could be a formula for the suicide of mankind. May I commend to your reading, as required reading please, Lewis Mumford's article in the current Atlantic Monthly (October, 1959) entitled "The Morality of Extermination." I would raise a serious question as to whether any rational analysis of the problems and dangers with which we are confronted can really justify a belief that armaments offer protection or that armaments offer security. More than that (and I think here Professor Fainsod concurred, but let me put it just a little differently), it seems to me that the dangers of a continuation of the arms race do not lie primarily in any likelihood of open conflict, intentional or unintentional, between the United States and the Soviet Union. The dangers of a continuation of the arms race are rather in two other directions, both of which have already been mentioned: first, a progressive expansion of the membership of the thermonuclear suicide club, and this is already imminent. No doubt, within years and months, we shall see France, and China, and then possibly Sweden and state after state after state acquiring thermonuclear

weapons. When the government of Egypt, and the government of Indonesia, and the government of Pakistan, and the government of the Dominican Republic all have thermonuclear weapons, then all the bets are off and you had better write off the human race, it seems to me. This is a major danger.

The second major danger, and this is already with us, is that the possibility of national decision-making in questions of war and peace is already passing out of the hands of national decision-makers. In the epoch of the ICBM, when there is already the prospect of a fifteen minute warning of enemy attack, there is no possibility of national decision-making. Decisions then have to be made by nervous, jittery interpreters of blobs on radar screens, by nervous, jittery technicians at missile bases, by bomber pilots, etc. If we really intend to let this happen, we and the Russians together, then, again, I shall become a pessimist and despair of the human future.

The other broad question I would raise is whether what Professor Fainsod called the Khrushchevian perspective was altogether adequately characterized by his observations regarding it. I defer to his judgment in these matters and to what I think is probably his superior knowledge of the record of the Khrushchev perspective, but it has seemed to me that the emphasis he has placed upon his view of it might conceivably be in need of qualification and possible correction. He seemed to imply, if I heard him aright, that the fundamental objective is still a Messianic objective, the fundamental purpose is still world domination or world conquest or the universalization of the Communist creed and Communist system of power whereby in the end all the rest of us are to be subjugated and done in by the enemy. I had thought that Premier Khrushchev, in his various public utterances, here as well as in many utterances in the Soviet Union, had put the matter just a bit differently. I am not now referring to the slogan or phrase of peaceful co-existence as such. This may have a variety of meanings. I am rather thinking of his constantly growing emphasis on productive efficiency and capacity to improve living standards as the way whereby, in his view, Communism is ultimately to prevail. And that emphasis seems to me hopeful and rather significantly different from the earlier Communist emphasis on Messianic universalism to be achieved in other, perhaps more conventional, ways.

It has also seemed to me that in many, many aspects of domestic policy the Khrushchev regime is already demonstrating that it is yielding to the internal pressures of which Professor Fainsod spoke. And adding all this together, it would seem that possibly the Khrushchev perspective, as here in process of re-interpretation, might be a little more hopeful than some of the other alternatives that Professor Fainsod referred to. But I'll let it go at that and simply raise the question, on which I'm sure he will want to comment later.

Mr. Whitney:

Let me take up right at the point at which Professor Schuman left off, the Khrushchevian view and his suggestion of a new interpretation of this, with a few personal observations from the recent trip of Premier Khrushchev. I myself

have come away from this trip, after watching the man in action at fairly close range and fairly intensely for quite a while, with the feeling that this man was a very, very determined man, that he himself has a great deal of confidence in the position of the Soviet states that he represents, that, on the one hand, he was convinced that this was perhaps the most important reason that he was here: that a war in this particular era would mean total devastation. But, at the same time, I feel that he was convinced, ultimately and completely, of the superiority of the Soviet system, the Soviet economic system and the Soviet political system. He was a man who was here, on the one hand, to warn against the danger of total destruction of total war, and, on the other hand, to proclaim what he really believes is the coming victory of the Soviet system on a world scale. And if we go back to one of his little speeches in which he himself describes his own early sentiments and views about the Soviet regime, he said he didn't know at that time (this was back in the early days after the revolution), that if he had been asked at that time to define what Soviet power meant, he wouldn't have been able to define it, but that he knew it was good, that it was something that promised a better future. Perhaps we can transfer this same frame of reference to him right now at the present time if he were asked to spell out exactly what he means by victory of socialism on a world scale. He wouldn't be able to spell it out, but he knows it's there. He feels it is there. He is a man who feels he is riding the wave of the future. I think that it's important to keep in mind not only how we may feel and the possibilities that may exist, but how the other side, or the man who is in control, looks at the situation.

Now Professor Fainsod spoke of his fourth line of thinking, fourth possibility. He emphasized, and I think very, very correctly, that very much depends on what we do with the possibilities at our disposal. Perhaps, today in our discussion we were emphasizing what the other side could do or the possibilities for movement and development of the other side, and not enough the other side of the equation which is, after all, us. Talking about the direction of development, and the possibilities for the future, we are in that future just as much as the Russians are. We are as much a part of the equation as they are. One thing has come home to me repeatedly in recent years, and that is this: That many times we think of the Russians as having many secret weapons at their disposal, but when we get down to it in the end, it seems to me that they only have one secret weapon at their disposal and that is a purpose. We think that the reason that we are behind in the field of missiles and earth satellites is scientists, that we don't have enough scientists or that we haven't devoted enough resources to this field. The fact of the matter is that we have plenty of scientists. What we have not had is a plan. What we have not had is leadership. What we have not had is a purpose.

The Communist purpose may indeed, as I'm sure most of us believe, in so far as it can be defined within the framework of a drive toward world domination, be a very bad purpose. But it is a purpose, and it is a purpose against which can be tested every individual expenditure of effort that takes place in the Soviet Union and within the Communist orbit. When it is a question of deciding whether

steel shall be allocated to produce more passenger automobiles or to produce other types of equipment or goods, a decision can be reached with reference to a purpose and to a plan. And, I would remind you that we live in a day when in order to realize something fifteen years from now, we have to start working at it today, that in the earth satellite field perhaps this most emphatically becomes apparent; what will be done ten years from now is determined by what is in the planning and development stages today. There isn't a single large corporation in this entire country that would get along without planning and programming in its ordinary everyday activities to the extent that the United States government gets along without these. So I say that Professor Fainsod is very right to emphasize that we do have within our own control at least one-half of this equation and that very much depends on how we use our possibilities.

Prof. Fainsod:

Perhaps I might comment on the two points that Professor Schuman raised. You remember that he raised questions as to whether this balance of terror was really any kind of protection at all, and whether we weren't eventually faced with disaster at the end of the road. And he also raised questions about the Khrushchevian perspective and the accuracy with which it had been reported.

On the first point, it certainly was not my desire to glorify the balance of terror as the best way of running the affairs of the world. This is a very, very disagreeable choice. The question which, I think, I would have to put to Professor Schuman and to anyone else is this: Assuming that we are not able to agree on terms of disarmament that give adequate consideration to Soviet security and to our security, what is the alternative except this balance of terror? I would infinitely prefer success in the disarmament negotiations as a way of escaping from the balance of terror. We've been engaged in such negotiations for quite a long time. We've sought a degree of security we've been unable to achieve. The negotiations are going to go on. I hope they continue. I think they deserve our very best and most serious efforts. But pending a degree of success in them, what is the alternative? Now this is a very, very disagreeable choice, but I put the question.

Now on the broader problem of the Khrushchevian perspective, I think Professor Schuman is quite correct in reporting that Mr. Khrushchev, in his speeches in the United States, featured this great competition between the two systems as a race in productive efficiency. Indeed, he said he did not want to impose Communism on any other country. This was a matter for the free choice of the people who are concerned; they will decide in their own way whether to choose Communism or not. And, if, of course, you accept Mr. Khrushchev at his own word, you would want to modify my description of the Khrushchevian perspective. I don't accept his speeches at face value, and, indeed, I think I could show you many quotations from Khrushchev where he speaks very, very differently. One might consult some of his speeches at the Party Congress to round out his picture of the Khrushchevian world. So I think the differences between us must be defined in terms of our respective willingness to accept the speeches he made

here at face value or not. I'm not, I regret to say, prepared to accept them. I see his objectives as extending beyond a willingness to rest his case on peaceful commercial competition or production competition. If I were willing to accept that, I think I would have much less to worry about for the future, and I could accept the optimistic posture with which Professor Schuman confronts this world.

Prof. Schuman:

Let me comment briefly on Professor Fainsod's generous comments on my perhaps ungenerous comments. I do not myself believe the Khrushchev perspective to be a question of whether to take the words of Comrade Khrushchev at face value or not to take them at face value. At least I don't regard that as the problem in my own thinking. All true believers in every Messianic code or creed have to continue using the semantic devices of the creed and using the same words for decades, generations, and centuries after they have lost all practical or operational meaning. Khrushchev is no different in this than others. It seems to me a more important question, and, to be sure, a much more difficult question, is this: are the internal pressures inside Soviet society, of which Professor Faisod spoke, pointing in the direction of a shift of emphasis politically and economically? Are the internal pressures in the Communist bloc as a whole, which are very real, likely in the months and years ahead to prevail, to be compelling, to become imperatives which the top level Communist power-holders and policy-makers must fully take into account if their system is to survive and flourish; and are these pressures likely to point in a more hopeful direction, as I was suggesting? I think the answer to that is 'yes.' Maybe Professor Fainsod thinks the answer is 'no.' Maybe my thinking is wishful thinking; maybe his thinking is wishful thinking; I don't know. But it seems to me it is not a question of the sincerity of Mr. Khrushchev. It is a question of the kinds of internal pressures and external pressures which will presumably shape and condition the future direction of Communist policy.

On the other question: What is the alternative to the balance of terror, if we cannot agree on disarmament? There are various alternatives, some of them quite unpalatable to many of us. There is the Quaker alternative. There is the alternative of those who say that under modern conditions and in terms of the Christian ethic, all reliance on balance of terror, all reliance on military violence, is now not only immoral, but it is suicidal. And some of these people, including some non-Quakers, particularly in Britain where there is a considerable school of thought of this kind, say the alternative to the balance of terror is unilateral disarmament. Let us disarm. Let us disarm without agreement. Let us abandon our armaments and cease relying on organized military force. Don't misunderstand me, that doesn't happen to be quite my position, but I think that it is a very respectable position and a very logical position and a very defensible position, indeed. And I think as the years go on it will become more logical, more defensible, and more plausible, and more palatable to more and more people.

If we are so stupid together, we and the Russians, that we can come to no agreement about the limitation of armaments and the ending of the arms race,

would it not be better then, under these conditions, to address ourselves to more immediate, concrete questions as to what the obstacles are from a shorter run point of view, rather than from a very long run point of view, in the way of some mutually acceptable and workable accords that would take us into the whole future of Germany, of Berlin, of Eastern Europe, the satellites, as well as disarmament? I don't know that we can cover the whole field or that we ought to try. But let me make this observation: It seems to me that from the record thus far of these protracted, agonized, and involved negotiations for some kind of arms agreement, two major obstacles have loomed up and are still very much with us in the way of any kind of even limited accord. One of those obstacles is the American search for a 100% foolproof inspection and control system which cannot conceivably be evaded or violated. The other obstacle is a psychological, political, and ideological obstacle, if you like, which stems from past Russian experience, which has been a very tragic experience indeed---the obstacle posed by the psychological inability of Soviet power-holders and policy-makers to accept any such kind of system of inspection, or even to contemplate it seriously, on the basis of a series of assumptions which have some validity in past Russian experience. This is the primary source of the deadlock, it seems to me.

What can be done about it? I would hope that it would prove possible on the part of farsighted and able statesmen to arrive at some kind of middle ground, that it would prove possible, as, indeed, Mr. Khrushchev himself has repeatedly said, that the Soviet authorities will accept some form of inspection and control with regard to some types of armament which we would regard as possibly acceptable, even though it wouldn't be 100% foolproof. Nothing in this world is 100% foolproof and those who seek 100% security are fools anyway. This is not to be had. I would think it would also be conceivable that Americans might come to accept something less than 100% security, since the quest for 100% security actually means zero security or no security whatever, you see. And maybe a little security is better than none. So I would not despair of the possibility of success in some effort at limiting armaments by agreement. But the obstacles are very, very formidable. As for the other problems, let's leave them for later.

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:

Question: Would it not be better to divert some of the capital presently going into military expenditures to aid for the underdeveloped areas of the world?

Prof. Fainsod: As you pointed out, the problem of accumulating savings is not one that is easily managed through democratic processes. You point out that the way out for underdeveloped countries in terms of minimizing sacrifices while preserving possible democratic paths of development lies through a massive foreign aid program. You suggest that financing such a foreign aid program would involve a necessary curtailment of military expenditures. I don't know that that necessarily follows. I have the impression that if we wanted to pay higher taxes or if we wanted to limit some of our luxury expenditures, we could find additional

resources for foreign aid which wouldn't seriously cramp our military expenditures. But I would go out to meet you to this extent, by pointing out that there are certain areas of the world where we have, in a sense, put our wager on military formations where it seems to me that those military formations have very, very dubious value indeed. And the same kind of investment put into capital development projects of one kind or another would yield infinitely greater fruit in terms of a vigorous and stable local society. I have in mind Pakistan, for example, and there are many other places that one could mention. So I would agree at least with a substantial part of what you have said.

Question: Professor Fainsod, you said something about the Soviet Union becoming less of a power nation--the hope for the Soviet Union to become less of a power nation and more of a welfare state. Do you mean by "welfare state" the sort of welfare nation that the United States has become out of fear, and, if so, what possible purpose could it serve?

Prof. Fainsod: What I had in mind, and perhaps I should have spelled it out a little bit more, was the diversion of capital from investment in heavy industry and armaments toward investment in housing, in consumer goods, and in other things which would improve the standard of living of the people. There are aspirations for such improvement, and to the extent that such aspirations are politically effective, the government may feel compelled to supply more in the way of consumer goods, housing, et al, than it had before. This would leave less for heavy industry and for armaments.

Question: If they are able to concentrate on consumer industries after producing a suitable arsenal of ICBM's or such, so that they would be a very fine defensive or offensive nation and possibly able to concentrate on consumer goods, what would happen then?

Prof. Fainsod: Well, I think they are trying to get the best of both possible worlds. But, I think they find it, at their present stage of development, a very cramping business. As I said last night, if you look at the seven year plan and look at it in terms of what they announced in the sixth five year plan, you find that the projected increase in consumer goods is not so great as it was in the earlier plan. And I assume this means that they feel that the priority still must go toward the ICBM's and the heavy industry to support it. But as they grow, one can contemplate a period that might raise the kind of problem which you sketched where they have a much larger gross national product to divide, where they can take care of the ICBM's and also take care of the consumer goods. To the extent that they supply consumer goods, I think that they will be giving themselves a stronger underpinning of support in their own population.

Question: Mr. Whitney, there was something you said that perturbed me a bit. Perhaps I misunderstood, and I wish you would clarify it. You mentioned that one of the advantages that the USSR has over us is the fact that they could

allocate their resources efficiently and apportion what they had where it would serve them best. And you suggested that we were at a disadvantage because we don't have the same way of allocating resources. Are you suggesting that we ought to adopt some similar way of allocating resources or are you thinking of a particular way in which we ought to plan and use part of our present expenditures for future purposes?

Mr. Whitney: I think I said that the Soviet Union does a great deal of planning on a totalitarian basis and we do practically none at all. I mean this is an extreme contrast. The Soviet Union as a totalitarian state has certain advantages. Let us start with the mere fact that a totalitarian state every single organization making up that state must direct all of its activity in accordance with the overall plan of activity provided from the top. This can lead, of course, in itself to a certain number of inefficiencies. Our system, in which an individual organization or an individual himself can go off in one or another directions, perhaps the diametric opposite from that in which the state itself is proceeding, has some inefficiencies and yet it has some virtues, too, because it provides for a certain amount of competition and a certain amount of efficiency. I am not suggesting that we adopt a totalitarian pattern based on that of the Soviet Union. I am suggesting that we begin to start planning and programming ahead and try to see where we are going twenty years from now, and that might be the beginning of democratic wisdom, because we aren't going to have a democracy very long unless we do.

Question: What significance do you attach to lack of a regular method of succeeding to power within the totalitarian state, such as the Soviet Union?

Prof. Schuman: Well, actually, ladies and gentlemen, Professor Fainsod can speak with much more authority on this than I can. I think he would disagree with what I am about to say. Let me say it anyway. This is a very serious and real problem and has always been so in the Soviet state. I have been impressed with the fact that the other two members of the panel have thus far referred to the Soviet regime as still a totalitarian state, and I should concur. I think in this they are correct. But neither of them has referred to the totalitarian regime as a totalitarian police state, and there are good reasons for this, namely that the arbitrary power of the political police to seize and arrest or imprison and execute ordinary citizens under suspicion has been very greatly curtailed, if not altogether abolished. If it has been possible to mitigate and modify and almost remove the police state aspect of the Soviet system, it seems to me in the longer future it is conceivable that this may cease to be even what we have been calling a totalitarian system. It is conceivable to me that further liberalization and democratization of the regime may lead to various methods (they won't be American methods, to be sure) whereby there can be brought into the process of national policy-making and national planning some elements that even we would recognize as democratic and responsive to public sentiment and various group interests. But on the more specific question, I would only say this: there has, it seems to me, been perceptible progress in the last six years, or particularly in the last five

years, in the methods employed by the top level Communist power-holders in dealing with opponents, in dealing with criticism, and in making provision for succession. I think there is an important distinction between having a bullet in the back of your head and being sent to Outer Mongolia as Ambassador, as Mr. Molotov was, or an important distinction between being strangled in the cellars of the GPU and being made President of a cement plant in Central Asia, as Kagonavitch was, on the basis, apparently, of a debate and vote in the Central Committee of the Party. By my lights, this represents progress, and I hope for further progress in that direction.

Mr. Whitney: You raise the question of succession as a weakness in the system, yet there has been a succession which did take place. Over a period of three or four years a new leadership managed to stabilize its position with the introduction of considerable change in the political line and did it without any tremendous, enormous amount of bloodshed. I think that while we were quite justified before Stalin died in wondering how succession was going to take place, and while we are quite justified at the present time in pointing to the lack of a completely regularized system of succession as a weakness or a possible weakness in the system, we would do very well to keep in mind our own immediate experience that there has taken place a succession very successfully and to consider whether it won't be possible for them to be as successful in carrying out the next succession also without bloodshed.

Prof. Fainsod: While we're celebrating the peacefulness of this succession, I might remind you of a little history. Lenin died in '24. Five years later some of the leading contenders were still in the Politburo. Trotsky was still alive. He was exiled to Alma Alta, and so on. Indeed, there was very little bloodshed in this early period. The period of bloodshed didn't come until the mid-thirties and the Great Purge. As a matter of fact, we've had more bloodshed in the early years after Stalin's death than we had after Lenin's death---Beria executed and a number of his associates.

Now I'm not prophesying more bloodshed. But I think it's a little early to be absolutely sure. Around the streets of Leningrad this February you had rumors of Malenkov's death. I don't know whether he's dead or not, and I don't know that many of these people who were spreading these rumors have any knowledge about it. What we do know is that he hasn't been seen. Some of these other people have---Molotov, Shepilov, and a few others. So far the record of bloodshed in this regime largely involves the Beria crew, so-called, and it involves a good deal of bloodshed in Hungary, a great deal. And we shouldn't be too sure that the last word has been spoken yet on this theme. I think we must salute the efforts that have been made to curb the power of the police, to salute them as healthy manifestations, but I'm not myself quite ready yet to write the Soviet Union off as a police state.

Question: Mr. Whitney, I understand that Mr. Khrushchev had a very wrong opinion of the United States. Do you think his visit changed this opinion, and if so, do you think there will be any accompanying change in Soviet policy?

Mr. Whitney: Well, it's of course impossible to get inside of Khrushchev's muddled head. One can catch glimpses, of course. To some extent it's evident that Khrushchev has many misconceptions about America, that he had them before he came, that he had them while he was here, and he still has them now. He's gone away with them. That was, I say, to be expected. At the same time I would say, on the basis of what I could see, there was an impact of America on Khrushchev during his trip. This was also to be expected. Even if we suppose, as I think, that he expected to come to a sort of wonderland and be impressed, nevertheless, the actual fact of being here, the actual fact of seeing America, even if it was mostly through car windows and from lecture podiums, this still had an effect on him. And I would suppose that the thing that had the most effect on him was that he got, in general, not too bad a reception from the people and that this affected his emotional reactions towards America as a country and towards Americans as a people. I think that this will have an effect, some of it short range, some of it long range. I think it will have an effect, even, on Soviet policy. I shouldn't over-exaggerate that, but I think that it will or has already.

Prof. Fainsod: I think I would agree in general that this has been a healthy visit, healthy in the sense that it gives him an exposure to a variety of experiences that he hasn't had up to this point. I think also that it was healthy in the sense that it symbolizes his willingness and our willingness to discuss, to keep the lines of communication open, for certainly if we do not live together we will die together.

Question: Outline for me, Professor Schuman, if you will, the internal and external political and economic situations and tensions between Russia and Red China and their possible effect on future Sino-Russian relations.

Prof. Schuman: A small order, sir, a small order. All three members of the panel have been asked this question or similar questions many, many times before many, many audiences, and not one of us knows the answer. But in self-defense, by way of concealing ignorance, I have a stereotyped answer, which is not very good but which I think is true, so I shall offer it to you. My stereotyped answer is that we should not expect any serious cleavage or rift or potential conflict about anything at all between the Soviet Union and Communist China so long as the present pattern of United States policy toward China remains what it is---a complete embargo on all trade, a complete embargo on all travel, a complete refusal to enter into diplomatic relations, a complete refusal to even consider the admittance of Communist China into the United Nations. I don't know how long this pattern will continue, for my crystal ball isn't that good. United States policy-makers continued something like that pattern, not nearly so extreme to be sure, for sixteen years after the Russian Revolution. We've continued to boycott Communist China for ten years, maybe we'll continue for sixteen years,

maybe we'll continue for thirty-two years, maybe we'll continue for sixty-four years. I don't know. All I feel I know is that for as long as we continue this policy, it will be fatuous to assume any serious cleavage or rift between Moscow and Peiping. I trust you will agree I have successfully evaded the question.

Mr. Whitney: I personally feel that the pattern of Soviet-Chinese relation doesn't necessarily depend on American-Soviet relations. It is conceivable to me that there could be a serious break between the Soviet Union and Communist China, though I consider it unlikely, unlikely for a very long time at least, even in a period when we have practically no relations of any kind with Communist China. I agree, however, with Professor Schuman, in that we are doing everything we possibly can in order to keep the Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union working together. Our conduct toward China is almost designed to that end. In a sense, one can make out a case that Stalin wanted it that way, and led us into that position, and we stayed very co-operatively.

Question: Professor Fainsod, in your report you did not mention the U.N. Do you think it's possible that within the future some of this conflict will be resolved through the U.N., either as a diplomatic body or through the strength of the U.N. itself?

Prof. Fainsod: If I omitted the U.N. it is not because I do not attach considerable significance to its role. I think of the U.N. both as an arena in which we confront each other, the Soviet Union and the United States, and at the same time, an arena in which, conceivably, pressures can be exerted to adjust differences between us. And it may well be that, if, over the years, the U.N., in one form or another, is strengthened, this introduces an additional element that will serve to facilitate adjustment of conflicting aspirations. I think we've sought at various points to use the U.N.; we tried to use it in the Korean conflict; we attempted or are attempting to use it in Laos over the objection of the Soviet Union; and, I hope that we will continue to use it.

Question: Professor Fainsod, what is the possibility of using the United Nations for Russia and the United States getting together through the United Nations?

Prof. Fainsod: Well, I see no objection myself. This has been suggested to the Russians on several occasions. I think the first person who made the suggestion was Adlai Stevenson on his first visit to Russia. He got a rather cold reception. I don't know that we ourselves have been up to this point very enthusiastic about it. But I conceive of aid, say, to the underdeveloped nations, as being much more acceptable under the U.N. aegis than it is under either of the Super Powers.

Moderator: At lunch, Professor Schuman, who, after all, has prophet's credentials going back a long, long way, said that he was used to making speeches on why war was not going to break out at the present time, and that he would gladly summarize this in a couple of sentences.

Prof. Schuman: You should now realize, in case you are not aware of the fact, that if one spends thirty years in making forecasts about the probable shape of things to come in world politics and his batting average is not too bad, everybody will forget about all the wrong forecasts he made and only remember the right forecasts. So if you want to go into the crystal ball business, bear this in mind. So I disclaim, really, any powers of prophecy in these matters.

The argument that World War III will never be fought, reduced to its very simplest terms, is that in the post-World War II pattern of world power, several important ingredients are lacking in order to have a good, jolly, worthwhile war. One could enumerate these ingredients, but there isn't time for that. I'll put it to you that on the basis of the whole historical record there has never been a war between Great Powers, except under circumstances in which the policy-makers and strategists on one side or the other, and very often on both sides, were sure in advance in their own minds that they had a decisive margin of superiority over the prospective enemy, and quite sure in their own minds that they had devised a winning strategy for victory. To be sure, most of them were proved to be wrong, but this is an essential ingredient for any really good war. This ingredient is lacking now. It has been lacking since 1945, and it has been particularly lacking since 1949.

It is not possible for Soviet policy-makers or American policy-makers to make any even half-plausible assumption that our side has a decisive margin of superiority and that we have a strategic plan for winning the war. There is none. I'm sure there is none. I haven't searched through the drawers of the Pentagon; I have no access to them, but no such plan is there. It can't be there in the nature of the situation. Because it's not there, during all these years of the Cold War, neither side has ever pushed any demands on the other for decisive positions or components of power which it thought that the other side would resist by force. This hasn't happened during the whole period of the Cold War. The most beautiful example, of course, was the Berlin blockade of ten years ago. There were those, including at one point General Clay, who said to President Truman, "Let's send a tank column into Berlin from Frankfurt." And Harry said, "No, Lucius. No tank column into Berlin. The Russians might shoot at the tanks." So no tank column was sent. We resorted to the airlift, instead. I don't know, but I would guess that one or another of the Soviet commanders of anti-aircraft batteries all around Berlin may have gone to the Kremlin and said to Uncle Joe, "Comrade Stalin, would it not be a splendid idea to shoot down the Anglo-Americanski airlift." To which Uncle Joe must have said, "Nyet, nyet, nyet! That would be a very bad idea. The Americanskis might shoot back." There was no shooting involved. The Russians lost this particular round, if you will remember, with no shooting. Well, I just mention that as a typical instance of the pattern of world power relationships between the Super Powers during the whole last fifteen years. And that's still the pattern. Therefore, no World War III.

Moderator: With that prophesy from a very good prophet, I think, perhaps we should draw this meeting to a close. We should give a particularly big hand to Professor Fainsod because this is his last appearance before us.

"THE COLD WAR: A PROBLEM OF POWER"

Wednesday Address

Speaker: Prof. Frederick Schuman, Williams College

Prof. Schuman:

Dear Mr. Chairman, dear Miss Moderator, dear colleagues and collaborators on the Duke University Symposium Committee, dear friends and neighbors; we find ourselves met together at the midway point, or perhaps a little beyond the midway point, of this Symposium program. We also find ourselves met together at the midway point, or perhaps a little beyond the midway point, of another sequence of events that we have met here to consider and discuss and evaluate. We are met together, I feel very confident, in a time for rejoicing. And I venture to invite you to join me in rejoicing and in considering the source of our rejoicing and in examining anew the tangled problems of a still troubled world which must be resolved if our rejoicing is to be justified and to be finally fulfilled.

We meet to rejoice because we know, whatever our doubts and puzzlements may be, that the rulers and policy-makers of our divided world in East and West alike have, in the Year of Our Lord 1959, finally resolved to make peace, and to keep the peace, instead of continuing on the tragic course of the past dozen years or more, which, if persisted in, could have had no other result than the thermonuclear co-annihilation of the human race. It is, to be sure, a sorry comment on our times that we should rejoice over the fact that the practitioners of the art of statecraft at long last should have decided in this year, our year of rejoicing, to choose life rather than death for all of us, to choose survival rather than extinction, to choose peace rather than war. Who but madmen, could have made any other choice? And yet we live in a century of madmen, many of whose ghastly miscalculations and monstrous decisions have repeatedly threatened our common civilization with irreparable ruin and with the mass suicide of mankind. During the dark and dismal years of the Cold War, this threat has repeatedly been posed in a form far more menacing to human survival than ever before in human history. Therefore, let us rejoice that the threat has been lifted, and that we are now irrevocably and irreversibly on the road to life and safely out of the valley of the shadow of death.

And in our rejoicing let us bless those who have been sufficiently courageous, virtuous, and far-sighted to resist temptation and deliver us from evil. Let us bless them in the spirit of the greatest sermon of all time, the Sermon on the Mount preached by Jesus of Nazareth 1,928 years ago, in which, at the very outset, he said, "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy; Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God; Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God."

Since we find ourselves met together in the midst of the Jewish high Holy Days, let us also pay deference to our Jewish neighbors and friends; let us also bless the peace-makers in the spirit of Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year,

celebrated last weekend, inaugurating the days of penitence and leading to Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, during the coming weekend. Let us recall in that connection, in this time of rejoicing, the words of a great prophet of Israel, Ezekiel, spoken 2,506 years ago:

"When I bring the sword upon a land, if the people of the land can take a man of their coasts and set him for their watchman, if he seeth the sword come upon the land, he blow the trumpet and warn the people, then whosoever heareth the sound of the trumpet and taketh not warning, if the sword come and take him away, his blood shall be upon his own head. But if the watchman see the sword come and blow not the trumpet, and the people be not warned, if the sword come and take any person from among them, he is taken away in his iniquity but his blood will require at the watchman's hand."

Let us rejoice that the watchmen of our world, after long delay, have seen the coming of the sword and blown the trumpet of peace and have warned the people and have not failed in their duty. Let us bless those, whatever our doubts and reservations may be, who have significantly contributed to the end of the nightmare of World War III and to the dawn of a new era of peace.

With all due blessings to those here unmentioned, let us bless Dwight D. Eisenhower for breaking with the past by inviting the Number One Communist of the world to visit the United States. Let us bless Nikita S. Khrushchev for breaking with the past and persistently asking for an invitation to tour America. Let us bless Secretary of State Christian Herter and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for contributing to the outcome, along with Ambassadors Menshikov and Thompson. Let us bless Harold Macmillan for going to Moscow last February. Let us bless Richard Nixon for going to Moscow last summer. Let us bless even Soviet Deputy Premiers Anastas Mikoyan and Frol Koslov for visiting America last winter and spring and paving the way for later journeys. Let us bless "Chip" Bohlen, former United States Ambassador in Moscow, "exiled" to Manila but now recalled to Washington and almost certain to accompany President Eisenhower to Russia next year. Let us bless George F. Kennan, also former Ambassador in Moscow, and also in a sense "exiled," but I hope ultimately to be recalled to public service.

The time is ripe for reassessing the origins and the course and the lessons of the Cold War, the lessons already learned and the lessons still to be learned. Let me ask you to join me in an effort at reassessment. Within the time at our disposal we shall by no means be able to cover all the ground, but we can cover some of the ground and that will be better than covering none of the ground. It is a curious fact that, although many books have been written on many and various aspects of the Cold War, no book has been written or, at any rate, no book has been published, dealing with the Cold War as a whole, with one exception. A British newsman, Kenneth Ingram, published in 1955 a short journalistic volume entitled, A History of the Cold War. My friend, Professor

Denna Frank Fleming of Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, has written a detailed and documented four-volume history of the Cold War, but at last reports he was still unable to find a publisher.

At all events, what we have been calling the Cold War did not begin fifteen years ago in 1945 in the aftermath of World War II and of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. It began forty-two years ago with the Russian Revolution of 1917, which brought the Communists to power throughout most of the old Russian Empire. The Communists were then convinced that the Russian Revolution would inevitably be followed by worldwide revolution, and that it was their duty to assist the inevitable to come to pass. The non-Communists and anti-Communists of the West were then convinced that the Soviet regime would inevitably collapse and that it was their duty and their mission to assist the inevitable to come to pass. Both sides, along with almost all other statesmen and people, then shared what Norman Angell, way back in 1910, had called "The Great Illusion," namely, the belief that under Twentieth-Century conditions national interests can still be served by war. Furthermore, Communists then believed that Communism could be extended by war, and anti-Communists believed that Communism could be destroyed by war. Both were wrong. Within ten months after Russia's October Revolution, Soviet Russia and the West were at war, and the war was not a cold war but a hot war marked by many casualties and considerable destruction.

Be it remembered, lest we forget what no Russian ever forgets, that this war was not begun by Communists sending armies against the West, but by the West sending armies against Soviet Russia. In 1918 and 1919 American troops killed Russians and were killed by Russians on Russian soil, along with British troops and French troops and Japanese troops and Polish troops and a good many others in another somber chapter of Russia's age-old tragedy of attack and invasion from abroad. The legacy of mutual fear, suspicion, and hatred which has nourished the Cold War of the 1940's and '50's originated in a hot war between East and West in 1918, '19, '20, and '21. The outcome of this war, you may recall, was a deadlock or stalemate. The United States and the Allied Powers failed to destroy the Soviet regime, and were obliged to abandon their armed intervention and blockade. The Communist rulers failed to undermine or subvert any of the capitalist states, and were obliged to defer or give up their hopes of world revolution.

Problems of power in international politics can be dealt with in one of two ways: either by violence, in which each side seeks to impose its will upon or destroy the other by armed force; or by bargaining, in which both sides compromise their differences or agree to disagree within the framework of a negotiated modus vivendi. The first of these ways is the way of war. The second of these ways is the way of diplomacy. When war, or preparation for war, eventuates in a deadlock or stalemate in which it is evident to all that neither side can impose its will upon or destroy the other by armed force, then only one other way is left for dealing with problems of power among the Great Powers of our world---the way of diplomacy, an ancient and honorable art which, when wisely practiced, is the art of maintaining peace among rival sovereignties in a State System

lacking World Government. These are simple truisms or self-evident statements of the obvious. But for forty years or more many Americans have been unable or unwilling to understand or act upon these eternal verities of international relations, and at times, although rather less consistently, Russian policy-makers, particularly in the last years of Stalin's autocracy, have been equally obtuse and blind to realities and to choices.

Take note, if you will, of two simple and obvious corollaries of the truisms of which I am speaking. The first is that in order to practice diplomacy, it is necessary to have diplomatic relations with those with whom you expect to practice diplomacy. Otherwise, obviously, no diplomacy is possible. Russians have always known this. Americans have enormous difficulty in getting this through their heads, as is shown by American refusal for sixteen years to enter into diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, and by American refusal in our time to enter into diplomatic relations with Communist China or North Korea or North Vietnam or Eastern Germany. The second corollary is that in the practice of diplomacy, one cannot, if one aims at agreement, always say 'no' or 'nyet' to all the proposals and suggestions of the other side. One must sometimes say 'perhaps' and one must occasionally say 'yes.' This too, Americans seldom understand, and Russians sometimes do not understand. All of this, of course, recalls the old riddle which asks the question, "What is the difference between a diplomat and a lady?" I'm sure most of you know the answer to that one. The old answer is that if a diplomat says 'yes,' he means 'perhaps,' and if he says 'perhaps,' he means 'no,' and if he says 'no,' he's no diplomat; whereas, if a lady says 'no,' she means 'perhaps,' and if she says 'perhaps,' she means 'yes,' and if she says 'yes,' she's no lady. To be sure, this leaves our lady diplomats in something of a dilemma.

Back in the early 1920's all these things were well understood and acted upon in the Soviet Russia of Lenin, Chicherin, and Litvinov, and in most of the other major countries of the world, with the exception, of course, of the United States. The result was the establishment of diplomatic relations, the practice of diplomacy, and the negotiation of a modus vivendi or a pattern of peaceful coexistence between Russia and the West. That pattern of coexistence endured for almost twenty years to the mutual advantage of Russia and the West, with no violence and no serious threats of violence and no cold war. That pattern would unquestionably have continued indefinitely, even down to the present day except for the Great Depression of the 1930's which Marxists mistakenly assumed was a vindication of the Marxist analysis of capitalism. In the course of the slump, millions of Germans and Japanese found their souls by losing their minds, and collectively embarked, under the leadership of madmen, upon national programs of mass murder and mass suicide.

The Cold War, as we have known it for the past dozen years or more, actually had its genesis, believe it or not, in the divergent responses of the Soviet Union and the Western democracies toward the common challenge of Fascism in the 1930's. Now you may find this difficult to believe, but if you will bear with

me in a bit of power politics analysis here I am sure you will agree that this was, in fact, the case. Let us proceed backward in time by way of establishing certain causal relationships among crucial events and decisions in world affairs. And then, very briefly let us proceed forward in time by way of showing how inexorable logic reveals that A is followed by B, and B is followed by C, and C is followed by D, etc.

The Cold War began in the late summer and fall of 1945, immediately after the surrender of Japan, with early repeated and emphatic American and British protests against the imposition of Soviet hegemony and Communist power on Eastern Europe north of Greece and east of the Elbe and the Adriatic. This vast and alarming extension of Russian power into Central Europe and the Balkans was alleged in Washington and London to constitute a Russian violation of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements of 1945, although I think it might be more fairly regarded as a Russian violation of the Anglo-American interpretation of these highly ambiguous and imprecise agreements, and not a violation of the Russian interpretation of the agreements. This expansion of Russian power was also alleged to constitute a new "totalitarian enslavement" of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who must somehow be "liberated" and given the blessings of Western democracy---despite the fact that most of them had never known either liberty or democracy in the Western sense and despite the further fact, alas, that the Western Powers, then and now and always, had no power at all to liberate these people from Communism. This alarming expansion of Russian power was also interpreted, you will recall, to mean that the Soviet power-holders and policy-makers were embarked upon a program of military conquest of all of Western Europe and, indeed, of all the world. This was untrue, but those of us who said it was untrue received little thanks for our attempt to set the record straight.

How and why did this condition of affairs come about? How and why did it come about that Russian power was extended into the middle of Europe? It came about very simply because Hitler and his psychopathic colleagues and followers, having conquered Western Europe and having failed to conquer Britain, decided in 1940 and '41 to attempt the conquest of Russia. It came about because the Russians finally defeated the Nazi Wehrmacht before Moscow in 1941 and at Stalingrad in 1942 and '43, at an utterly appalling cost in life and property representing at least ten times the casualties and material losses suffered in World War II by all the other United Nations combined. It came about because Russian armies fought their way westward to Berlin and Budapest and Vienna and Prague and the Adriatic before Anglo-American armies were able to fight their way through France into Western Germany. It came about because America and Britain were unable to establish any effective second front against Hitler's Reich, despite the African and Italian campaigns of 1942 and '43, until the Normandy invasion of 1944, with the Russians, meanwhile, bearing almost the entire burden of the war in its European theater.

And why were the Western powers unable until the last months of a six-year war to contribute more effectively to Hitler's defeat and to occupy more of Europe

before the Russians occupied it? The answer surely lies in the so-called "Peace of Munich" of September, 1938, twenty-one years ago, whereby the Western Powers betrayed Czechoslovakia and, in effect, gave Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, partly in the hope that he would attack Russia and leave the Western Powers at peace. The meaning of Munich, as a few of us pointed out at the time, was that the Western democracies, in a mistaken quest for peace, were surrendering Eastern Europe, and that Eastern Europe would therefore pass under Nazi control or be partitioned between Germany and Russia or possibly pass under Russian control, if Hitler's efforts to conquer Europe and Russia and the world should possibly fail.

All of these things came to pass in succession. The Western Powers did not surrender Eastern Europe at Potsdam or Yalta, or on the bloody and long-delayed beachheads of Normandy in 1944. They surrendered Eastern Europe at Munich in 1938. In international politics, as in our personal affairs, decisions have consequences, and these consequences are often irrevocable. The consequences of Munich were irrevocable. They are with us today and they will be with us for a long time to come. The Cold War originated in Russian determination, thus far successful, to capitalize upon these consequences, and in Western determination, thus far unsuccessful, to undo or reverse these consequences. The matter is as simple as that. And if the Cold War is now happily approaching its end, this is because the policy-makers in East and West alike are now disposed to accept the consequences of power politics during the last twenty years, since the risks of not accepting them are far, far greater than the risks of accepting them.

Now let's look very briefly at this sequence of events, decision, and consequences in chronological order instead of reverse chronological order. In the 1930's the policy-makers of the Soviet regime responded to the menace of Fascism by joining the League of Nations in 1934, by negotiating military alliances with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and by trying in every possible way to organize an anti-Fascist coalition which would have sufficient power to deter the Fascist leaders of Germany, Italy, and Japan from unleashing war, or if need be, to bring them to defeat speedily and at relatively small cost in the event that their madness should lead them to unleash war in any case. But all Soviet efforts toward this goal came to nothing because the policy-makers of the Western democracies in the 1930's, meaning France and Britain (since for all practical purposes the United States during these tragically wasted years had no foreign policy at all) preferred to appease the Fascist leaders by giving them their way in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe in the persistent hope that they would either keep the peace or would attack Russia and leave the West alone. The so-called "Peace of Munich" constituted the culmination of this process. Russia was not invited. Russia was not represented. Neville Chamberlain and Eduard Daladier met with Hitler and Mussolini for the purpose of surrendering Czechoslovakia to Hitler. In this endeavor they were highly successful despite Czech determination, up to a certain point, to fight for national survival and despite Russian willingness to come to the defense of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chamberlain, who was never willing to go to Russia, flew three times to Hitler's Germany in the

summer of 1938, apparently on the principle that "if you don't concede the first time, fly, fly again."

After Munich, all was well from the point of view of the Munichmen. All was well until Hitler, in March of 1939, expunged and annexed to the Nazi Reich the helpless remnant of Czechoslovakia and made it perfectly clear, as he had written in Mein Kampf, that he was resolved to conquer Poland and to subjugate the Western democracies before undertaking the conquest of Russia. Western alarm coincided with Russian proposals to make a new effort at a Grand Alliance to resist Fascist aggression. But as it turned out, in the spring and summer of 1939, British and French policy-makers were unwilling to enter into any alliance with the Soviet Union on any terms which made sense in the circumstances of the time. The result was the Stalin-Molotov-Hitler-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, contemplating in its secret protocol a partition of Poland and a division of Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. One week later World II began with the Nazi invasion of Poland on the 1st of September, followed two days later by declarations of war on Germany by France and Britain, neither of whom had any capacity whatever to defend Poland against the Nazi invaders.

Now since we are engaged here in demolishing the illusions of the tragic past and considering the degree to which such illusions have now been abandoned or are still effective in shaping human attitudes and acts, let us notice the fallacy, repeated thousands of times in the Western press, that Stalin unleashed World War II by his pact with Hitler in August, 1939, thereby allegedly giving Hitler the "green light" to invade Poland by assurances of Russian neutrality and even co-operation. This view, despite all repetition, is a myth and a falsehood.

The voluminous records of the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials make it perfectly clear, with abundant documentation leaving no room for doubt, that Hitler and his political and military intimates decided in late April and early May of 1939, four months before the Nazi-Soviet Pact, to invade Poland on the 1st day of September of that year. This decision was as fixed and final and irrevocable as any such decision can ever be. It was, of course, highly secret. But it was known through secret channels to top level policy-makers in London, in Paris, and in Moscow. Stalin and Molotov in Moscow still hoped to negotiate a workable Anglo-Soviet Alliance against Hitler's Reich. Chamberlain and Halifax, Daladier and Bonnet refused to negotiate any workable alliance with Russia against Hitler's Reich. Stalin and Molotov were thus left with two choices: to do nothing; or to make a deal with Hitler whereby half of Poland passed under Soviet control. They chose the latter alternative in preference to the former on the reasonable assumption that the former would be more dangerous to Soviet safety and survival than the latter. In this they were surely right, by the pragmatic test of results which is the only test there is for decisions in foreign policy. But by the same test they were surely wrong in acquiescing passively in 1940 and '41 to the Nazi conquest of Western Europe in the fatuous hope that the Soviet Union could somehow thereby buy peace and safety.

The Roosevelt Administration in Washington, in spite of loud and powerful isolationist opposition, realized that the Nazi conquest of Western Europe and the attempted Japanese conquest of Eastern Asia represented a mortal threat to all other Powers and all other peoples and must be resisted even at the risk of war. Resistance was offered through "lend-lease" and other devices to the Fascist program of world conquest, and it led to war with the Fascist Caesars in their final and fatal madness in attacking the United States. Stalin, Molotov, and their colleagues offered no resistance, and no provocation, and belatedly discovered what they should have known from the outset: that in any case Russia would be attacked and invaded and almost done to death.

However, I am often inclined to believe that no very useful purpose is served for the present and the future by rehashing the mistakes and the crimes of the past. Those mistakes and crimes were very widely and generously distributed in all the capitals of the world in the 1930's and '40's. I would say only this, that during the 1950's many Americans, most Americans I believe, and many West Europeans, have been making the mistake of supposing that we are still living in the 1930's, and have been making the further mistake of assuming that Communism and Fascism are identical, and that diplomatic negotiations with Communists in the 1950's would prove to be as disastrous as were diplomatic negotiations with the Fascists in the 1930's.

This familiar analogy is wholly false and is a major source of most of our troubles and frustrations and dangers during the postwar Cold War between East and West. But the pattern of power implicit in the Cold War, and, indeed, the source of the Cold War, emerged from the agonies and tragedies and long belated triumphs which followed the decisions of the Fascist Caesars in 1941 to attack Russia in June and to attack America in December of that fateful and hideous year. The invasion of Russia, more than the attack on Pearl Harbor, proved to be, in the end, an act of final and fatal madness for the potentates and policy-makers of the Fascist triplice.

Soviet policy-makers were determined to perpetuate this result of World War II as protection against any future occurrence of the monstrous miseries suffered by the Soviet peoples during World War II. Anglo-American policy makers were determined to reverse this result of World War II as protection against any future recurrence of totalitarian attempts at the conquest of Europe and the world. Russian fears and Western fears were alike unjustified by the facts, as a few of us again tried to point out during the years of danger. But policy-makers in particular, and people in general, do not think and feel and act in terms of the facts. They think and feel and act in terms of their interpretation of or illusions about the facts, and often in terms of their false analogies and their fears, all of which are quite understandable. The Cold War was and is a product of the mutual and reciprocal fears and illusions and false analogies and misconceptions, some of which, at least, we are now happily in the process of correcting, overcoming, and transcending.

The very essence of the Cold war, in my own mind (if you will pardon a personal reference), was epitomized in a little incident at the National War College in Washington way back in 1947 in a panel discussion following a lecture I had been invited to give there. The Chairman of the panel discussion was Mr. Maynard Barnes of the State Department, recently American Minister to Communist Bulgaria and already an ardent Cold Warrior. Mr. Barnes opened the discussion by saying, "The problem we face is not new, but old. Russian troops are in Central Europe. Russian troops have many times been in Central Europe before. They have always had to be driven out. Russian troops are in Central Europe now. They have to be driven out. This is our problem." Before I could make the obvious comment, Mr. Barnes was interrupted by a very distinguished diplomatic historian, Professor Arnold Wolfers, then of Yale and a member of the permanent staff of the National War College. Said Professor Wolfers, "Mr. Barnes, what are you saying? It is true that Russian troops have been in Central Europe many times before. They were in Berlin in 1760," and then he reviewed the record a bit, "but when have they ever been driven out? They have always been recalled home on the basis of negotiated agreements among the Great Powers. When have they ever been driven out?" Mr. Barnes thought, and thought, and thought, and he could think of no such instance. Professor Wolfers was, of course, correct. Finally, Mr. Barnes said, "Well, it doesn't make any difference. The Russian troops have to be driven out anyway." Obviously it makes all the difference in the world, in our time the difference between life and death for all mankind, as to whether Russian troops in Central Europe are to be driven out by force, which, incidentally, is quite impossible, or are to be withdrawn ultimately on the basis of a negotiated accord among the Great Powers dealing with one another as equals and each granting quid pro quo for concessions granted by the other side.

By the spring of the year 1953, it had become obvious to a few of us, who try to follow these matters with some care, that the Cold War had become a totally senseless and highly dangerous conflict which had to be ended by negotiated accords among the Great Powers, meaning in the first instance the United States and the Soviet Union as the greatest of these Powers. This conviction was reinforced by the removal from this vale of tears in early March of 1953 of Josef Stalin, and by his deposit on his bed of repose next to Lenin in the tomb in Red Square. For it is clear from the record that Stalin in his later years had become a psychopathic victim of paranoia with whom no meaningful diplomatic negotiations outside of Russia, and no meaningful human relations inside of Russia, were any longer possible.

A new leadership in the Soviet Union offered new possibilities. By the Spring of 1953, which was six years ago, and many years before the advent of the ICBM's, the Sputniks, or the Luniks, it was already abundantly clear that neither America nor Russia could impose its will on the other by armed force, and that any effort to do so could result only in the mutual destruction of both, and the end of our civilization, and quite possibly the suicide of the human race itself. Therefore, to revert to the obvious truisms with which we began, it was clear by 1953 that there was no tolerable alternative to a revival of diplomacy and a negotiated settlement of the Cold War.

A week or ten days ago I was going through some old files and I discovered a rather interesting article in The Nation of New York in the issue of June 20th, 1953, entitled "Cold War's End." This purported to be a prophetic article forecasting peace in Korea, peace in Indo-China, a treaty for the neutralization of Austria, a Summit Conference, ultimate solution of the German problem, and much else, all of which could have come to pass, and should have come to pass, within two or three years after 1953.

Some of these things did come to pass, but not all of them. It transpired that, in some respects, this prophetic article was prematurely prophetic. A truce in Korea was signed in late June of '53, and a truce in Indo-China was signed in July of '54, an Austrian treaty was signed on the 15th of May in '55; a Summit Conference met in Geneva of '55; and there was every prospect of a negotiated settlement of the Cold War by the end of that year. And then something went wrong and the Cold War was resumed instead of being terminated as this article had forecast. You will, of course, understand that considerations of modesty forbid me to name the author of the article.

Now what went wrong in 1955? Various things went wrong, including a number of mistakes and miscalculations by policy-makers in both Washington and Moscow, and also in London, Paris, Budapest, Cairo, and elsewhere. And among the other things that went wrong, President Eisenhower's heart attack of September of 1955 left him temporarily incapacitated and left the direction of American policy in the hands of a Secretary of State, who, among his very many and great virtues, was addicted to the vice of opposing any negotiated settlement. He is now departed and in peace, and of the dead we speak no evil. Let us only notice that if a comprehensive East-West settlement, or even a partial settlement, had been negotiated in the late months of 1955, there would, I am confident, have been no violence in Hungary and no violence at Suez and Sinai in the fall of 1956. A double tragedy could have been avoided, and the thousands who were slain would still be alive.

It is later than you think. 1959 is a good deal later than 1955, but happily not too late. Unless further mistakes and miscalculations are made, the Cold War will be ended by a series of diplomatic settlements during the coming year or years; some of them may take longer. No one in his senses would undertake to forecast the details of those settlements. Even though some of you think by now that I am no longer in my senses, I am going to pretend that I am and I'm not going to try to forecast these things.

I leave you with a brief formulation of two lessons learned, and five lessons yet to be learned. The rulers of Russia have, I believe, learned, whether they choose to admit the fact or not, that the Marxist analysis of capitalism is simply wrong with no basis whatsoever in the realities of our times, particularly in the United States. They have also learned that Communism will never liberate or subjugate or unify all the world, and that Communism's future fortunes in the world cannot be served by propaganda or subversion and least of all by war, but

can be served only by demonstrating that the Communist system can contribute more effectively than other systems to human health and wealth and happiness, and, ultimately, to human freedom. This remains to be demonstrated, but I think they have learned that this is what they have to try to do.

The policy-makers, and, I think, most of the people of America, have learned that war as a weapon of national policy has now become wholly unthinkable, intolerable, and impossible, and that peace requires that Americans deal with Russians not as fools, nor as knaves, nor as scoundrels, nor as incarnations of evil, but as human beings, and as equals with interests and aspirations similar to, and quite compatible with, American aspirations and interests. These things, I think, have been learned.

Beyond this, much remains to be learned by Russians and Americans alike, including the ultimate lesson that enduring peace in a world community requires effective law in a world community, and that this will finally require agreement on some limited and workable form of World Government, probably through a development of the United Nations in that direction. But apart from this ultimate lesson there are, it seems to me, several other lessons closer at hand which I believe will have to be learned.

First, we must learn that no unification of Germany is possible except through some form of disengagement, disarmament, and neutralization in Central and Eastern Europe. This concept or formula is not a product of Russian wickedness or Soviet or Communist conspiracy. This idea was first advanced at the Summit Conference in Geneva by Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of Great Britain, in July of 1955. It has since been endorsed and advanced by a great variety of people in East and West alike. It was put into concrete form by Adam Rapacki, the Foreign Minister of Poland, in November of 1957 and advanced in several variants in '58 by the Polish Government. It was endorsed by Khrushchev. It has the full support of the British Labor Party and of many Conservatives, of the German Social Democrats, and, I think, of the more thoughtful foreign commentators on world affairs in our own country. But, of course, it has been flatly rejected over and over again by our policy-makers in Washington. I repeat, we must learn that no re-unification of Germany is possible apart from some form of disengagement, neutralization, and disarmament in Central and Eastern Europe. The position to which we have adhered, or our policy-makers have adhered, for ten long years now, the position that Germany is to be unified by what would amount to the annexation to Western Germany of Eastern Germany, and that this re-unified Germany is to be heavily re-armed with American assistance and ultimately with thermonuclear weapons, and that this re-unified Germany is to be allied with the Western powers against Russia, bears no relationship to the realities of our world. This notion is wholly, utterly, and totally unworkable. No Russian government in a thousand years would ever dream of accepting it in any event.

Second, we must learn that no liberation of the satellites from Russian control is possible except through some form of disengagement, neutralization, and

disarmament in Central and Eastern Europe. Given some form of agreement in that direction, then eventually some form of liberation of the satellites will, I think, become possible. Without that, not possible.

Thirdly, we must learn, we and the Russians together, that no agreement on disarmament is possible through dramatic Soviet schemes for the abolition of all arms and weapons within four years or through continued American insistence on 100% foolproof schemes for inspection and control, which are technologically and politically impossible. Agreements to reduce armaments can be furthered, in my judgment, only by a negotiated settlement of political problems through the practice of diplomacy among peoples, and by the resultant diminution of mutual fears and suspicions, and the advent of mutual trust and confidence. Way back in the fall of 1945, in commenting on the problem already then posed of the international control of atomic energy, Prime Minister Clement Attlee of Great Britain said, "Where there is no mutual confidence, no system of control can work." This is true. This was true then and it is true now: "Where there is no mutual confidence, no system of control can work." I might add here as a footnote, in case you have forgotten (this is not very encouraging I grant you, but it states the fact), there has been only one instance, or one and one-half instances, if you prefer, in the whole history of modern diplomacy of an international conference aimed at the reduction of armaments by international agreement among equals which has succeeded in coming to an agreement for the reduction of armaments by international agreement among equals. Only one, or one and one-half, has succeeded. All the rest have failed totally. I refer, of course, to the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921-22 and the later London Conference of 1930, which dealt with cruisers. This is the only case of international agreement among equals for disarmament. There was no provision whatever made for any inspection or control. All the parties abided by the agreement and it was carried out in good faith for fifteen years.

Fourth, we must learn that we here in America will, in fact, need in the years ahead an economic substitute for the Cold War. Even though many of our business leaders may tell Mr. Khrushchev, "No, the problem is very simple. We don't need an economic substitute for the Cold War," I submit to you that we will need an economic substitute for the Cold War and that we should all of us be devoting far more thought to this problem than we have been doing thus far.

And fifth, (and finally, you will be glad to know) and still far off, very far off I fear, we must learn that in the long run no stable and secure world settlement will be truly possible without the participation of China, because China embraces one-quarter of the human race, with a population far larger than that of the United States, Russia, and Western Europe put together.

Can we learn these lessons? I believe so. We must learn them or perish. Therefore we can learn them if we will resolve to chart our course toward fruitful life rather than continue on a course toward universal death for ourselves

and our children. Let us then help ourselves, as we are trying to do here, to learn, let us help our leaders to learn, let us help our Russian neighbors to learn, because the more we learn, the more true it will become that "Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God."

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:

Question: Why should we trust Khrushchev any more than we should have trusted Hitler?

Prof. Schuman: We should not. In international affairs, we should not base agreements on trust. This is nonsense. You must base agreements on some assumption of what your interests are, and what the interests of the other party are, and what the dynamics of action are on both sides, not on trust. No trust is involved here.

Why should one assume that the interests of the power-holders in the Soviet Union are substantially different than the interests of the power-holders in Hitler's Reich? Well, there are some simple and obvious reasons for assuming that there is a major difference here. The power-holders in Hitler's Reich were completely dependent for maintaining themselves in power and for maintaining full production and full employment in the Germany of the 1930's on armaments, preparations for war, conquest, exploitation of conquered peoples, and extermination. This is how they lived. They couldn't live otherwise. The power-holders in the Soviet Union are not operating in that kind of economy or that kind of society. They can, with relative ease, and it would be enormously to their advantage to do so, shift their resources from armaments to consumer's goods; and they are not living in a context in which they are inexorably driven toward foreign expansion, aggression, and war, as Hitler and the Japanese warlords were. I hope we can get that distinction through our heads. It is of vital importance.

Question: Would you please list the other reasons of this afternoon why the elements of war are not present today?

Prof. Schuman: For the benefit of those of you who were not present at the panel discussion of this afternoon, reference is made to a facetious request of the Chairman of this afternoon for me to reiterate in two minutes the substance of an hour and one-half lecture entitled, "Why World War III Will Never Be Fought?" I couldn't quite do it in two minutes, nor can I do it here in two minutes. But at all events, maybe in three minutes, Miss Moderator. The argument rests on the following assumption: That on the basis of historical experience, in our State System, and even in earlier State Systems, in order to have a good, satisfactory, worthwhile world war, there are at least five prerequisites that must be present in the pattern of world affairs. You must first have the Powers divided into hostile coalitions. You must secondly have an arms race under way in which each tries to gain military superiority over the other. You must, third, have a series of incidents which act as sparks to set off the explosion. You can spell

this out for yourselves in the background of 1914 and of 1939. Thus far in terms of these three preconditions of a world war, we've been doing extremely well in the last fifteen years. We have the Powers divided into hostile coalitions. We have the most supercolossal arms race of all time. And we have had incidents almost every week,---planes shot down, border disputes, whatnot.

But we need two other things for a war between Great Powers. You need one Power or group of Powers making demands on the other Power or group of Powers for positions and components of power which are deemed decisive on both sides for future power, and which the other side will resist by force. And fifthly and decisively, you need the policy-makers and strategists on one side or the other, or usually both, in a position where they are able to entertain plausible or partially convincing beliefs in the military superiority of their own side, and to concoct strategic plans for winning the next war. There has never been a war in human history in which one side or the other or both, usually, did not entertain at the top level of policy-making a conviction or illusion of "our" superiority over "them" and a plan or program of a strategic nature by which "we" are going to win the war. Always, this.

This is now lacking. This has been lacking in the Cold War for fifteen years, and it is still lacking. It is not possible for anyone in his right mind in Washington or Moscow to entertain any illusion of military superiority or to concoct any plan for winning the next war. This is not possible. I can't tell you why unless you want to give me another hour. But it's not possible, and it's less possible in 1959 than it was five years ago or ten years ago. Therefore, the two great Power blocs have never, in all these years, made demands on one another for positions or components of power which the other side would resist by force. This has never happened. The Korean War is no exception, for, alas and alack, President Truman and Secretary Acheson and even General Bradley and some others in January, 1950, gave the impression to the world that the United States wouldn't defend South Korea. This was an error, but that impression was given. There has never been any Communist aggression against any frontier area which the United States said it would defend by force. And the United States and its Western allies have never taken any military action against any frontier area which Moscow said that it would defend by force.

Why? I've given you the reasons. This will not be. Therefore, none of the incidents ever leads to war. And therefore, the arms race and the grouping of the Powers is, in a way, rather irrelevant. However, actually I'm sorry that I recapitulated this thesis because the usual effect of this argument is to make people complacent and make them apathetic. We have no right to be complacent, and the worst thing that could possibly happen in American-Soviet relations in the months and years ahead is any kind of complacency or apathy on the part of the American public. It seems to me that we owe it to ourselves, and to the world at large, and to posterity, to grapple most seriously and think most seriously and clearly, if we can, about the kinds of problems and issues that

will continue to confront us. Otherwise, we can have no assurance against some ultimate catastrophe.

Question: On what terms can or should trade be resumed with Russia?

Prof. Schuman: Well, you are all aware that in recent years commerce between the United States and the Soviet Union has been negligible. I believe Khrushchev in one of his addresses said you could carry all the goods between the two countries in two or three ships. I believe our total exports to Russia last year were 1/10th of 1% of all our exports over the world, and Soviet exports here were half of 1% of Soviet exports. Why is it so negligible, particularly in view of the fact that way back in the 1930's there was a considerable volume of mutually advantageous trade between the two countries? It is negligible primarily because the things the Russians want to buy here are almost in every case things still on the strategic embargo list. They are alleged to be of use in war or of use in the strengthening of Soviet military potential, and therefore, their export is forbidden. That's part of the problem.

There are various other aspects of the problem: debt questions, questions of credit, perhaps too technical to go into here. But I think without any question the primary obstacle to an expansion of American-Soviet trade, which in my view would be to the great advantage of everybody concerned, is the prevailing official view, translated into legislation and into administrative orders and acts banning the export of all kinds of things, that increased trade between the United States and Russia would somehow redound to Russian advantage and American disadvantage.

By the same logic, we ban all trade with China, on the assumption that such trade would redound to Chinese advantage and American disadvantage. Of course, anyone who has had Economics 1 - 2 knows better than that---that all trade is to the advantage of both parties, including the party to which there is the least advantage. I believe that we shall ultimately have to learn also to modify this misconception of the function of international trade.

Question: Will greater reliance on long range weapons make disengagement of standing forces in Europe and subsequent unification of Germany more possible?

Prof. Schuman: That is an interesting question, ladies and gentlemen. But I presume that ought to be referred to a military historian or military specialist, neither of which I am. Therefore, I can offer only a layman's answer to this. There is one sense in which all weapons and all armed forces and all strategies and tactics are already completely obsolete. By that I mean we have reached a point at which war can no longer be used as an instrument of policy, because recourse to war with the weapons available means the end of the human race. I think it means no less than that if we envisage a general, prolonged thermonuclear war. This being so, perhaps it's not too helpful to make distinctions between various kinds of armaments, but I take it the questioner has in mind

something which is a possibly hopeful thought, that is, that insofar as the military planners of the two great Super Powers are more and more successful in perfecting intercontinental ballistic missiles with thermonuclear warheads which can hit any target 5,000 miles away, insofar as this is the reliance for defense and security, the uses of conventional armies, navies, and air forces becomes more and more questionable. What do you need armies, navies, and air forces for if you are going to fight the next war that way? Maybe then, in this sense, the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles might help to promote reduction of, and disengagement of, standing forces in Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, there's a rub to this on both sides. On our side the rub is that the strategy of NATO from the beginning has all been based on the immediate use of atomic weapons at the onset of any new hostilities. Any disengagement or consideration of the hope expressed in this question would require considerable rethinking of the function and task of NATO, as I suspect it would require equal rethinking on the part of Soviet strategists and planners of the whole structure of the Soviet armed forces. But let's be cheerful and assume there is a little hope in the question posed here.

"THE ECONOMIC RACE FOR WORLD SUPREMACY"

Thursday Seminar

Opening Remarks: Mr. Thomas Whitney, Journalist

Remarks: Prof. John S. Curtiss, Duke University

Questioners: Julie Campbell

Warren Wickersham

William Mauer

Moderator: Marian Sapp, Symposium Committee

Moderator: This is the Duke University Student Symposium, Thursday afternoon, October 8th, at 3:15 p.m. in the Union Ballroom.

Mr. Whitney: The title of the seminar for today is "The Economic Race for World Supremacy." There is certainly more and more of a consciousness in this country and abroad of Soviet economic accomplishments. One testimony to this is a recent work put out by a joint economic committee entitled "A Comparison of the United States and Soviet Economies." It consists of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, and it's only Part I of this particular work, and I can certainly recommend it as being a very interesting and worthwhile series of studies on Soviet economic growth as compared with that of the United States.

Let's start our discussion today by looking at a few Soviet economic accomplishments. It was recently announced by Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhail Suslov in his speech in Peiping that the Soviet Union this year will produce, and this was said at a time when almost ten months of the year were over, 60 million metric tons of steel, 129 million metric tons of oil, 261 billion kilowatt hours of electric power, and over 500 million metric tons of coal. This isn't any mean accomplishment. This puts the Soviet Union well in first place in the world in coal production. It puts the Soviet Union far into second place in the production of steel and electric power in the world, and third in the world in production of oil. It's very interesting also that the increases in output that the Soviet Union will register this year in its production of key commodities are considerable. For instance, in the case of steel, according to Suslov, production will increase 5 million 100 thousand tons over last year---that is in one year's time. Electric power will increase 23 billion kilowatt hours in output this year over last year. And in the case of petroleum the increase will be 16 million metric tons. Now these are just figures to you, but to try to put them in a little more concrete terms let me state it this way; that an increase in output of this magnitude in the case of steel means that in every five years the Soviet Union, if it can maintain such an increase over a period of five years, adds as much steel production to its existing large production as is made by West Germany, the third ranking steel producer in the world. The addition each year of 23 billion kilowatt hours of electric power to the existing large Soviet production of electric power means that Soviet power production is increased as much every two or three years as

the existing power production in England and France. The addition of 16 metric tons of petroleum production to the Soviet Union's existing production of petroleum means that every three years the Soviet Union is adding as much to its existing production as the total output of Saudi Arabia, at least an amount in that general area of magnitude, Saudi Arabia being one of the largest oil producers in the world. This is no mean accomplishment.

Now let us add to that one other important fact, that is that as you study the Soviet economy, as you look back at the history of the Soviet economy, it will become apparent to you that production increases are being achieved in the Soviet Union, and have been achieved in almost all the years of peace in the Soviet Union every year. Sometimes these increases are larger, and sometimes they are smaller, so far as the statistical measurement of total production goes. There is much discussion among American economists as to whether the Soviet gross production index for industry does not exaggerate Soviet accomplishments. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in each year there is undoubtedly an increase in industrial production in the Soviet Union, year after year and regularly. And in the case of each important commodity this is also the case. Some years in the case of steel an increase of only 2 million metric tons was achieved in the Soviet Union, and sometimes as will be the case in this year, it will be as much as five million tons. Yet the fact remains that there has been an increase even in those years in which planned production has not been attained. The movement is regularly and steadily up. This is something that cannot be said of our own economy, certainly, because, as you know, we move to a certain extent in fits and starts.

It's all very well to talk about tons of steel and billions of kilowatt hours of electricity, but let's also talk about some specific objects that are being built in the Soviet Union in the present time as examples. This year when Vice-President Nixon visited the USSR, one of the cities he saw was the booming metropolis of Novosibirsk in Siberia; and one of the things he visited at Novosibirsk was a site outside the city itself. It was an area that had been smoothed over by bulldozers and where construction crews were at work on a large scale, and what Nixon and the newspapermen who were with him saw was in embryo a new, great center of world science. It's a city which, at least as far as I know, doesn't yet have even a name. It was started, I believe, two years ago. Up to that time, it was just woods alongside the reservoir that has been formed by the electric power dam across the Ob river. In about two years time more it will be a booming city of scholarly and scientific work. There will be there thirteen major research institutes, almost every one of them devoted to work in the field of the physical sciences and mathematics. Some of the most important Soviet scientists are already there starting their organizational work in their new institute. There will be a university there which will, in part, prepare people for research work in this new science city. There will be a factory for the production of laboratory equipment. There will be a library with four million volumes in its initial collection. This will have risen on a place where there was nothing several years ago. There isn't the slightest doubt that it will, in ten years time, rank

alongside Leningrad, Moscow, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Cambridge, England, as one of the world's great science research centers. This is being built right now, at the present time, and it was not there a few years ago.

Another project in Siberia which Vice-President Nixon didn't see was in its own way as great a project. Over on the Angara River at a small place called Bratsk, there is being built the greatest hydroelectric station in the world. The Angara River flows out of Lake Baikal and into the Yenisei River and it has one particularly useful characteristic which makes it potentially one of the world's greatest hydroelectric power producers. It has a very steady flow year in and year out from season to season because it flows from Lake Baikal which, in effect, forms a tremendous reservoir. And because of this and because there is a very rapid fall in the level of the river, this means that a dam built across the Angara River can produce hydroelectric power at a very, very cheap rate. The rapids where this dam is being built was a complete wilderness a few years ago. Now there is a teeming city populated by young people who have been sent out there, perhaps not all of them willingly, but at any rate they are there, to build this dam. The dam is at the present time well under way. It will probably be producing power in another three to four to five years, if not earlier. The total capacity of the power produced will run in the area of 4,500,000 kilowatts. This is more than twice the capacity of Grand Coulee in Washington, which, until a few years ago, was the largest hydroelectric dam in the world. And this project is right in the middle of a total wilderness. This cheap electric power will flow over power lines to areas of Soviet Eastern Siberia and Central Siberia which have not had adequate electric power up to now. The power will be used, along with power to be produced from other electric power stations projected in the same area, along with electric power to be produced from coal and perhaps from nuclear power, to create one of the world's new, great industrial areas, and, I repeat, in an area which is right now a wilderness, an area which will turn out an enormous quantity of chemical products---aluminum, metals, coal, an area which has all the natural resources and which will in twenty to fifty years time rank with such industrial areas as our own Pacific Northwest, as the Ruhr, as one of the great productive districts of the world.

Let's take another Soviet accomplishment that I talked about yesterday in an economics class. It isn't an accomplishment yet, but something that is being done. While Khrushchev was here in the United States, a decree was issued in Moscow, a decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Soviet Trade Unions. It was front page news in Pravda and yet I doubt whether it was reported in more than a few papers in this country because of the fact that the Khrushchev visit was getting so much attention. What is this decree? This is a decree which is intended to complete or carry on further the process of transfer of the Soviet workers from an eight hour work day, which they had in the post war period, an eight hour work day, and a six day week, to a seven hour work day, again, six days a week. A reduction of their work week from the area of 48 hours to 42 hours. And, eventually, as it has been stated by Soviet authorities, they plan to reduce it to 40 hours. After

all, we're used, most of us, to offices and factories and the like that work already on a forty hour week and in some cases on a thirty-five hour week. But how does something like this look to people like Indians, let us say, or others who come from countries where the eight hour day or, for that matter, even the six day week is something still to be dreamed about, something that hasn't been achieved. This is something that is being done, the process of transferring to the seven hour day will be completed, if this plan is carried out, by the end of next year.

The moral of these things that I have just been talking to you about is that the Soviet Union has achieved a good deal, as is obvious from its moon rocket, but the Soviet Union isn't resting on its laurels. The Soviet Union is doing things at the present time which will bear fruit years and decades from now. But that's not the only point to be made about the Soviet Union. Last week Premier Khrushchev arrived in Moscow on his TU-114 airplane and the next day took off for Peiping. This airplane, I think it's the biggest passenger airplane in the world---it's absolutely enormous, as you remember, when Vice-Premier Koslov came here last June he had to descend on a ladder because there wasn't any ramp available at Friendship Airport in the United States tall enough to get up to the plane---it's an enormous and a very, very effective and efficient plane. It made the trip back with Vice-Premier Koslov from Washington to Moscow in a little less than ten hours, which is a very fast flight, indeed, with an average speed of over 800 kilometers or 500 miles an hour. This is the plane that Premier Khrushchev travels in, I suppose one of the finest fruits of the aircraft industry of the world, even perhaps superior to the first jet plane that ever went into passenger service and stayed in it anywhere in the world, the TU-104, also a Soviet plane. Premier Khrushchev, when he traveled over his country, could look down from this most modern plane, down below to the Soviet earth, and what did he see? He saw a land where there were practically no roads at all, little dirt trails over the horizon with deep holes where Soviet trucks can get stuck up to their axles and over without any trouble at all. Once in a long, long while, maybe a paved road. The Soviet Union, which has one sixth of the world's surface, has fewer modern paved highways than the state of New York or the state of Pennsylvania by itself alone. Jet transportation in the sky above and no roads down on the earth below. This in a way epitomizes a great deal of what is in existence in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is a land of contrast. And I will cite an example that I cited in Dr. Hoover's class yesterday: If you go from the airport Vnukovo into Moscow (it's only about twenty miles outside of town), there are still left along that highway a few villages, and you will see in these villages log cabins. It has been a long time since there was a President of the United States born in a log cabin. We don't have any more log cabins, or very few. But it wouldn't be at all impossible for many years to come if Prime Ministers of the Soviet Union were to have been born in log cabins, because almost all of rural Russia is made up of log cabins. They are made in very much the same way that they were made in the times of Ivan the Terrible or a thousand years ago. Logs are taken, rough hewn, notched, put together very effectively and very efficiently with rather primitive tools, and with moss in between for insulation---and that is Soviet

rural construction in the middle of the 20th century. But, if you were to go on toward Moscow on the road between the airport and the city, you would see a kind of queer looking T-shaped thing sticking out of the top of the roof of a log cabin, and you would ask your Intourist chauffeur, "What is that?" And he would say, "Oh, that is a television aerial." And true enough, it wouldn't be like any television aerial you had ever seen or had, but it would be a television aerial and every one of those aerials would represent a television set down below in that cabin. And most of them have television aerials on them. So there you are. The construction methods of the 13th century alongside the electronics industry of the 20th century. Again, that is Russia.

There isn't any one truth about the Soviet Union. The truth about the Soviet economy does not lie exclusively in nuclear power plants, in atomic ice-breakers, in moon rockets. It also lies in elevators which still don't work in many parts of the country. Even though the situation has improved, it still lies in roads that don't exist, in life which is in many respects still on a very primitive level, where even running hot water is still a luxury which many people have never experienced or heard about. And this is something that you must always keep in mind when you read about the Soviet Union or when you think about its economic progress.

And yet, the fact is that the Soviet Union has hit the industrial jackpot of the 20th century in the biggest possible way, and is exploiting this situation to the utmost. It has opened that wonderbox of nucleonics, electronics, and automation, modern industrial chemistry, and all the rest of it that has given us the good things which make our American life so interesting and attractive. The fact that in the Soviet Union so many of these good things of life have not yet filtered down to the average Soviet consumer doesn't mean that the techniques and the talents for using those things are not there. They are there. It is true that the Soviet Union is producing nearly three times as many engineers as we are per year. And the problems of use of natural resources ultimately come down to only one thing in the final analysis---skilled people, people able to make something out of nothing. And that is what the Soviet Union has.

As for us here in the United States, because our subject here is "The Economic Race for World Supremacy," well, it's obvious, I think, to all of us that we aren't standing still. Things aren't getting worse, certainly. Things are to some extent getting better from year to year. We aren't standing still. Yet, if you stop to look, we aren't running either. In a way, you know, this topic is a very interesting one: "The Economic Race for World Supremacy." Now we're here talking about this, but are there people in Washington, do people in Washington in the important positions in the government, do people in key positions in industry in our country, do the influential people who make the important decisions in the country think that we are in an economic race with Russia for world supremacy? Do they think of this as a race? Do they worry whether Russia catches up with us in electric power production, for instance, which is perhaps the most valid single index of industrial progress that one can think of in the world today? Well, my contention would be that they don't think of it very much

in these terms. It's a little bit like the race for space. Until the Soviet Sputnik got up there, and it was apparent just what a tremendous psychological impact this was having, until that moment we weren't in the race for space. In fact, even after that moment, leaders of our government said that we were not running a race with the Soviet Union, and thereupon immediately started to run a race. By this time, we were an awful long way behind. And I just was noticing in the New York Times the other day that Dr. York, who is one of our leaders in the space field, puts it this way. He said, "The Soviet lead in rocket propulsion can be traced to the fact that the Soviet Union embarked on a strong, systematic program of rocket development of 1945, while the United States did not get going with a crash program until 1954." "As a result of this head start," he said, "the Soviet Union by 1957 had developed a rocket with an initial thrust of 600 thousand to 800 thousand pounds for space research." "In the United States," he pointed out, "the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile with 360 pounds of thrust is only now becoming available for space missions." "Ultimately," Dr. York, said, "this country's chances of catching up with the Soviet Union in space rocket propulsion depend largely upon the Saturn rocket, a cluster of rocket engines producing 1 million, 500 thousand pounds of thrust." The Saturn rocket is under development by the Army Ballistic Missiles Agency of Huntsville, Alabama. Not mentioned by Dr. York was the fact that the fate of the Saturn project is still somewhat uncertain because of budgetary and organizational review of the space program.

Are we in the space race? I mean the question is open. Nobody knows whether we're in it or not, because nobody has decided whether we are. The United States, likewise, up to the present time hasn't shown much signs that there is any such race for economic world supremacy. Let me conclude these introductory remarks by saying that as long as we don't recognize that there is such a race, then it's very difficult to see how we stand very much chance of keeping ahead in the long run.

Moderator: Thank you Mr. Whitney. Dr. Curtiss, I believe, has some remarks.

Prof. Curtiss:

First of all, I want to present some material supporting the views of Mr. Whitney regarding the rapid growth of the Soviet economy. In 1930 American steel production was 35.5 million short tons; Soviet steel production was 4.7 million tons. The ratio thus was about 7.1. For 1940 the corresponding figures were 47.4 and 20.1 million tons, or almost 2 1/2 to 1. In 1958; which was a poor year for us because of the recession; we produced 89 million tons of steel; and the USSR produced 60 million---or about three to two. Thus in the period between 1930 and 1958, the Soviet Union had cut our lead in steel from over seven to one to merely three to two. Surely such rapid progress on their part indicates that we have an effective competitor.

In discussing Soviet economic development one of the first questions we should consider is the validity of Soviet statistics. While there have been

considerable differences of opinion on this point, I think that the majority of students of Soviet economics feel that when the USSR declares that its production of coal or oil for 1949 was 108 percent of its 1948 output, without giving the 1948 figures, or states the quantity of output in terms of rubles, these figures must be used with great caution. The statistics on value of output, for example, are of little value unless we know the value of the ruble that is being quoted and unless we know the prices of the various items that are being made. On the other hand, it is generally held that when the Soviet government announces the production of so many million metric tons of coal or oil or so many billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, these figures are fairly reliable. Over the years the figures of this sort have been fairly consistent, and the government itself uses them, so these figures command respect. When Soviet statistics are unfavorable, the government, instead of lying about them, usually simply gives no figures at all. Mr. Whitney mentioned to me the case of Soviet population estimates after World War II. For a long time there were none; finally, when the amount had slightly exceeded the pre-war figure of two hundred million, the USSR announced that its population was estimated at 200,200,000.

My main topic is Soviet agriculture, about which nothing has yet been said. In 1930 Stalin compelled the Soviet peasants to pool their lands in collective farms in order to achieve a more productive agriculture. The peasants, however, were very reluctant to turn over their livestock to the collectives, and so many of them killed and ate their cattle before they joined. The result was that the numbers of cows, sheep, and pigs were cut by one-fourth or over, and it took many years to make good this loss. Also, while the government supplied much farm machinery to the collective farms and urged modern methods, the peasants received little for their labor. The government compelled them to turn over part of their crop to it in the form of compulsory deliveries, for which the government paid little, and the prices paid for the balance of the crops were not high enough to make it profitable for the peasants to work hard for the collectives. So the peasants grew little more on the collective farms than the government compelled them to grow, and instead preferred to spend most of their energy on growing crops and livestock on their own garden plots for themselves. Thus, while by the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941 Soviet agriculture had advanced somewhat and had made good the earlier losses of agriculture, it still lagged far behind industry.

The German invasion in 1941 and 1942 did immense damage to Soviet agriculture by destroying vast quantities of farm machinery and buildings and killing much livestock, as well as killing great numbers of peasants. It took years to complete Soviet recovery after the war. In addition, Stalin continued the policy of giving the peasants relatively little for their crops, so that they did not find it worthwhile to work extra hard. In addition, if a collective farm made exceptional progress, the tax officials, as Khrushchev later said, pruned it as gardeners prune shrubs in parks. Hence, by Stalin's death in 1953 Soviet agriculture was producing crops not much over one-quarter above the 1928 level, and number of livestock was no greater than in 1928.

Khrushchev, who was much interested in agriculture, determined to introduce new policies in order to improve the situation. In September, 1953, he made a speech in which he proposed that the low prices paid to the peasants for their compulsory deliveries of produce be raised drastically---five times for cattle and poultry, and doubled for milk and butter. Payments for potatoes and vegetables were raised by 25-40%. In addition, the government would pay 30% more for its purchases of meat, and 50% more for milk. In order to stimulate the raising of livestock, Khrushchev insisted on a vast increase in the planting of corn. Where the climate would permit the growing of corn for grain, hybrid seed from the United States should be planted, to obtain much higher yields than before. In the colder regions, he ordered the growing of corn to provide silage for winter fodder for cattle. Thus corn has always played a big part in Khrushchev's farm program. A great expansion of production of mineral fertilizer was another of his demands. Finally, he embarked on a huge effort to plow up millions of acres of virgin soil or other idle land in Western Siberia and Central Asia to grow vast quantities of wheat.

In later years Khrushchev introduced other new farm policies. In 1958 he ordered an end to all compulsory deliveries of farm produce, so that the government would pay for all it bought at the market price. The collective farmers now receive their pay in cash instead of in crops, as formerly. The collectives also enjoy much more autonomy than before in making their own decisions. Moreover, in 1958 the government arranged for the collective farms to buy and use the farm machinery, which up to that time had been owned by government Machine-Tractor Stations.

These various measures have had much success. Millions of young men and women have gone to open up the virgin lands, and with machinery supplied by the government some eighty million acres have been planted. While the harvests have not all been good, on the whole the USSR has produced much more grain than ever before. Also, thanks to the stress on raising corn and silage and to the new zeal of the peasants induced by the greater returns for their labor, there has been a sharp gain in the number of livestock and in their productivity. By 1957, Khrushchev was emboldened to announce the goal of overtaking the United States in respect to per capita production of milk, butter, and meat, and in 1959 he announced that the USSR was already producing more milk and butter than the United States (although not more per capita). Soviet meat production is less favorable, however, as it is now little more than half that of the United States. In general, it can be said that, while Soviet agriculture is much less efficient than ours, it has already done much to raise its efficiency and may be on the way to new successes. We are still ahead, but our lead is being challenged.

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:

Moderator: Thank you very much Dr. Curtiss. I was wondering if there are any questions now which the audience would like to address to Mr. Whitney.

Question: Mr. Whitney, in the early part of this week the National Planning Association in Washington released a report in which it stated that the announced goals of the Soviet government concerning overtaking U.S. production in industrial output by 1965 was beyond the realm of practicality, and it stated a number of reasons for believing that the Soviet Union will be forced to slow down during this period. It stated, among other reasons, three on which I'd like for you to comment: (1) A labor shortage which is believed to be attributable to the extensive war losses during World War II and also to the decrease in the birth rate during that period; and (2) it also mentioned the fact that the necessity for replacing equipment which was just now beginning to wear out will be more extensive than at any time during the past; and, (3) it also mentioned the problem of increased pressure for consumer goods by the Soviet people and that this has already been conceded by the Soviet leaders and will continue to be a thorn in their side in the goal for industrial expansion.

Mr. Whitney: Would you cite the exact phraseology of their overall conclusion for me?

Questioner: Well, in other words, the conclusion was that the officially announced goal to match U.S. industrial output by 1965 was outside the bounds of practical possibility. It also stated at the end of the report that these conclusions should not lead to a sense of complacency on the part of the American citizenry.

Mr. Whitney: Let's deal with this business of catching up, that is, the stated goal of catching up with the United States by 1965. I myself have not seen this particular report. I've seen a number of reports of this same sort, along this same general line which do come out with the conclusion that there's nothing to worry about. There's no reason for us to get discouraged because they aren't going to catch up with us anyway. Typical of this is one right here, a study put out by a group which was headed by Professor Nutter of Virginia which said that there is no definitive evidence that the Soviet economic system has been able to generate more rapid growth over the long run than the traditional private enterprise system of the West. Now as far as this report of the National Planning Association is concerned, in the first place, the Russians have never said anywhere in black and white that they intend to catch up with us by 1965. They have never set out anywhere in black and white the date by which they intend to overtake the United States. Even if they did, it would be a very difficult thing to measure because overall strength, unlike one particular item, isn't so easy to measure. It would presume some kind of overall index figure, and the kind of index figures that the Russians use are the most questionable portion of their statistics practice, and they have been seriously questioned by American economists. But it seems to me that, in general, this report of the National Planning Association represents a type of approach to this problem which is going to increase complacency and make it more of a surprise than it's otherwise going to be on that bright day when we wake up and find that they are about sixty miles ahead of us. And we've done this often in the past. That is to say, we've waked up to find that there was a new earth satellite weighing two tons more up in the air, and here are we way down here with little apples or grapefruit or whatever it is we've got.

I don't mean to belittle our programs, but we're behind, period. And at the same time, we can find people even today, despite the statements by Dr. York and other people, who say we are ahead of them in space research, that while our satellites aren't so big as theirs, we get more information from them. True enough, we haven't hit the moon yet. And I don't know how you can get around that fact. I don't know how you can get around the facts of Soviet economic progress by any kind of verbiage or any kind of sophistry. It's true that the Russians face a serious labor problem. It's true that this problem is due to the fact that there was a very low birth rate during World War II, and that kids who would ordinarily have been born if their fathers hadn't been killed or at the front, would now be entering the ranks of Soviet labor. When it says there is a labor shortage, it doesn't mean that the Soviet labor force is going to decrease. There's a labor shortage in relationship to labor demands, to the demand for labor. Given the fact that there has been a large scale capital investment program, they would be able to use a number of million more hands with their lathes than they will have coming into their labor force. This is what that labor shortage amounts to. It doesn't amount to a decrease in their labor force. This isn't the type of a shortage which is going to cause their economy to slide backward. And not even the National Planning Association says that it will.

So far as the question of replacement of losses, that is to say, the replacement of wastage in industry of lathes, machinery, equipment which has been worked too long already probably, this is an important problem for them. Much of their equipment which came from before the war, during the war, and immediately after the war is going to have to be replaced. Again, it is nothing that cannot be done. I mean it's not a problem of such magnitude that it is going to cause them to slip backwards.

Increased pressure for consumer goods---the interesting thing about this particular item is that there is increased pressure for consumer goods and as there becomes more consumer goods there is more incentive to work harder, so that labor productivity, which is the main problem in the Soviet economy, in the Soviet Union in its race with the United States, is assisted by increasing availability of consumer goods because it provides increased incentive. I believe that the conclusion to this report inevitably will lead to the type of complacency that the authors say they want to avoid. That's my comment.

Question: Mr. Whitney, we've been talking about statistics and their reliability. To what extent can we rely on Soviet statistics?

Mr. Whitney: Well, this is the general question of statistics in the Soviet Union. Dr. Curtiss gave an answer on his part even before you asked the question. And I agree with Dr. Curtiss to a very great degree. You stated in your question, if I understood you correctly, that there is a great lack of statistics in the Soviet Union. Well, let me put it this way: Right now there is a flood of statistics. There was a complete drought up until 1956, but right now the government is beginning to put out enormous volumes of statistics, not all the

statistics that everybody wants by any means yet. But now it has become a problem of too many instead of too few---too many compared to the people who are trained to examine them. So it's no longer a question of not having statistics. Point Number 2: I would agree with Dr. Curtiss when he said that, in general, the Soviet practice (I'm not talking about other Communist countries, particularly China) is when they don't want to reveal something, they don't so much put out fake statistics as just keep their mouths shut about it. They don't say anything about it. Oftentimes, by knowing this practice you can find out what is going on in the Soviet Union in a negative sense. You watch not what they talk about, but what they don't talk about. And so often you find that what they don't talk about is something that things are bad in. For some reason, in the Soviet psychology things always have to go up, even golf scores. I mean, literally, things have to go up. If they stop going up, they don't mention it. For instance, Suslov, in his report to Peiping this year, doesn't talk much about Soviet agriculture. Why not? Well, we know that they've had it rough in the Ukraine. We don't know how serious it is. Certainly, there is no famine. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if you watch these things you can tell to some extent by what they don't say what is going on.

In general, I feel that the Soviet statistics that we get are the same ones, when we get them at all, that are being used by Soviet government authorities. Now they have a certain number of defects. This particularly applies to, and you have to use them with caution, their overall index figures. Let us say the index of industrial production... There isn't any simple way of calculating this thing. This is an extremely difficult statistical calculation. All of you who are studying economics know this, I'm afraid, better than I do probably. This is an extremely difficult statistical calculation which tries to put into one number the entire complexity of industrial production. And there are many, many questions that arise. Let us say, suppose, you want to compare production today in the form of some number with production in 1913. Well, there are a lot of things that are produced today, like television sets and all kinds of modern devices that were not produced at all in 1913. So what value do you give these things, because the comparison is very important. Well, or let's say they only produced a few of them in 1913. This is the kind of problem that has come up in Soviet statistics. Generally speaking, I do not think that Soviet statistics are so unreliable. Some of our economists have gone much too far in their readjustment of Soviet industrial indexes, I consider. It's a very difficult thing to readjust another government's statistics.

Question: If we assume that we are in an economic race, and we do have some means of winning this race, and we come to the conclusion that we have lost; then what effect would that have on the American system in the eyes of the world?

Mr. Whitney: Now this is a relevant question. The question is: What difference would it make anyway? Up until the present time, or at the present time, the general measure of state power that is used by everybody in the world is

economic. We may talk a great deal about morality and the moral force, but when it gets down to brass tacks, it is always a question of counting the tons of steel and counting the kilowatts of electric power and counting the things that are produced, that go into the aggregate called power. One of the reasons is that these are the same things that go to make up military power. To be sure, we are in a new age, a new military age, where we have weapons that seemingly are of such power that they could counterbalance great economic strength. There's a good deal of argument about the importance of production. I think that one of the most perceptive works that has been published recently which discusses this is The Affluent Society by John Kenneth Galbraith of Harvard. He comes to the conclusion that production doesn't really matter anyway, that we don't need to worry about production anymore. I disagree with him very radically, because when we are outproduced we won't have to ask the question whether we have lost. It will begin to become apparent to us in so many different ways and will become apparent to the rest of the world simultaneously that we will know we have lost without having to reduce it to an index figure. It can mean, as it means right now, a moon rocket up there when we don't have one yet. It can mean a government that has been bought ten years from now because we don't have as much money to lay on the line as the Russians. It can mean, if you have more goods, you have more money; you can spend more money on subversion, you can spend more money on espionage; you can spend more money on arms; you can spend more money on everything. These things become evident very quickly. The Russians right now even, when everybody knows that they have maybe 50% of our economic production, our economic capacity, are doing very well in the political race with us, not just because they have this production, but because they do pretty well in using it to its maximum effectiveness. When they have as much as we have, I'm afraid you won't even have to ask that question.

"THE KHRUSHCHEV VISIT"

Thursday Address

Speaker: Prof. Thomas Whitney, Journalist

Prof. Whitney:

I was tempted for a minute, after having been on this Khrushchev visit, to clap myself for myself. You know, the Khrushchev trip was, in a very real sense, an adventure in communication or attempt at communication between Russians and Americans. And let nobody underestimate the magnitude of that task of simply communicating very simple ideas. Perhaps the best way I could illustrate it is with a story that doesn't really refer to Nikita Khrushchev himself, but to one of the forty Soviet correspondents who were traveling around in his entourage over the country. This correspondent, who was the head of the foreign section of one of the Soviet Union's leading newspapers, came to me with a very, very puzzled look on his face one day and in his hands he had the front page of a San Francisco newspaper. There was a banner headline across the top, and he held this out to me and said, "How can you translate this for me?" I read to myself, "Giants Crush Dodgers." He said, "Is this some kind of gang warfare that has broken out here?" I was, of course, able to explain to him very quickly what the headline meant in terms of Moscow soccer teams. And then a great ray of light came across his face, and, at last, he had understood what was going on in the United States; but, up to then, he was very, very worried about the situation as it was developing out there on the West coast.

Nikita Khrushchev had his own problems in communication, and some of them were problems that arose simply from questions of translation, even though he had with him a young man, Alex Troyanovsky, who studied at the Friend's School in Washington for three years and then at Swarthmore College, son of a former Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and Victor Sukhodrev, also a very able young man who has studied in England. In spite of the fact that he had both of these boys along with him who were nearly bilingual, there were moments when there was a great question in my mind as to how much of Nikita Khrushchev was getting across to his American audience.

I was sent on the trip by the Washington Post, because, among other things I do know Russian, and it was felt that, knowing Russian, I would be able to get more of what was going on. And, in a sense, this was correct. Here's a little example of one of the questions that was asked Khrushchev at the National Press Club in Washington, and the way the whole thing worked out. The questioner asked (the question was read in English), "How soon does the Soviet Union expect to send a man to the moon?" Alex Troyanovsky took this question and he translated it. In translating it, he used a word in Russian when he came to the verb 'send' which doesn't mean literally 'send' but means 'throw.' The question came across to Mr. Khrushchev, "When does the Soviet Union expect to throw a man to the moon?" Mr. Khrushchev looked a little puzzled for a

moment, and then he went on and gave his answer. He said, "We in the Soviet Union don't believe in throwing our people around," or words to this effect. And he gave a little dissertation of approximately a paragraph on how the Soviet Union doesn't throw its people around. And then he got down to the question and said, "And as to when we expect to send a man to the moon," and as you see, by this time he had gotten back to where we had started from in the first place. I've forgotten now what the answer was, but it was clever enough and it evaded the question, of course, as one might expect.

At this point, Troyanovsky had to translate back into English Khrushchev's answer which had been based on a misunderstanding, based on a mistranslation by Troyanovsky in the first place. Now I don't know how many of the people in the hall knew what was going on or how many of the people in the radio audience, but it was a pretty mixed up little question and answer session. And that's just one sample of a number, I wouldn't say of similar things, but it's a sample of the difficulty that one encounters in communication from one language to another simply and purely from mistranslation.

In that same session, the same day, Alex Troyanovsky made another mistake. Somebody asked, "What new proposals does the Soviet Union have...?" I think it was on Berlin. Troyanovsky translated: "What new problems does the Soviet Union have...?" Well, it took Khrushchev a while to get around to discussing proposals after having been asked what problems the Soviet Union has, and I don't know how many of his American audience realized that he hadn't understood the question, through no fault of his own. But at any rate, he more or less did an answer---another illustration of the difficulties of translation.

Then, too, you know, there is no such thing as a perfect translation. Those of you who watched Mr. Khrushchev on TV, I think, got a good deal of the spirit with which he spoke. He would answer in Russian, and then there would come the translation. So often, as the translation came, even though it was a technically competent translation in most cases, somehow or another the punch got lost. Yet this translation was the one that was used as the text that was printed in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and all the other papers with printed texts. This was the official English text, the text that was delivered.

I can give you an example of the kind of phraseology that Khrushchev used that didn't come across. There was a question in the last session that he had at the National Press Club, the second press conference, the one the afternoon before he made his final speech on NBC and then took off for Moscow. He had been asked at this press conference whether the Soviet Union would be willing to expand trade in consumer goods with the United States. Now, I don't think it was intended in this way by the person who asked the question, who represented a newspaper known as Womens Wear Daily, which is chiefly interested in consumer goods, of course. I don't think it was realized by the person who asked the question that this was kind of a tender point with Mr. Khrushchev because he could buy consumers' goods here right now and what he wants is producers' goods, it

did arouse a slight asperity on Mr. Khrushchev's part. And he immediately came back and said, "You'll have to realize that the Soviet Union is no colony." And then, as I remember, his phraseology went like this and I'll give it to you in my own translation---a literal translation word by word---"If you want to sell sausages and shoes, then that's no merchandise. If you want such a buyer, go look somewhere else." The translation of Alex Troyanovsky came out something along the following lines, "If you should want to sell us sausages and shoes, you will not find a market for those goods in our country." Now the essential thought is there---you can't sell us sausages and shoes---but it hasn't got the punch that Khrushchev had.

I was asked by my managing editor before the trip broke up, who wanted me to compare Khrushchev: "To whom is he comparable in our own political firmament?" He certainly is not comparable to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the aristocrat who spoke always as an aristocrat. He certainly is not comparable to Winston Churchill, the great man of literature and letters as well as politics, a man who always speaks in beautiful, well-rounded phrases. He is not comparable to President Eisenhower. It seemed to me that he was most of all comparable, in some ways to Harry Truman. Now I know that this is something that neither of these two men would like. And since I would like to hope that both of them will be cordially disposed toward me, I hope that neither one of them reads the article in which I compared them to each other.

So why did Nikita Khrushchev want to come to the United States? And what did he get out of it? What did we get out of it, if anything? And what should be our opinion on this unique venture in international diplomacy which I suppose has no parallel anywhere, at any time. Well, Niki certainly wanted an invitation for a long time, and it certainly had been obvious for a long time that he wanted to come to the United States. Why? Well, let's start with a couple of personal reasons. The first of these is his own political prestige in his own country. Stop to think for a minute: the United States is the country which occupies a particular place in the minds of Soviet citizens, be they Communists or non-Communists. It's a sort of a combination of dreamland and Hades, at one end of the scale and the other. It's an enemy and a friend. It's a sort of a fetish and it's a sort of a bugbear. And this is the Never-Never land that no Soviet premier had ever visited. Certainly, Khrushchev, who if he is trying to do anything is trying to be different than his predecessors - both Lenin and Stalin, was anxious to be the first premier to come to the United States. Let's put it in social terms. He, in a way, is a nouveau riche, a social upstart in the world. I don't mean that he thinks of himself particularly in this way, at least not in a conscious manner, but he certainly is. The Soviet regime, even though it's forty years old, is relatively new among the regimes and systems of this world. And it's chief hasn't been invited to the big house yet. And he has been waiting for the day when he could wangle himself an invitation. So that he could walk across the threshold of the big house because once he walked across that threshold he knew he had arrived. And everybody else would know that he had arrived. He was the new rich waiting for an invitation to join the big club. And this was it. That's one reason he wanted to come.

I think almost as important as any other thing, including very cogent political reasons, in Nikita Khrushchev's wanting to come to the United States was his own burning curiosity. This guy is a man who's got a great big bump of curiosity on his head. He's the kind of a guy who always wants to stick his fingers into the machinery to see what makes it work, and to stick his nose into everything and find out how it's going on. He has listened, in his life, to so much about the United States one way and another, from one direction and another, saying one thing and another, certainly, he wanted to come to the United States, if only to be able to say to all the people who talked to him about America, "Well, you know, when I was in America Ike said to me..." and then to go on for five minutes telling his co-conversationists about America. He certainly was curious to get a glimpse, and I don't think he had any intent even when he started seeking an invitation, of making what you might call a real exploration throughout the country. It was partly a matter of just being here, partly a matter of what he could see from the car windows and the railroad trains. But he wanted to see it, and he wanted to see it in the worst possible kind of a way.

But then there are also important political reasons why Nikita wanted to come to the United States. I don't think we have to picture him as being a great altruist in order to come to the conclusion that Nikita Khrushchev, on the basis of the reports which his nuclear scientists and nuclear experts have furnished on their tests of hydrogen bombs, to assume that he has realized that peace is not an optional thing in the world anymore but a necessity. One can wonder about the leaders of China---they don't know anything about thermonuclear weapons. But Khrushchev does. He's talked about it on occasion. He must realize that there is a desperate need for peace, that war does mean mutual destruction of both warring sides, that there isn't any way that he can destroy the United States in such a fashion as to be absolutely guaranteed against a total destruction of the Soviet Union, and vice versa as far as the United States is concerned. There must have been a motive of trying to seek peace. And as I watched him going around the country, I could see him time and again, it seemed to me there was, perhaps the word "sincere" is never applicable to an experienced politician and particularly to a Communist, but it does have some meaning---I think he was trying to get across his own plea for co-existence. And I think that's one of the reasons he came.

There are real reasons as to why this might mean something to the Soviet Union itself. His whole program since Stalin died or since he came into the reins of power has been to ease tension inside the Soviet Union, to assist the gradual development of living standards alongside a cataclysmic growth in economic strength. And what stands in his way of doing more and doing faster in this direction? Obviously, expenditure on arms. Can he reduce expenditure on arms as long as the United States is fully armed? Or well armed? The answer, of course, is no. And yet there might always be the possibility of seeking and getting some kind of a disarmament agreement or some kind of rapprochement which would permit him to cut his arms expenditures? And right now is a particularly important time for this. Why? Because right now in these years there would be coming to age the young people, the men and women, and particularly

the boys, who would have been born if there had been no World War II, but who were not born because there was such a war, because their fathers were dead or at the front. And there's a gap in the Soviet manpower framework, so to speak, of perhaps as many as five million young people in the age groups that are going to come to maturity in the next few years. This age gap has already gone most of the way through high school and these would be the people who would be able to add to Russia's military and economic power, but they won't be there. Now this would be a good time to reduce the strength of the armed forces, another good reason to try to seek a rapprochement with the United States.

And then, of course, you know being a good Communist politician one must always have a couple of strings in one's bow and there's a good reason to come here. Maybe he can lull us into a kind of unawareness of exactly what he is up to and what the Soviet Communists are about. There is no harm in trying, after all. This is another good reason. But the reason, I think, perhaps more fundamental than any of these things that I have mentioned so far, except perhaps his own curiosity, is one other thing that hasn't been mentioned too much in connection with this trip. If the Soviet Union faces West, to the United States, which is a powerful nation indeed, a nation which at one time and another has been allied with the Soviet Union, which in recent years has been extremely hostile to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union also has another power to consider in the world on its eastern borders. I'm referring to Red China. There are, after all, some 700 million people in Red China. There is a long border between the Soviet Union and Red China. There is the semi-continent of Siberia, which is not empty but is sparsely settled, which belongs to the Soviet Union, in between European Russia and Red China. I think that certainly fear, and this may be in part unconscious or subconscious, fear of Red China is one of the factors behind the attempts of the Soviet Union at a rapprochement with America. In my opinion, and I should add this immediately, the Russians don't have the slightest intention of breaking up their alliance with Communist China if they can help it. But what I think they fear very much is the long range growth prospects of China, and they want to open a bridge to the West just in case. I think Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan had this very much in mind when he came here last January. I think Khrushchev had it very much in mind here last month.

Well, that's the Soviet side. In the meantime, what was on the American side to change the atmosphere in such a way as to make it possible for Nikita Khrushchev to visit America. Well, there are certainly several factors that we could mention that are of considerable importance. By no means the least of these was the fact that John Foster Dulles died early this year. Dulles had certainly, it seemed to me, stood firmly against the President's participating directly in negotiations on a summit level ever since 1955, and his view had held. With the passing of Dulles, it became possible for Eisenhower himself to inject his own personality into the international political scene. And the more he saw of the international political scene, the more he enjoyed what he saw. And he himself has a great deal of the responsibility and credit, I believe, for issuing the invitation to Nikita Khrushchev. I wouldn't say that this had entirely taken

place without political considerations. There is, after all, an election next year, and I assume that there are leaders at the top of the Republican Party who have pointed out to the President, and his immediate advisors, how interesting a role could be played in the 1960 election by a very determined effort to achieve a settlement of differences with the Soviet Union. At the same time, again, we come back to the question of the meaning of the word "sincere" so far as experienced politicians are concerned. I believe that the President was very sincere in attempting to play, or taking on himself the role of peacemaker, in taking on an assignment during his last year in office to try to arrive at some easing of those very considerable and difficult problems which divide the East and the West.

Then, so far as the United States itself is concerned, it seems to me there is a factor, I mentioned on the Soviet side of the equation. Behind much of what we do, it seems to me, is our own fear, in the long run, of Red China. And I believe that one of the reasons it was thought to be by no means unintelligent at this point to have Nikita Khrushchev in this country as our guest, was that we ourselves would not have burnt all our bridges to that other great power of the world---the Soviet Union.

This, then, it seems to me, was the immediate political and personal background. And how shall we evaluate this trip and its results? I think that there are a good many points that can be made about it. I followed the whole Khrushchev caravan for two weeks and it was, I must say, quite an experience. I should tell you before I go further, about my one exclusive interview with Nikita Khrushchev. It took place in Iowa on the field of farmer Roswell Garst. Mr. Garst had decided that when he went out onto his fields he would invite all the correspondents to accompany himself and Mr. Khrushchev. He told me about his decision earlier that morning, and I hadn't bothered to explain to him what was likely to happen, but I had some idea because I had been on the fields of Iowa before covering news stories, and I knew what could happen with 300 eager photographers and correspondents, and, sure enough, it happened. It is what has become known in Iowa history as the Donnybrook of Farmer Garst's cornfield. Photographers were piled up on top of each other. Farmer Garst himself was snapped as he picked up a root of corn to throw at the photographers to get them away so he could show Mr. Khrushchev his corn. The mounted police were seen riding down on the newspapermen, whereupon one of them yelled: "The Cossacks are coming!" Mr. Garst's one row corn chopper, and this is the correct technical term, came tearing down the row on top of about fifty enterprising newspapermen. Fortunately, it did not chop up any of them. And, in the midst of this, I had my interview with Mr. Khrushchev. I had come up from behind through the corn, and Mr. Khrushchev was at the edge of the corn patch. And there was I with my head over his shoulder, and he was looking rather amused at this spectacle of mayhem and violence spread out in front of him. I noticed a corn cob in front of him, and didn't know what else to do, so I addressed him in Russian and said, "How do you like this corn?" And sure enough he was interested in the corn. He didn't pay any attention to what was going on out in front of him, and he gave me a little lecture on corn. He explained to me that this corn in this field was planted not only too thick,

but that there was much too much stalk and not enough corn. And about that time the mayhem began to catch up with us and we had to move on, but I had scored by exclusive interview with Nikita Khrushchev. Meanwhile, I got my picture splattered all over front pages all over the country because there in the most popular news photo of the day were Ambassador Lodge, Mr. Garst, Mr. Khrushchev, and a character identified in the Baltimore Sun as an unidentified Soviet security agent.

Aside from the episode in the corn field, I think I should start out by giving a credit to some of the people in the State Department who helped out in the organization of the Khrushchev tour. And first of all to Foy Kohler, who was given an almost impossible task---namely, to organize the tour with inadequate authority, or at least with what seemed to me was very little authority. Everybody else was horning in on it, and Foy was the man who was expected to be the fall guy. Well, he wasn't the fall guy. He did a wonderful job. But the whole episode illustrates some of the problems of our own form of government, and some of the problems of dealing with the Russians.

Let's take one little aspect of this trip, for example. Premier Khrushchev was invited here by the President of the United States. No more had the invitation been announced than the Soviet Ambassador in this country, Mr. Mikhail Menshikov, sometimes known as "Smilin' Mike," grabbed the ball and started running down the field with it and nobody stopped him. As soon as it had been announced in the press that Khrushchev had been invited to this country, invitations began to pour in to Menshikov, who has many contacts in this country which he has acquired during his several years here as Ambassador, and who had certainly been thinking about the eventuality and possibility of this trip, since it was one of his chief assignments to get this invitation. So Mr. Menshikov began to accept these invitations. The State Department, Mr. Kohler, and these other people didn't know that they had been accepted until some days later Mr. Menshikov would come over and say, "Oh, well we can't do anything on that day because I," he didn't say 'I', "because Prime Minister Khrushchev has accepted an invitation to have luncheon with Mr. Eric Johnson on that day." Well, I think personally that it would have been possible with clever management and a real firm hand from the very start, and an insistence that all invitations be channeled through the White House, to have kept this under control. But it was not kept under control. The result was this: Khrushchev saw in the United States not what he, Khrushchev, wanted to see necessarily. I don't know what he wanted to see, and I don't know that anybody else does either. He didn't see what President Eisenhower wanted him to see either. He saw what Ambassador Menshikov thought it would be advantageous from his, Ambassador Menshikov's, point of view for Khrushchev to see. And naturally Ambassador Menshikov wanted to show off to Khrushchev his own contacts that he had cultivated in the United States and accepted the invitations of those groups and those people who were familiar to him. And among other things, and I presume this was on instructions from Moscow, this is a rather natural thing and one that could be expected, the tour became not a visit or a tour of the United States, but a speaking tour of extraordinary intensity and difficulty, so that there

was practically no time for Mr. Khrushchev to do anything. There was very little time for Mr. Khrushchev to do anything but make public speeches at the rate of two and three a day. Even given his fine physique and his great endurance and his unquestioned patience, in many respects this was a great strain on him.

Now another thing that happened in connection with this trip also became apparent very quickly: security considerations were allowed to override almost every other consideration from the very start. The Soviet Security General, who bears equal responsibility with any American authorities on the subject, came to the United States almost as soon as the invitation had been accepted, and immediately went into conference with American security authorities and was in on all their arrangements from the very start. Security people are the kind of people who if you ask them will such and such a thing be secure will always answer "no," because if you make them accept the responsibility there never is such a thing as perfect security anywhere for anybody. And yet this was precisely what was done, and as a result many things that could have been done, it seems to me, were wiped off the list because they were vetoed on the security level, many of them by the Soviet security authorities themselves. Instead of having worked out the schedule and then giving this to the security people and saying, "Now work out your security," or "Provide the maximum security you can," (which is all they ever provide anyway and it's not much), they were given almost a veto right on many things. This went to absurd lengths.

Now I believe in security for Premier Khrushchev. I believed in security for Deputy Premier Mikoyan when situations were permitted when he was almost hit by eggs, and could have been hit by other things as well, in Detroit and Chicago and then San Francisco. Now this sort of thing went to the other extreme. I suppose that Premier Khrushchev has gone back to the Soviet Union thinking that the United States is a militarist state in which nine-tenths of all the people are in uniform, because nine-tenths of the people he saw were in uniform, and he saw mostly their back sides. He was literally surrounded at every point by a human wall, not even mentioning the photographers and newspapermen. The security men were usually much closer to him. I remember very well on his train from Los Angeles to San Francisco, our train had a highway patrol escort. Now what does a train loaded with security officers need a highway patrol escort for? We had a helicopter escort that day. When he arrived in San Francisco there was a helicopter up there about a mile, surveying the scene, to keep order. What could that helicopter possibly have done in case of an attempt on the life of Prime Minister Khrushchev? I wonder; I still wonder. In New York, when he arrived he was taken to a baggage compartment of the Pennsylvania Railway Station, and there, in a scene resembling the most horrendous scenes from Dante's Inferno, he was greeted by the representatives of Mayor Wagner. I happened to notice that as the meeting broke up, Henry Cabot Lodge, our Ambassador to the United Nations, was escorted to his car by three uniformed patrolmen who tripped over each other on the way. There were so many policemen and security people in the picture that they literally got in their own way, and everybody else's way, and Khrushchev's way, and made themselves a first class security problem---there were simply so many of them.

Now as I say, I believe in security. I believe in providing maximum security. But in anything like this you take a chance to start with and you're not going to get rid of it by having a few more cops around. We should have accepted the risk, have provided as much security as could have been provided without interfering with other objectives of the trip. In fact this is what we came to anyway. He took a chance. He accepted the invitation. Anybody takes a chance when they go anywhere, even when they cross the street. And as it was, you know, he got stuck in an elevator, even though it had been checked the day before, in the Waldorf Astoria.

Another criticism I have of our handling of the trip---and I say this on my own authority. I don't know the inside story on this---it seems to me that in a certain sense, in the trip arrangements, American politics were allowed to enter in a way, into the choice of the individual who accompanied Khrushchev about the country. I'm referring to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Ambassador Lodge is a very able person, and has represented our country very effectively in the United Nations for several years. I don't think, however, that he was necessarily the best choice as the President's personal representative in escorting Prime Minister Khrushchev about this country. One of the reasons that I don't think that he was the best choice is that I, and this is my own personal opinion and I say it on my own authority and I have no inside information on this, particularly none from Ambassador Lodge himself, I have the feeling that he has, perhaps, some political aspirations; that maybe there might have been in the back of his mind the idea that by accompanying Khrushchev around the country, and by entering into what might have gone down in history as, had it continued very long, as "The Great Debate," he might have gotten himself a nomination for Vice-President on the Republican ticket. I know in any case, that he sought this job himself, and, of course, he was given the job. Now this point that I'm making illustrates another aspect of the trip which I didn't like as an American. It seemed to me that as we went around on this trip, which certainly was one with momentous consequences, momentous consequences for the future as well as for us today, there were many too many groups and individuals latching on to this for its publicity value in order to puff up their own little enterprises or operations. Well, let's give an example since we're going to be frank about it. I suppose that the motion picture Can Can got at least two or three million dollars worth of publicity when Nikita Khrushchev came out with the great pronouncement that it was an immoral movie. What could have been better for this motion picture? The cost to Twentieth Century Fox, I am told, of putting on, on a Saturday at overtime rates, the dry run of the scene from Can Can that they put on for Khrushchev was something on the order of \$64,000.00 including the cost of the banquet for 300 film stars and goodies for all the correspondents in another studio. I think, however, that in a sense the damage to American prestige by putting Khrushchev before this particular scene from this particular picture was probably a great deal more than the two or three million dollars it might be worth to Twentieth Century Fox in publicity for their film. I say this with reason. I have looked at the French magazines that have covered this trip and I know from what my foreign colleagues told me on the trip that this episode was something they latched on to. After all, you know, many

of our Indian colleagues and many of our British colleagues, and other European and Asian journalist, when you get right down to the bottom of it, don't really love either the Russians or the Americans. And when there is a chance, I don't say they do this with a vengeance or malice aforethought, but when there is something that makes both sides look absurd, they aren't too hesitant to grab on to it. And this little picture of Nikita Khrushchev being shown the dancing girls from Can Can and pronouncing the whole scene immoral was a beautiful little vignette to them of the coming Soviet - American world and they took advantage of it and drove this home all over the world. Here are the barbarians at work.

Another example---something which concerns people for whom I have a great deal of respect and regard and among whom I have at least one good friend---the labor leaders in San Francisco, Mr. Reuther and Mr. Carey and the rest. You'll remember that Khrushchev had angled for an invitation by George Meany, the President of the AFL-CIO. He didn't get it. Of course, Mr. Meany is against receiving any Russians anytime, anywhere. And Mr. Reuther, Mr. Carey, and some other of the Vice-Presidents and executive officers of the organization which was having its convention at the Cow Palace in San Francisco, did invite Mr. Khrushchev to a dinner, a private dinner---I say 'private' in quotation marks for there was never any dinner that was any more public---because as soon as the dinner ended out trooped all the eight A.F.L.-C.I.O. Vice-Presidents who had been present at the dinner, and Mr. Reuther came out and gave us a version of what had happened during the course of the evening, a version which was at least so complete that it had been obvious that they had, if not taken it down with stenographic notes, at least taken it down with very elaborate notes and had intended to make it public from the start. Now the most interesting thing about this version was that it differed very radically at some points, including one very crucial quotation, from a version that was given out the next day by the same group in mimeographed form. Now I recommend to your reading the Khrushchev - Reuther conversation because it was certainly one of the most interesting ones in the entire trip, one of the most interesting documents the trip turned out. But I couldn't help but feel that Mr. Reuther was, at his press conference, going a little bit out of his way and perhaps playing a little bit of havoc with this thing we call the truth in order to prove that he was just as good and stalwart an anti-Communist as Mr. Meany, who wouldn't see Mr. Khrushchev. Perhaps I could be wrong, perhaps I'm too cynical in my interpretation of the motives.

Mayor Poulson down in Los Angeles certainly knew what he was doing when he stuck his neck out in his introductory speech to Mr. Khrushchev and got it chopped off. He was certainly looking for a little publicity. What does this go back to? If you remember, when Vice-President Nixon went to Russia, and let me say that the Vice-President handled himself very well in the Soviet Union, very, very well indeed---I have a great deal of respect for the way he handled himself on his tour in that country---when he was in the kitchen of the little American house with Prime Minister Khrushchev, there developed a great discussion. This discussion became the hottest news story of the day, and Mr. Nixon certainly got wonderful publicity out of this argument with Prime Minister

Khrushchev. As a result, the impression grew up among American politicians that the way to get ahead in politics was to take on Mr. Khrushchev and have a good knock-down, drag out argument which everybody would watch on television, and prove how you could stand up to this Communist devil. And this was the sort of a psychology with which this trip started, and which led, it seems to me, at one point, to a rather sad situation.

Now there was another aspect that fitted right in with this. I don't know how to explain this and I don't know how it even actually worked out. When Khrushchev arrived in Washington, I was at the airdrome along with about 100 other newspapermen to see him come in and then we came in buses behind his cavalcade into town, and along the way there were many people waiting out to see this Communist leader, who was coming along with President Eisenhower. The crowds, as we could see, were not falling all over themselves. They weren't cheering tremendously when he went past. They were being very quiet, no great noise, no great enthusiasm, but certainly no particular coolness, at least none that I could notice. Yet the headlines blossomed out unanimously all over Washington that day, in the afternoon papers and in the New York papers, "A Chilly Reception for Khrushchev." Why? I know there had to be something written about it. I trace a certain amount of this back to the coverage by one of the radio networks of the procession. This particular network had a group of commentators out who were competent and experienced people, and they were ahead of the cavalcade as it came down, and they would report as the cavalcade went along on the mood of the crowd. They picked people who weren't particularly enthusiastic. In general, their report was along the line that this was a chilly reception. As the reception came along, there were people in the crowd itself who had their little portable radios along and they heard these broadcasts about a half a mile ahead of them. So in a sense, they already knew what their own mood was. Now mind you, this isn't brainwashing in the Communist pattern. It's not a line put out by the State Department, certainly. It wasn't anything that was really very evident. Yet this sort of a line got spread around about the trip, and I think it did a certain amount of damage for a period, particularly until things got changed.

Now another thing about this trip. Newspapermen always complain no matter what arrangements there are for them. This is a truism. I've never yet been on a trip where they weren't ready to scalp whoever were the authorities who were in charge of the trip. I've never yet been on a trip when they weren't threatening the most drastic action on the part of their editors at home unless such and such was done promptly. So it's very difficult to satisfy us journalists. But, nevertheless, on the particular trip in question, I think a good many of the complaints were quite justified. Why do I think they were justified? We were provided with access to a fair number of the events. We were provided with transportation and hotel rooms, of course, our newspapers paid for it, and so on. But this was organized for us. But on the trip, as it developed, the people who were sent along to handle the press relations, to handle the press aspect of the trip, were lower echelon people in the State Department who had themselves very little authority. Now they were very wonderful people and they worked like dogs.

And, with one exception, they went all the way out to try to help us out. But what seems to have happened is that although this man Khrushchev was a guest of the White House, the White House Press Secretary, Mr. Hagerty, instead of taking the job on himself as only he could have, or, at least, of turning it over to the Chief of the Press Section in the State Department to arrange to work out the problems of coverage of this most difficult story, it was turned on down to lower ranks. The result was almost exactly what you could expect in such a situation---the kind of chaos that occurred out in Farmer Garst's cornfield. Was the press to blame for this? I say "no," but the press was perhaps in part to blame for it because the press doesn't govern itself very well in the best of situations. But, I say that if there had been press management at the proper level, this sort of thing would not have happened or would not have been so bad, and there would have been many less problems in the press coverage of the story.

Some of these remarks that I have made, particularly on security and on the press aspect of the trip, bring up another thing, and that is that our government doesn't really have any organizational setup to handle something like this. What do we have? We have the State Department. The State Department is something that operates abroad. It doesn't have very many people in this country. Its security people represent a minimal staff, actually. The White House was in on it, but the White House doesn't have a setup to handle this sort of thing, even though this man was a White House guest. The result is that everybody is brought in on the act---the Army, helicopters from the Marines, I suppose the FBI, although they weren't obvious, the Secret Service, the security people from the State Department, the local police forces. And in security problems in, let us say, the San Francisco area, eight jurisdictions of organization involved in the security arrangements.

Well, it's very difficult to co-ordinate that many different organizations under our particular political setup. This raises the question of whether we should undertake such things unless we can provide for the proper organizational handling of them. Now in considerable measure it was the type of defects in handling the organization of the trip that I have just mentioned here that led to what I will now call "the crisis of Los Angeles." And let's go back just a bit to get the picture of how this developed. At Mr. Khrushchev's first talk in the United States at the National Press Club, the first question he was asked was one, you might say, with a real vicious curve. You perhaps remember it. You perhaps saw it. It was, in any case, the repetition of what was supposed to be a joke about his relationship to Stalin during the period of Stalin's purges and other crimes, which in essence, depicted him as a coward, which very possibly he was, and maybe this is why he was sensitive. And then he was asked to comment on this. This was the first question he was asked in the United States. His family was there. He didn't take it as a joke. It hadn't even been asked as a joke, when you get right down to it. He held himself back and, those of you who saw it may remember, he held himself in, he controlled himself, but he was really very angry. Then this session passed over and it really wasn't so very bad. Then in New York at the Economics Club there was another incident. He was asked a question. He started to give an answer which evaded the question, and there were boos and there was heckling from the crowd. He was tired. It was the end of a long day,

and he sort of blew up. He said, "Well, look here, I'm the Premier of the Soviet Union and if you don't want to listen to me, I can go." It wasn't clear whether he meant I can go home, or I can go back to my room. But at any rate they quieted down and he gave his answer. But this was another danger sign. And then the following morning of the day after that, when he left New York, he complained that he hadn't been permitted to drive through the workers' quarters in New York. I suppose he had wanted to go through some of the slums in Harlem on the way to the airport and somebody had vetoed it. In any case, he had put in a complaint. On the way out to Los Angeles he had asked to go to Disneyland. Now this is a subject that has attained great fame. Personally, I've never seen anything like this: the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union complaining that he had not been allowed to go to Disneyland. The trip had been set up for his wife and his family and at the last minute he had asked to be included in it. As far as I can make out, what happened was this: the Los Angeles police chief put his foot down. This was not in his jurisdiction. Disneyland was in the next county, Orange County, and the Los Angeles police chief said: "No, I will escort you to the county line and then I will leave you. I will leave you to the tender mercies of the Orange County sheriff." And the people who were in charge, including General Zakharov himself, were unwilling to go on to Disneyland on this basis, and they told Khrushchev that he couldn't go to Disneyland. Whether anybody ever told him, really, why he couldn't go, nobody will ever know. But it led to his famous explosion. Then later that night came the worst one of all when Major Poulson of Los Angeles had the effrontery to mention again that phrase, which apparently is one which he doesn't like to be reminded of, the "We will bury you" phrase. He'd already explained what he meant by this phrase once in Washington, and here it was being thrown at him again by somebody whom he resented because the man had greeted him at the Los Angeles Airport with a mere two sentence greeting, very brief and very curt. And he again exploded, and this time he threatened to go back to the Soviet Union, in essence, if the harassment of him didn't cease. And I saw this scene, and I believe that he was very sincere when he made this threat. This, I believe, was something that he intended to do, and had the harassment continued, I think he would have left and gone back to the Soviet Union. But the warning signal by this time finally went out, and everything went smoothly from there on.

The situation that developed there wasn't by any means all the American fault. After all, if Khrushchev did not receive the treatment of a dignity which he demanded, it was partly at least, because he didn't conduct himself in such a way as to inspire dignified treatment. If he didn't enjoy it when he got involved in banter with Spyros Skouras, it was partly because he himself interrupted Spyros Skouras and he himself engaged in banter with him. This was a man who was for the first time in an alien country, I mean in this particular country, who hadn't yet acquired a very good feel of how his audience was reacting and how he himself should react. But we can certainly say one thing about him, and that is that though he himself doesn't always invite dignified treatment, he is very sensitive to affront to his dignity. If we want to put this in terms of the American vernacular, he's a guy who can dish it out but he can't always take it.

And I think that this is one of the important conclusions, believe it or not, that comes out of this trip. We now know more about this man than we ever knew before. For instance, we know that he is a highly emotional man who can get himself carried away in a situation. We know that he is a compulsive talker. There were times when I thought he couldn't stop. And I wondered what Gromyko thought, an educated man who's sitting there watching him unable to bring his sentences to an end. He kept going on, and he kept getting deeper everytime he went further, it seemed to me. I never will forget the image of this man in Los Angeles, unable, as it seemed to me, to keep from going on. And this is the guy we have to deal with in international affairs, this is the man who has peace and war, a very large part of the decision, in his hands. So we now know a great deal more about him than we knew before.

Now I have some other points I wanted to cover, but it seems to me that it is getting pretty late and perhaps we can cover some of these things in the question period. But, in conclusion, my own observations, again I stress that this is my own personal view, on the Khrushchev trip: It seems to me that the trip begins, for better or worse, a new era of Soviet - American relations. And I think that, basically this is a good thing. Sooner or later there had to be an attempt made to settle Soviet - American differences by peaceful methods and this is it, this is the start, this is the beginning. But it's only very fair to point out that this new era in which we have entered is going to be very tricky and very dangerous for the United States, and it's going to call for the most clever and wise handling of ourselves. And as I think you can gather from my observations on this trip, it seems to me that American leaders, the American leadership, and, in a broader sense, the American people as a whole, have not yet grasped how difficult a problem the United States faces in trying to deal with the Russians without losing our shirts.

Thank you.

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR:

Question: Have you any predictions about the reception of Eisenhower in Russia, and what may be the results of his visit there?

Mr. Whitney: I think that the question of the results is really a little too much on the crystal ball side, particularly since he isn't going to go there until next June, so let me pass on that one. But my predictions on the reception of Eisenhower in Russia are these: that he will be welcomed there with a very warm and wholehearted welcome, and that there will be, it seems to me, no attempt to create a reciprocal situation in which he is heckled. This is my guess. In other words, I think that the Soviet government will do what its natural tendency would be to do anyway, and that is, since he is a guest, to treat him with the greatest of hospitality, having in mind that for those who want to think back to the reception of Khrushchev in this country, this will probably be the best way of showing up, certain aspects of the treatment of Khrushchev here in this country, as far

as international opinion is concerned. I think he will get a very good reception from the public and from the government.

Question: In 1975, do you think the U.S. will be closer to Red China or to Russia in its diplomatic relations?

Mr. Whitney: Well, I hope you don't come around in 1975 and hold me to this. My guess is that we will be closer to the Soviet Union.

Question: Something on a similar subject. Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times predicted eventual war between Russia and Red China, with the U.S. supporting Russia. Please comment.

Mr. Whitney: Well, I think I should correct that statement. I don't believe that Harrison Salisbury did predict an eventual war between Russia and Red China, as anybody thinks that he did. To point out the exact passage and the exact words, --I think I know the article to which you refer,--this article was a part of his recent series on the Soviet Union, in which he inferred hostility, or growing hostility, between the Soviet Union and Red China. I think, in my talk, I have already indicated that there is on the part of the Russians a good deal of fear of the growing power of Red China. This is combined with a great desire to keep a close alliance with them, but also, to attempt to keep bridges open to the West, just in case. I don't think the relations are very cordial or very good, but neither do I think our own particular foreign policy, is of a type which is likely to drive any wedges between the two countries.

Question: Khrushchev said after his arrival in Moscow that some people in the U.S. are making the President's task for peace very difficult. Would you elaborate, please, as to whom these people are?

Mr. Whitney: Well, I don't think we need to accept Khrushchev's word for anything. Let me try to approach this from a slightly different direction. Why is it that Khrushchev said, after his arrival in Moscow,--and before his departure from the United States for that matter,--that the President faces a somewhat more difficult task in working out a rapprochement with the Soviet Union than he, Khrushchev, does. I think that this is a very natural thing on the part of Khrushchev: to leave himself a way out, in case things don't work out, or let us say, maybe thinking even that they won't work out, that there won't be a rapprochement, that things will fall down. Then he can blame it on these people who are causing so much difficulty between the Soviet Union and the United States. Who are they, in his mind, or in the lexicon of Communist ideology? These are the monopolists of Wall Street, making more profits, unwilling to convert their factories to peace-time uses. They are the gangsters of the pen, including myself, who have a vested interest in the Cold War. They are anybody whom the Soviet Union doesn't happen to like at that particular moment. This leaves him a way out --a retreat.

Question: A different personality here. How did Mrs. Khrushchev impress you? Did you feel Mrs. Eisenhower treated her coolly, as the President indicated? (Mr. Whitney: As the Press indicated.)

Mr. Whitney: Oh, I don't know about Mrs. Eisenhower and Mrs. Khrushchev. I think Mrs. Eisenhower did everything she could and that she should have had to do, in order to make Mrs. Khrushchev's stay here more pleasant. Mrs. Eisenhower has never personally sought to build up social capital on the basis of her husband's position. Mrs. Khrushchev impressed me, as I suppose she impressed everybody, most favorably. I had a chance to talk to her several times. She's a delightful person--I mean, I'm sure she is a dedicated Communist just like her husband, but she's a person who--well, she's a typical Slavic mother, who admires her husband endlessly, and you could catch these glimpses as she would look up at him with so much admiration--her warrior on his white steed, this was her man. She was really very, very charming, indeed. And incidentally, she was his best selling point in this country, it seemed to me. So many people felt that, after all, if a woman like this can like him he can't really be so bad.

Question: Do you think that Mr. Khrushchev's visit here will make him think twice before starting anything that might lead to World War III?

Mr. Whitney: I would think that even before he came he would have thought twice. The question in my mind is whether he will think three times.

Question: How free are correspondents, especially Americans and English, to move about in Moscow and Russia, in general?

Mr. Whitney: Foreign correspondents are at the bottom of the ladder insofar as residents of the Soviet Union are concerned, in every respect, that is, the ones who live there all the time, the ones who reside there. I'm not talking about those who go in on special trips. Unfortunately, though they have at the present time much greater facilities for travel than they used to have under Stalin, they still do not have complete freedom of travel. They can make trips but they have to ask the permission of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they have to go through Document Control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs before they can move from one city to another. This handicaps their movements and, quite aside from censorship, which is another one of the burdens they bear, they do have a difficult time moving around the country. Still, it is a lot better than it used to be.

Question: A question which might be of much interest today. Do you think the invitation to Khrushchev had any connection with the British elections, insofar as our planning was concerned?

Mr. Whitney: No, I don't. I think that Ike had enough to do to think about American elections.

Question: Do you think President Eisenhower is backing down on his and our stand on West Berlin?

Mr. Whitney: No, I don't think that Eisenhower is backing down on his or our stand on West Berlin. I think what is becoming apparent as a result of the Khrushchev trip is that there is somewhat more room for negotiation on this subject than most of us had realized hitherto. Now that the results of the Khrushchev trip are known---namely, that, according to Eisenhower and Khrushchev both, the time limit has been lifted on the Soviet threat to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany, it becomes apparent that we probably will be willing to negotiate on the question of West Berlin. And let's look at this for just a second; there are, as Khrushchev has pointed out, two Germanys, as long as the Soviet wants to keep these two Germanys apart. The situation in West Berlin is to some extent a slightly anomalous situation. Soviet demands as they have boiled down over these periods of negotiations for the establishment of a free city of West Berlin, are not necessarily demands that would impair the freedom of the people of West Berlin. At least the Soviet approach to this is something that can be, I believe, discussed. I think this has become apparent, and is one of the good things that has come out of this trip.

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The Symposium Committee consists of representatives from major campus organizations, the faculty, and the administration. The entire cost of the Symposium is borne by student organizations. Beginning with the Symposium this year, the committee will sponsor an annual Symposium in a field of vital interest to the University Community. We thereby hope to provide a continual intellectual challenge as well as a forum for the interchange of ideas.

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